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Abstract 
Improving public sanitation is one of the major urban health and environmental issues that 
confronts most cities in the developing world. Sanitation-related diseases have been 
practically eradicated in the developed world but these diseases continue to threaten lives 
in the developing world. It is estimated that poor or inadequate access to sanitation kills 
some ten million children below the age of five every year. More than half of the world’s 
rivers, oceans and lakes are polluted with untreated wastewater, which contributes to 
environmental degradation as it pollutes surface water, rivers and groundwater. This holds 
true for the Philippines where cholera and diarrhoea remain endemic. In Metro Manila, the 
country’s capital region that is home to at least 12 million people, less than 15% of the 
population are connected to the sewage system, some 85% are served by improperly 
constructed and ill-maintained septic tanks and the rest of the populations still practise 
open defecation. In 1997, the Philippine government awarded long-term concession 
contracts to two private concessionaires to bring in the much-needed capital and private 
sector efficiency to upgrade and expand water and sewerage services in Metro Manila. 
Some 20 years after the concession contracts were awarded, the two private 
concessionaires have achieved or nearly met their target of providing 100% water supply 
connections in the capital. Sewerage services, on the other hand, are at less than 15% of 
the population.   
Why has public-private partnership (PPP) failed to fix the sewerage problems in Metro 
Manila? To answer this question, this research analyses the performance of Metro Manila 
sewerage services through the lens of the network governance theory. This thesis suggests 
that the concessionaires were not able to timely deliver the intended outcomes because of 
the network effect of PPP. The network effect of PPP refers to outcomes that are caused by 
the emergence of network features created as a result of bringing in the private sector in 
the governance of public services. PPP has exhibited certain network features that altered 
the rules of infrastructure service delivery and allocated new roles among the state, the 
market and civil society. The network features created by PPP are (1) resource 
interdependence between the stakeholders both in the private and public sectors, (2) 
challenge of achieving goal congruence in a multi-stakeholder setting and (3) unclear 
management roles.  
Data collection for this research in the form of documentation, interviews and direct 
observation, was conducted in Metro Manila, Philippines. Interviews were the key source of 
information for this thesis to elicit information on the respondents’ interorganisational 
 viii 
relationships and dynamics and how such interactions impact on the service delivery 
outcomes as documentary information mainly provided information on the legal, political 
and performance aspects of the Metro Manila water and sewerage concessions 
This research contributes to both research and practice. This research contributes to the 
literature on network governance, PPP and policy implementation. By using the network 
perspective to analysing PPP performance, this research augments the current literature on 
understanding PPP outcomes by filling out the administrative analysis gap that has not 
been explored in the literature. Second, it also offers a new perspective on evaluating and 
understanding PPP outcomes by developing an analytical framework that examines 
networks, not just a single organisation, as the unit of analysis to analyse the performance 
of sewerage services. Third, it aims to contribute to the growth of a more specialised and 
differentiated study in the field of network governance theory. For policymakers and 
practitioners, this research promotes the understanding that policies are implemented by 
multiple institutional actors, which can make policy implementation a complex process. An 
acceptance of the perspective that policy implementation is interorganisational in nature 
contributes to effective and responsive policy design. This can guide governments in 
considering the potential network features that may arise when adopting a new policy, such 
as PPP, that can hinder the achievement of the desired goals or effects.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 The need to improve access to sewerage services 
The subject of shit has always been talked about in euphemism. As early as 1842, Edwin 
Chadwick made the causal link between lack of sanitation and infectious diseases and 
campaigned for sanitary reform through for engineering-based water and sewage system 
(Mara et al. 2010; Black & Fawcett 2008). Not until it literally stank during the ‘Great Stink’ 
of 1858 in Great Britain that sanitation and sewage were elevated as a legitimate public 
policy agenda and addressed in a systematic, massive and concerted manner (Black & 
Fawcett 2008, pp.15–16). This prompted the 19th century sanitary revolution, which was 
the precursor to the modern time sewerage system. Following Britain’s success, the idea 
spread soon after throughout Europe and the US and eventually brought by the European 
powers to their colonial administrations in Asia, Africa and the Americas, primarily to keep 
the imperial troops and administrators alive (Curtin 1989; Curtin 1998). Today, most 
homes in high-income countries have access to toilets that are connected to a sewerage 
network sewage that conveys wastewater for treatment to before it is discharged in the 
environment.  
After the 19th century sanitary revolution, sewerage and sanitation suffered decades of 
neglect in middle and low income countries. Access to improved sanitation is not catching 
up with continued population growth, especially in urban areas where around one billion 
people live in urban slums with poor or no sanitation (Gambrill 2016). In 2015, 2.4 billion 
people still lack access to improved sanitation (UNICEF and World Health Organization 
2015, p.5). The indiscriminate disposal of untreated sewage to the environment increases 
the risk of sanitation-related diseases, such as diarrhoea and cholera, that continue to take 
millions of lives in the developing world (Lopez et al. 2015; Black & Fawcett 2008). Every 
year, some ten million children below the age of five are killed by sanitation-related 
diseases (Cumming 2008, p.3). More than half of the world’s rivers, oceans and lakes in 
the world are polluted with untreated sewage, which contains pathogens that contribute to 
environmental degradation and causes diseases through direct contact or exposure to 
contaminated drinking water, fish and shellfish-growing waters or irrigated crops (Baum et 
al. 2013, p.1994). This increases the likelihood of epidemics of catastrophic proportions 
(Saier 2008; Mara et al. 2010).  
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This holds true for the Philippines where sanitation-related diseases remain endemic 
(Lopez et al. 2015, p.2). From 2008 to 2103, there were 42,071 suspected and confirmed 
cholera cases reported in 87% of provinces and metropolitan areas in the country (Lopez et 
al. 2015, p.2). Around 3% of the urban population still practise open defecation and less 
than 4% of the urban wastewater is collected and treated in the Philippines. Sewerage 
systems are mainly concentrated in urban areas such as Metro Manila, Baguio, Iloilo and 
Subic and a few select tourist resort areas (World Bank 2013, p.2). The sewerage system 
established in the capital of Manila in 1909, which was only intended to serve a population 
of 440,000 (Caoili 1999, p.76), predated all other sewerage systems in Asia (Doeppers 
2009; Torres 2010; Mactal 2009). By the 1990s, less than 10% of the 7.3 million 
inhabitants of Metro Manila were connected to the sewerage network (Hartman & Werhane 
2009; Kearton et al. 2013). Around 85% of the population were served by over two million 
ill-maintained septic tanks that are connected directly to public drainage or by pit latrines 
(World Bank 2012, p.2). Untreated wastewater ends up in storm drains or open waterways 
into the Pasig River, which flows between Laguna de Bay (the largest freshwater lake in 
Asia) and Manila Bay (Kearton et al. 2013; Tetra Tech & Berkman 2013).  
Cash-strapped and mired in debt, the state-owned Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage 
Services (MWSS) could not afford to upgrade and expand sewerage services in Metro 
Manila. In 1997, the Philippine government privatised MWSS through a long term 
concession agreement (CA) to bring in the much-needed capital and private sector 
efficiency that was expected to improve water and sewerage services in the capital. The 
Metro Manila water and sewerage concessions were financed under the Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP) loan agreement signed by the Philippine government with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Bello 2004, p.12). Public-private partnership (PPP) was 
one of the fiscal austerity and market liberalisation measures imposed by the IMF and the 
World Bank on developing countries to ensure that the borrowing countries did the right 
thing with the billions of dollars they borrowed (Stiglitz 2002). PPP was ‘heralded as an 
elixir that would rejuvenate lethargic industries’ and resuscitate ailing economies in the 
developing world (Prasad 2006, p.673). By the end of the year 2000, some 93 countries 
had partially privatised water or wastewater services or were in the process of doing so 
(Brubaker 2003, p.1). After the international exuberance on PPP waned, the World Bank 
reported that by 2002, some 75% of water concession contracts in Latin America, 
Caribbean and Asia were either renegotiated or cancelled. A large number of these 
concession contracts were in Asia and were renegotiated or cancelled during the Asian 
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financial crisis due to disputes over water tariff increases (Hall et al. 2005; Kwak et al. 
2009; Gómez-Ibáñez et al. 2004). 
Notwithstanding the controversies that shrouded PPP, water supplies managed to see 
improvements due to strong demand and political enthusiasm (Black & Fawcett 2008, p.7). 
Water has received more attention in terms of research, policy development, programmatic 
support and resource allocation. Sewerage and sanitation services, on the other hand, have 
been lumped under the topic of ‘water and sanitation’ but have rarely been given much 
attention on their own and any mention of sanitation is ‘purely cosmetic’ (Black & Fawcett 
2008, p.67). Sanitation and sewerage services have been politically neglected and 
therefore received far less resources (Black & Fawcett 2008, p.8). It is estimated that 
funding for water in the 1990s was four times higher at US$12.6 billion annually compared 
to sanitation, which received US$3.1 billion (Hutton et al. 2008, p.18). In Asia, the factor 
difference between spending on water and spending on sanitation in the same period was 
5.5 times. In 2008, a joint USAID and World Bank study on the Economic Impacts of 
Sanitation in the Philippines reported that, since 1970, public expenditure for urban 
sanitation in the Philippines accounts for a mere 1.5% of that disbursed on urban water 
supply (Rodriguez et al. 2008, p.1).  
Lack of funding is not the only challenge impeding sanitation and sewerage development. 
Planning and implementation for sewerage infrastructure takes time even with the 
availability of scientific evidence and vast engineering possibilities in modern times. Urban 
centres are faced with a myriad of convoluted problems, which can be any one or a 
combination, of natural, technological, biological and social nature. Implementing sewerage 
projects are complex due to higher population densities, less-coherent community structure 
and absence of opportunities for open defecation (Saier 2008, p.3).  
Sanitation is still seen as a purely private matter and not an inherently attractive and 
photogenic subject; thus discussion thereof is viewed as taboo (Black & Fawcett 2008). 
Even in the academic literature, the subject of shit is rarely talked about. One book that 
explored the dirty world of sanitation in great detail is Black and Fawcett’s (2008) The Last 
Taboo. This seminal work argued resolutely for the unlinking of sanitation and sewerage 
from water supplies to give the former their rightful place and airtime in public policy 
conversations. For the longest time, sanitation specialists have failed to persuade 
politicians, the media and other influential people on the importance and urgency of 
sanitation and sewerage services. It was not until 2008, which was declared by the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly as the International Year of Sanitation, that this important 
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but neglected sector was finally given attention by international organisations and national 
governments (Black & Fawcett 2008, p.4). 
The focus of this research on sewerage services in Metro Manila, Philippines is timely and 
highly needed. Poor sanitation is not only a burden to the individual but a deadweight for 
governments as well. A government’s inaction to improve the sanitation sector costs that 
country more than the amount of investment needed for sanitation infrastructure. 
According to the World Bank, Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam collectively 
lose US$9 billion a year because of poor sanitation (based on 2005 prices) or at least 2% 
of their combined gross domestic product (Hutton et al. 2008, p.1). Health costs resulting 
from diseases and deaths from sanitation-related diseases are estimated at US$4.8 billion, 
the majority of which money is allocated on health care and medicines to combat easily 
preventable, sanitation-related diseases. In the Philippines alone, the country’s overall 
economic losses due to poor sanitation amounts to about US$1.4 billion or PhP 77.8 billion 
per year (Rodriguez et al. 2008, p.1). On the other hand, the cost of implementing 
ecological sanitation approaches is estimated at US$270 million on an annual basis 
(Hutton et al. 2008, p.1).  
The issue of funding to construct, upgrade and maintain water supply and sewerage 
infrastructure in Metro Manila, Philippines was supposed to have been addressed by the CA 
with the two private companies, Maynilad Water Services, Inc. and Manila Water Company, 
Inc. Water and sewerage services in Metro Manila were privatised in 1997 and, to date, the 
two concessionaires have reported water supply coverage to nearly 100% of the population. 
However, the same cannot be said for sewerage services. As of December 2011, it was 
reported that Manila Water’s service coverage was at 13% of the population with a 
treatment capacity of 128 mld while Maynilad Water was at 6% of service area population 
with a treatment capacity of 468 mld (Kearton et al. 2013, p.37). During the same period, it 
was expected that sewerage coverage would have been at 21% and 13%, respectively 
(Tetra Tech & Berkman 2013). The concessionaires have proven to be technically 
competent and financially healthy enough to expand the water supply aspect but why are 
they behind their sewerage targets? This thesis is motivated by this puzzle. 
1.2 Problem statement and central argument 
The main question that this research aims to answer is: Why has PPP failed to deliver the 
expected outcomes in infrastructure services? This research attempts to answer the central 
question by exploring the links between the network features of PPP and the effects of 
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these features on the performance of the privatised infrastructure services. To answer the 
main question, the following sub-questions are raised. First, what are the network features 
created by PPP? Second, what are the effects of these network features on PPP outcomes?  
This thesis suggests that the concessionaires were not able to timely deliver on the 
outcomes because of the network effect of PPP. The network effect of PPP refers to 
outcomes that are caused by the emergence of network features created by PPP. The core 
argument of this thesis is that PPP created distinct network features that potentially 
prevent it from functioning as a competitive supplier in the market. As a result, the desired 
outcomes associated with PPP as suggested in the market competition theories cannot be 
achieved or can only be partially achieved. This is the network effect of PPP and this thesis 
explains the causes of the network effect of PPP.  
The failed cases of PPP have been well-documented but it is unclear why they failed (Araral 
2009, p.226). A number of reasons have been offered in studies that analysed PPP in 
many countries, which can be categorised based on the economic and societal effects. The 
economic effects of PPP analysed the impact of ownership on performance by drawing the 
relationship between economic performance and ownership as the dependent variable, 
and outputs, inputs and controls as independent variables. Studies on the societal effects 
of PPP examined the importance of the social and institutional contexts that can provide a 
susceptible environment for private sector participation in public services to flourish. These 
factors are competition and regulatory capability, institutional capacity and public sector 
governance capacity. These studies focused on a single organisation, i.e., either the private 
sector or the government, as the unit of analysis.  
Current public management theory is lacking in the practice of managing governments 
comprised of relational networks (Goldsmith & Eggers 2004, pp.21-22). Existing studies on 
the performance of PPP in developing countries, including the Metro Manila Water 
concessions, have analysed the outcomes from a principal-agent and organisation-set 
perspective and mainly examined the water aspect and not the sewerage services. The 
focus on contributions of individual organisations has deflected attention on the impact 
interorganisational collaboration in public management (O’Flynn et al. 2013, p.17).  Using 
the network governance theory, this research aims to examine the effects of PPP on the 
governance structure of public infrastructure services that the literature on PPP outcomes 
neglected to consider, i.e., (1) government no longer has the monopoly of decision-making; 
(2) contractual relationships are created between the government and the private sector 
provider but not in the tradition of principal-agent where one party is assumed subordinate 
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to another; (3) market sector actors are a part of the accountability network, and (4) 
accountability is a complex web of relationship between individuals and 
institutions (Osborne, 2010 p.5).   
PPP brought the private sector into the fold of governance of infrastructure services but 
there is dearth of empirical research on how the change in network structure in these 
services impact on the intended policy outcomes. There is a vast literature on PPP in 
infrastructure services but its network effects on the outcomes have largely been 
overlooked. This research posits that PPP failed to yield the expected outcomes due to the 
network effect of PPP. The policy objectives of PPP were not achieved because its 
proponents assumed that the superiority of the private market alone is enough to improve 
public infrastructure services. In reality, PPP created complex and numerous relationships 
within a network of public and private actors who need to work together to deliver vital 
public infrastructure services. While PPP has made the private sector the direct provider of 
public services, the private sector still has to work with a number of private and public 
organisations in the performance of its service delivery functions. There is a pressing need 
for a more comprehensive and integrated approach to the study and practice of 
privatisation.   
This research departs from the prevailing approaches of understanding PPP outcomes by 
examining the new network features created by PPP and what the effects of these features 
are on the intended policy outcomes. This thesis does not discount the other causes 
explaining the shortcomings of PPP put forward in the literature. Instead, this thesis seeks 
to augment the underexplored administrative analysis of PPP by examining its network 
effect. This research offers an alternative analytical framework to understand the 
complexity of the network governance structure in PPP.  
PPP has been variably defined, ranging from the complete transfer of enterprise ownership 
or productive assets from the public to the private sector (Jomo 2008) to any cases where 
private enterprises are enlisted to perform activities previously under the realm of the 
government (Jomo 2008; Parker & Kirkpatrick 2005; Gleick & Cain 2004). These different 
definitions are embodied in the range of options available to governments in enlisting the 
participation of the private sector in infrastructure provision. These arrangements vary from 
the least private sector commitment, such as supply and service contracts, to divestiture 
that involves complete transfer of ownership assets to the private sector (Guislain & Kerf 
1995, p.1). Somewhere in the middle are concession-type arrangements where a public 
entity grants the private company the right and the obligation to provide an infrastructure 
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service, whether gas, power, water, transport, sanitation or telecommunications. The terms 
and conditions of this arrangement is specified in a contract or license (Guislain & Kerf 
1995, p.1).  
As will be discussed in Chapter 2, the supporting theories of PPP provide that this strategy 
will flourish under competitive conditions but will face a challenging environment when 
applied to naturally monopolistic services. In the range of PPP options, concession 
contracts are deemed most suitable for services that are naturally monopolistic, such as 
water and sewerage services (Kerf et al. 1998; Guislain & Kerf 1995). Most of the PPP 
contracts on water and sewerage services in the developing world are concession 
arrangements. When discussing the Metro Manila case, PPP and concessions shall be used 
interchangeably. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis  
Examining the network features and its effects on the privatised sewerage services in 
Metro Manila, Philippines is explained in this thesis in eight chapters. Chapter 2 surveys the 
literature analysing the effects of PPP. This chapter reviews the theory and application of 
PPP and explains why the network perspective is appropriate in understanding the 
performance of PPP. PPP transformed the network governance structure of infrastructure 
services because it dispersed the responsibility over a public service to public and private 
actors (Vincent-Jones 2000, p.319). It is more appropriate and comprehensive to examine 
network-level activities and structure when several actors work together to deliver a vital 
public service rather than the individual actions of organisations. This chapter also explains 
how PPP created new network features and how these can create negative network effects.  
Chapter 3 presents an analytical framework to analyse multi-causal and multi-level 
relational networks and how these impact on the outcomes of privatised infrastructure 
services. This research refers to the literature on network governance theory in developing 
the analytical framework to evaluate the impact of interorganisational relationships on the 
performance of PPP networks. This study applies the analytical framework to the case of 
the privatised sewerage services in Metro Manila (hereinafter referred to as ‘Metro Manila 
concessions’). Network outcomes are shaped by numerous important decisions that occur 
in different arenas. This study focuses on three arenas in the Metro Manila sewerage 
services network where vital decisions and negotiations on sewerage services take place: 
(1) tariff setting, (2) construction of sewage treatment plants (STPs) and (3) interagency 
monitoring. Each arena will be examined in detail in separate chapters. This chapter also 
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describes the data collection and analysis procedures adopted to study the Metro Manila 
sewerage network, as well as the ethical concerns and challenges encountered in pursuing 
this research.  
Chapter 4 presents a historical overview of the sewerage services in Metro Manila by 
identifying crucial government policies and developments relating to the sewerage sector 
since the emergence of the first sewerage system and how these have shaped the 
governing structure of the sewerage sector in Metro Manila over time. The purpose of the 
historical review is to draw out crucial decisions and events over the years that helped 
shaped the current institutional design of the sector. Public services are governed under 
governance structures and changes in policies alter the landscape of these structures. The 
historical review revealed that PPP is the most crucial and most recent policy implemented 
on sewerage services that effected considerable change in its governance structure that 
may have influenced the outcomes. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine the three major areas of decision making that impact the 
most on the outcomes in the Metro Manila concessions: (1) tariff setting arena, (2) STP 
construction arena and (3) interagency monitoring arena, respectively. These three 
chapters are structured in a similar way. First, I discuss the problems that the 
concessionaires encounter in the decision making arena. Second, I examine the issues 
created by the network features of PPP in the arena. Third, I analyse the network effects of 
the network features in the arena.  
Finally, Chapter 8 presents a comparison of the outcomes from the three decision making 
arenas. In this chapter, I highlight the three main findings that emerged from examining the 
Metro Manila sewerage services from a network perspective. First, I discuss that vital 
decisions in privatised infrastructure services are made by public and private actors in 
different arenas. Second, I argue that PPP created new network features and that, third, 
these network features created negative network effects that hindered the accomplishment 
of intended outcomes. This chapter also discusses the contribution of my research to the 
literature on network governance, PPP and policy implementation, and the practical lessons 
for policy makers and advocates. I also identify the methodological and research 
observations arising from this research. Finally, I offer suggestions for future research. 
1.4 Summary of findings 
With the Metro Manila sewerage sector as the case study, this research finds that PPP has 
transformed the network governance structure of infrastructure services by bringing 
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together public and private actors in different arenas who have to work together to deliver a 
public service. Using the network perspective in analysing PPP outcomes provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of PPP. This bridges the administrative analysis gap in the 
PPP literature.  
The Metro Manila sewerage network is complex because of its sheer size: it is comprised of 
several sub-networks, arenas, actors and resource interdependencies. While the 
responsibility of providing sewerage services in Metro Manila has been transferred to the 
private sector, the concessionaires are dependent on a number of actors in implementing 
sewerage projects. Most if not all aspect of the concessionaires’ vital operations are 
dependent on accessing resources that are under the control of other actors, and these 
resources exist within sub-networks and arenas comprised of numerous actors and 
governed by different rules. Implementation of sewerage projects impacts on a number 
policy sectors, such as health, environment, urban development, economics and utilities 
regulation. It traverses temporal dimensions as the concessionaires’ contract is for 40 
years. It crosses vertical and horizontal administrative jurisdictions as the concessionaires 
have to coordinate with a gamut of national, sub-national, private and non-government 
entities.  
This research concludes that PPP failed to deliver the expected outcomes in the Metro 
Manila sewerage services network because the network features created by PPP created 
negative network effects. PPP changed the governance landscape of public infrastructure 
services. As a result, management of privatised infrastructure services is not just about 
service provision but equally important is managing the interorganisational relationships in 
PPP networks.  
This conclusion was established by examining the different arenas where important 
decisions about sewerage service delivery take place. The different arenas reveal the 
numerous challenges encountered by the concessionaires at different stages of 
implementing sewerage projects due to the many actors they have to work with and the 
copious rules and procedures they have to comply with. PPP has dispersed accountability to 
a number of actors and, when the areas of accountability are not clear among the actors, 
this can hinder effective service delivery. PPP has also vested the government with multiple 
roles of policy maker, regulator, commercial signatory to the contract and contract manager 
from its former role as the sole public service provider. These multiple roles can conflict and 
compete and, when the government prioritises one over the other, this can create relational 
issues with the concessionaires, other government agencies and/or the consumers. The 
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effectiveness of a policy, such as PPP, is not only shaped by the strategies and action plans 
formulated to carry out the policy but also by the relationships among the actors tasked to 
collectively implement the policy. 
This research does not offer generalisations on the outcomes or performance of the Metro 
Manila concessions against other PPP in infrastructure services in other cities or countries. 
I am mainly interested in understanding the performance of PPP on sewerage services in 
Metro Manila, guided by the broader literature on PPP, sewerage and network governance. 
However, the analytical framework to analyse the network effects of PPP in the Metro 
Manila concessions developed in this research can be used to examine other privatised 
public infrastructure services in the Philippines and other developing countries to test its 
robustness. The MWSS is only one of the many government enterprises privatised by the 
Philippine government. One privatised utility that may benefit from the analytical framework 
is the power sector. Like water and sewerage, the electricity sector also failed to meet the 
expectations of PPP (Roxas & Santiago 2010) and it would be worth looking into if and how 
much the network effect of PPP contributed to this outcome. In that regard, this thesis aims 
to contribute to understanding interorganisational collaboration in PPP networks and in the 
broader topic of policy implementation.  
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Chapter 2 
Networks, network effects and the performance  
of PPP in public infrastructure services 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops a theoretical framework to understand the performance of PPP policy 
in infrastructure services, such as water and sewerage services, which was prevalent in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. Governments have been plagued with the problem of 
effectively converting policy recommendations into action as there is often a disparity 
between the intended effects and actual outcomes. PPP was one of those policy reforms 
where governments found themselves with outcomes that did not yield or fell short of the 
results that the champions of PPP expected.  
The promotion of PPP policy focused on its effects of achieving the intended economic and 
social objectives. In explaining the outcomes, scholars often examined the performance of 
a single actor, either the private actor as the provider of the service or the government as 
enforcer of the policy and regulator. PPP created new rules and allocated new roles among 
the state, the market and civil society (Prasad 2006, p.672) and yet this new governance 
structure has not been explored in the PPP literature. With PPP, the private and public 
sector have to work interdependently, not independently of each other. This thesis argues 
that the expected outcomes were not achieved because PPP created new network features, 
which can be barriers to service delivery. 
To understand how PPP created new network features, this chapter reviews the literature 
on PPP and network governance. The second section presents the arguments for PPP and 
the supporting theoretical foundations. The third section discusses the importance of 
considering industry characteristics and context when implementing PPP in natural 
monopoly services. Given the mismatch between the supporting theories of PPP with the 
economic characteristics of natural monopoly infrastructure services, such as water and 
sewerage services, the fourth section suggests that PPP results in a relational network 
governance structure rather than a free market structure. As such, it is proposed that the 
network governance theory captures the interactions and interdependency of organisations 
in PPP. To support this argument, a review of the network governance literature is 
undertaken to draw a link between PPP and the emergence of a new governing network, 
which makes it impossible for organisations to function like free market players.  
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2.2 Arguments for public-private partnership  
There is a range of options in enlisting the participation of the private sector in 
infrastructure provision, which varies from the least private sector commitment, such as 
supply and service contracts, to divestiture that involves transfer to the private sector of the 
ownership of existing assets (Guislain & Kerf 1995, p.1). Bringing in the private sector to 
operate services traditionally performed by the government was a strategy championed and 
implemented in the West in the late 1970s to enhance efficiency of the services concerned 
(Jomo 2008; Bortolotti & Millella 2008; Roland 2008).The logic is that, under a private 
provider, public services will be more economically viable as it faces competition from other 
private providers in the market. Expectations on PPP have its supporting theoretical 
foundation from public choice, property rights and principal-agent theories, which support 
the notion that private ownership reduces the cost of public service delivery.  
Public choice theory emphasises the importance of competition in achieving cost savings 
under private ownership while property rights theory focuses on ownership and service 
quality (Bel & Warner 2008, p.1342). For a competitive market to flourish, the market 
should have (1) many buyers and sellers, (2) symmetric information on the price of the 
products, (3) sellers that sell similar products, (4) no transaction costs and (5) no barriers 
to enter and exit the market. Under these conditions, it is expected that the market will be 
Pareto efficient. This assumption works provided that there are no externalities in 
production or consumption, the product is not a public good and the market is not 
monopolistic in structure (Megginson & Netter 2001, p.321). In the absence of competition, 
property rights theory predicts excess profits or corruption in private production and 
overemployment and patronage in public production (Bel & Warner 2008:1342). If the 
market fails, the government is justified to intervene and resolve market failure or improve 
efficiency (Megginson & Netter 2001, p.321). 
According to the principal-agent theory, the poor performance of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) emanate from the difficulty of the government to monitor the performance of these 
enterprises because (1) there is no individual owner with strong incentives to monitor the 
managers of SOEs and (2) there is no public share price to inform the actions of public 
managers (Gupta 2008, p.172,188). The agency problem will be addressed when 
management control is transferred to the private sector as it is assumed that it is 
incentivised to operate the enterprise efficiently to reduce costs and maximise profits 
(Bortolotti & Millella 2008, p.69). By delegating public infrastructure services to the private 
sector through competitive tender, it is assumed that any government can fulfil its 
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efficiency and equity goals (Cavaliere & Scabrosetti 2006, p.4). In a competitive market, 
private firms have incentives to achieve both productive and allocative efficiency by 
reducing excess supply or reduce inefficiencies in public service delivery to earn profits. 
Their market longevity depends on their profitability (Bel & Warner 2008, p.1342). The 
private operator is expected to maximise profits by reducing costs through improvements in 
efficiency, leading to improved service delivery and lower costs for all consumers. With 
lower costs and higher profits, the private owner/operator will invest to further improve and 
expand services (Tan 2011, p.50).  
In middle and low income economies, however, the motivation to privatise was pragmatic 
albeit more ambitious. Due to poor performance of SOEs that only exacerbated their 
worsening fiscal conditions, developing countries succumbed to donor pressure to involve 
the private sector in the provision and financing of public infrastructure services (Araral 
2008, p.528). By the late 1980s, PPP in infrastructure services, particularly water and 
sanitation utilities, reached the developing world with higher expectations riding on its 
coattails, i.e., to stimulate economic growth, alleviate poverty and ease the macroeconomic 
burden brought about by inefficient public enterprises (Parker & Kirkpatrick 2005; Parker & 
Kirkpatrick 2007; P. Cook & Kirkpatrick 1995; Ramamurti 1992). Government agencies or 
public enterprises were viewed as a major contributor for fiscal imbalances that crowded 
out the available funds for social services and private sector borrowing, which undermined 
the development of the private sector (Paul Cook & Kirkpatrick 1995, p.15). The IMF and 
World Bank assisted these countries out of their fiscal problems through loans on the 
condition that structural reforms, such as fiscal austerity and market liberalisation 
measures, will be implemented (Stiglitz 2002). 
The failure of governments in the developing world to improve and expand water supply and 
wastewater services motivated governments to resort to the private sector to infuse the 
much-needed investment capital, technical expertise, innovation and efficiency into the 
sector (Malaluan & Wu 2008; Brubaker 2003; Brubaker 2001). From 1990 to 2001, there 
were some 202 projects amounting to US$39.7 billion in investments by the private sector 
in water and sewerage services in developing countries (Harris et al. 2003, p.4). However, 
enthusiasm over PPP in water and sewerage services was soon dampened when, a few 
years into its implementation, higher water tariffs imposed by private operators were met by 
intense opposition by the public. By 2003, the World Bank reported that 3.5% of water and 
sewerage concessions valued at US$11.3 in developing countries were cancelled (Harris et 
al. 2003, p.4). 
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Following the controversies that shrouded PPP, academic literature analysing its 
performance flourished during the first decade of the 21st century, which analysed its 
effects on the government’s economic and social objectives. Research on the economic 
effects generally indicates that PPP had positive impacts, especially from the 
microeconomic perspective (Kikeri & Kolo, 2005; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Parker & 
Kirkpatrick, 2005; Cook & Uchida, 2003; Shirley & Walsh, 2001). Cook & Uchida (2003), 
however, concluded otherwise and suggested that while there is a robust partial correlation 
between PPP and economic growth, it has contributed negatively to economic growth. They 
observed that measuring the impact of PPP on macroeconomic growth is more complicated 
because economic performance is influenced by a number of factors exogenous to the firm. 
PPP can have a positive impact on economic growth if it is accompanied by effective 
competition and regulation (Cook & Uchida 2003, p.123).  
On the other hand, research on the societal effects of PPP indicates that this policy has 
resulted to some ‘improvements in productivity and profit but the process is much more 
complex and the benefits are not automatic’ (Parker & Kirkpatrick 2005, p.517). These 
studies are mainly comprised of case studies that use both qualitative and quantitative 
methods and provide descriptive data and responses that are not specifically tackled by 
econometric analysis. A key contribution of this perspective is the importance of the social, 
institutional and local context on the outcomes of PPP, which cannot be measured by 
econometric models. There is evidence that a number of PPP cases failed in the developing 
world because the proponents lacked understanding of the local context and readiness to 
implement this policy (Prasad 2006, p.683-684). PPP was deemed to have been 
undertaken abruptly with ‘little prior analysis of market conditions, leading to the 
importation of inappropriate models and without ample deliberation on the sustainability of 
reforms’ (Desai & Imrie 1998, p.638). Specifically, these flaws include poor 
contract design, corruption, donor pressure to privatise, failure of private operators to 
comply with the contract, abrupt currency fluctuations and controversy over drastic price 
increases (van de Walle 1989; Kikeri & Kolo 2005; Prasad 2006; Haarmeyer & Mody 
1998). Most of the case studies suggest that tariffs increased under the privatised regime 
and higher tariffs increased inequality, considering the low-income elasticities that apply to 
water (Prasad 2006, p.675). 
2.3 Significance of industry characteristics and context in implementing PPP 
This thesis attempts to answer the main question as to why PPP failed to deliver the 
expected outcomes in infrastructure services. This section discusses the inherent economic 
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characteristics of water and sewerage services and the prevailing conditions in the 
developing world where most cases of PPP in water and sewerage services took place. This 
section explains that there seems to be a mismatch between these characteristics and the 
supporting theories of privatisation. These theories justified the objectives that 
policymakers aimed to achieve in adopting PPP as a policy reform strategy (Kay & 
Thompson 1986, p.19). According to these theories, PPP will flourish under competitive 
conditions. However, these theories face a challenging environment when applied under 
the monopolistic conditions that characterise public infrastructure services, such as water 
and sewerage services (Kettl 2010, p.244). Another issue confronting the application of 
these theories is the fact that developing countries, were most cases of water and 
sewerage PPP take place, lack liquid capital markets and strong legal systems that can 
protect property rights and allow PPP in infrastructure services to flourish (Parker & 
Kirkpatrick 2007, p.528). 
2.3.1 Natural monopoly characteristics of water and sewerage services 
The principal-agent theory justifies the delegation of infrastructure services to the private 
sector but in reality, it cannot guarantee improved services as goal incongruence and 
information asymmetry can create problems between the principal and agent (Brown & 
Potoski 2003, p.277). According to the public choice and property rights theories, PPP 
works well when there are no externalities and no public goods, the market is not 
monopolistic and there is no asymmetry of information (Megginson & Netter 2001, p.329). 
Competition can be challenging to achieve for water supply and wastewater in view of its 
inherent characteristics, as follows. 
2.3.1.1 Limited number of suppliers 
Water and sewerage services have been traditionally performed by the government and as 
such, the available suppliers are limited (Barnekov & Raffel 1990, p.148). The high capital 
needed in this service also inhibits competition as market fragmentation limits the 
economies of scale (Pérard 2009, p.197). Constructing infrastructure for water and 
wastewater services is generally capital intensive and has high sunk cost making it difficult 
to introduce competition in the sector (Prasad 2006, p.672). Thus, there can only be one 
water and wastewater services provider in a defined geographical supply area.  
Competition can only be imposed during the procurement stage and managers cannot rely 
on a continuing process of competition in the market to secure cost savings (Bel & Warner 
2008, p.1338). The competitive bidding is for the right to operate a monopoly service  
(Shirley & Walsh 2000, p.13). Once the contract is awarded, the service is a monopoly as 
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there are no other suppliers in the market competing with the winning bidder to provide 
water and sewerage services. This undermines the argument for cost savings under the 
public choice theory (Bel & Warner 2008, p.1342). The long-term nature of water 
concession contracts also creates monopoly with a single supplier in the market (Brown & 
Potoski 2003, p.277). 
2.3.1.2 High barrier to entry and exit 
Due to the high capital and operating costs required to operate the service, there is a high 
barrier to entry into and exit from the water and sewerage services sector, thus restricting 
competition in the sector. There is a high barrier to entry because the interested private 
provider would have to go through the rigors of a public bidding and contract negotiation 
process with the government (Price 2007; Hodge & Greve 2007). The public sector’s main 
interest is public service while the private firm is motivated by profit, i.e., ‘Money is the end 
of private business while money is a means in the public sector to achieve social outcome’ 
(Moore 2000 as cited in Greve & Hodge 2010, p.158). Because of this goal incongruence, 
the government has to ensure that the bidding process is fair, above-board, rigid and 
thorough to ensure that only qualified suppliers participate in the process. The terms of the 
contract are clear and specific to protect the public interest (Gómez-Ibáñez et al. 2004, 
p.9).  
Water and sewerage infrastructure have long, useful lives and the long term-duration of 
water concession contracts creates a barrier for firms to exit the sector. Water concession 
contracts usually span from 20 to 40 years due to high sunk costs in fixed infrastructure 
(Bel & Warner 2008; Prasad 2006). A long-term contract allows for affordable pricing for 
consumers while providing for stable and reasonable rates of return for the provider. Early 
contract termination is subject to stiff penalties (Haarmeyer & Mody 1998, p.21). In a 
monopolistic environment, there is a risk that the private sector may deliver the service at a 
lower quality to reduce costs and raise profits because the private sector is more prone to 
opportunism than mission-driven, such as non-profits and governments (Brown & Potoski 
2003; Shirley & Walsh 2001).  
2.3.1.3 Information asymmetry 
Property rights theory emphasises the importance of regulating utility services to ensure 
that cost savings are due to efficiency and not quality erosion (Bel & Warner 2008, 
p.1342). To ensure that the supplier fulfils its duties and obligations under the contract, 
government has to monitor the performance of the supplier. In monitoring PPP contracts, 
the government has to rely on the information provided by the private sector on its 
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compliance to the terms of the contract (Brown & Potoski 2003, p.277). This creates 
information asymmetry, which is not a conducive condition for competition to flourish. With 
asymmetric information, the government cannot directly guarantee that the private sector 
is acting in the public’s best interest, particularly when activities preferred by the principal 
are costly to the agent or where agents pursue activities that are deemed costly by the 
principal. An example would be a contract provision requiring the private firm to ensure that 
water supply services are provided to the poor at affordable rates, or when the private 
sector opts for a technology that is deemed expensive by the government that can raise 
tariffs. 
The private sector also runs the risk of encountering information problem from the 
government. It is difficult for the private sector to ascertaining the quality of water and 
sewerage infrastructures during contract negotiation as these are buried underground. The 
actual condition will only be known during physical rehabilitation after the contract has 
been sealed. It is highly likely that the actual magnitude of costs involved is higher than 
they have originally estimated  (Araral 2009, p.226). 
2.3.1.4 High transaction costs 
Because of the sector’s inherent characteristics, private providers incur transaction costs 
that otherwise would not have been necessary in competitive markets. The private sector 
supplier has to interact with numerous government agencies at different levels and the 
more actors that the supplier has to interact with, the higher the transaction cost (Zhou & 
Peng 2010, p.358). The provider would have to go through the rigidities of competitive 
bidding, regulation, reporting and monitoring (Vincent-Jones 2000, p.343). Water supply 
and sewerage services impact on a number of sectors, such as health, environment, urban 
planning and utilities regulation, which are handled by different government agencies that 
the private supplier has to coordinate with.  
Contract monitoring increases transaction costs, which conflicts with the cost savings claim 
of PPP as supported by the public choice theory. While the government no longer operates 
the public service, it still incurs costs in the regulation and monitoring of the contract 
(Brown & Potoski 2003, p.279). The private provider is subjected to regulation by the 
government because water and sewerage services are of paramount public interest 
(Bakker 2003; Rees 1998; Gómez-Ibáñez et al. 2004). The sector is affected by various 
externalities that impact on its production, such as health and environmental factors that 
expand government regulation beyond pricing alone (Prasad 2006, pp.672–673). The 
government sets specific terms and conditions in the contract to ensure that public health, 
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environmental and affordability concerns are complied with by the supplier. The provider is 
also required to prepare for contingencies as the water sector is vulnerable to climactic 
conditions and long-term storage options can be problematic, especially in times of drought 
(Prasad 2006, p.672). 
Transaction costs can be lowered if governments can identify in the contract all the service 
obligations and outcomes expected from the private sector (Brown & Potoski 2003; 
Freeman 2000). Contractual specificity on the duties and responsibilities of the supplier 
can also protect the public against acts of opportunism (Freeman 2000, p.668), such as 
the level of water quality, number of water connections, among other things. However, it 
would be impossible to predict and address every possible complications that may arise for 
the duration of long-term contracts. It is for this reason that regulation of water quality is so 
tight and might explain why most cases of privatised water services failed to generate 
savings and instead saw increases in tariffs (Bel & Warner 2008:1342). Further problems 
are created if the monitoring system is ineffective and parties have to resort to a 
remediation process, which is an additional transaction cost (Vincent-Jones 2000; Jackson 
& Stainsby 2000; Williamson 1999).  
2.3.2 Higher expectations on PPP in the developing world 
Public choice theory, property rights and principal-agent theories were intended to support 
the government’s objectives of improving firm efficiency and not to resolve macroeconomic 
issues. Developed economies adopted PPP in order to increase economic efficiency, with 
much emphasis placed on raising productivity and reducing costs of production at the 
enterprise-level (Parker & Kirkpatrick 2005, p.528). This was expected to improve the 
economic performance of underperforming industries and resolve the persistent problems 
of management and control (Kay & Thompson 1986, p.19). With mature capital markets, 
well-functioning legal system that protects private property rights and conventional 
standards of business behaviour, developed economies provide a setting conducive for 
PPP. 
Implementing PPP in a capital market lacking in liquidity, operating within a weak regulatory 
and supervisory regime may not yield the same outcomes. A public sector having difficulties 
creating the right regulatory environment for public utilities is also likely to have trouble with 
private utilities (McGranahan & Satterthwaite 2006, p.8). PPP was seen as the ‘magic 
bullet’ that would solve the macroeconomic burden brought about by inefficient public 
enterprises, stimulate economic growth and alleviate poverty in the developing world 
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(Parker & Kirkpatrick 2005; P. Cook & Kirkpatrick 1995). PPP was advanced as a policy 
condition SAP, the agenda of which was broader than the efficiency and resource allocation 
objectives of the developed economies (Cook & Uchida 2003, p.122). In the developing 
world, the productivity of a state enterprise is typically two to three times lower than private 
firms and in some cases significantly lower (Kikeri & Kolo 2005, p.3). Government 
enterprises were a major contributor to fiscal imbalances and private investment capital 
was deemed the solution to finance the upgrade and improvement of public services. 
Transferring these functions to the private sector was expected to ease the financial burden 
of the government and free up some money to finance social services. 
The problem with saddling PPP with broader and more ambitious objectives is that it is 
incompatible with the theoretical foundations of privatisation. Much of the developing world 
suffer from flaws in competition and regulatory capability, institutional capacity and public 
sector governance capacity, which do not provide a susceptible environment for private 
sector to flourish (Gómez-Ibáñez et al. 2004; Hall et al. 2005; Kwak et al. 2009). The 
effects of PPP in the provision of infrastructure services are greatest, ironically, in weak and 
corrupt government states but expectedly, regulation would be weak in these countries 
(Prasad 2006, p.686).  
2.4 Network effects: integrating networks in the study of PPP 
The existing literature analysing PPP outcomes analysed the economic and social effects of 
implementing this policy based on the actions of a single organisation, either the 
government or the private sector. While numerous studies have been conducted on how 
the ‘amount’ of public and private sector participation impacts on service delivery, the 
relationship between public and private sector organisations involved in service delivery 
has rarely been looked into (Van der Heijden 2011, p.368). Focus on organisational 
effectiveness is appropriate when outcomes can readily be attributed to the activities of 
individual organisations but not all problems can be solved by the actions of a single 
organisation.  
The implementation of the PPP policy also created a network effect caused by new network 
features. PPP changed the composition and governance of public infrastructure services. 
The new PPP network is comprised of autonomous but interdependent public and private 
actors who have to work together towards a common goal of delivering a public service. The 
governance of privatised infrastructure services should be viewed as horizontal, relational 
and self-organising coordination networks where private and public actors resolve and 
negotiate problems and decisions jointly. Network governance theory is deemed to be the 
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appropriate analytical lens to understand these relationships. Network analysis is relevant 
to public management because there is an overdeveloped capacity for policy analysis and 
an underdeveloped capacity for administrative analysis and network analysis is seen to 
potentially to correct this disparity the balance (Milward & Provan 1998, p.388). 
In establishing the argument that PPP creates network effect caused by new network 
features, the first subsection defines network and its relevance to this research. The 
second subsection identifies the different network features that impact on network 
management and outcomes identified in the network governance literature. The third 
subsection discusses the different network governance structures in public infrastructure 
services and explains how new policies can change the network structure and create new 
network goals. The fourth subsection discusses the network effect of PPP. The fifth 
subsection identifies the distinct set of network features created by PPP and how these 
features created barriers for effective policy implementation. 
2.4.1 Definition of networks 
The study of networks and network management has acquired considerable significance in 
policy implementation research (O’Toole 2000, p.279). A number of scholars have 
highlighted the networked character of policy implementation (cf. Osborne 2010a; Kettl 
2010; McGuire & Agranoff 2007; Rhodes 2007; Bryson et al. 2006; Klijn & Koppenjan 
2000; K. G. Provan & Milward 2001; Kickert et al. 1997; Bardach 1994; Benson 1975). 
Governance networks theories span at least 40 years built around the different research 
traditions of political science, organisational science and public administration (Klijn & 
Koppenjan 2012), social network analysis, political science and public administration/ 
management (Berry et al. 2004). Under the public administration stream, it was further 
broken down into policy formation networks, governance networks and policy 
implementation networks (Kapucu et al. 2014). Each of the streams is concerned with 
different types of networks. The last two decades had seen a surge of interest on networks 
in the academic literature (Kapucu et al. 2014; Klijn & Koppenjan 2012; Berry et al. 2004; 
Provan et al. 2007).  
The growing network literature, while it has provided understanding on networks, has also 
created confusion with the different definitions, terminologies and conceptual frameworks 
used. The study of networks has yet to arrive at a unified language with a concrete 
definition (Provan et al. 2007, p.480). One of the earliest definitions was formulated by 
Benson who viewed networks as ‘a number of distinguishable organisations having a 
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significant amount of interaction with each other’ and are ‘connected with each other by a 
series of mutual resource dependencies and their relationship may be direct or indirect, 
consensual or competitive’ (Benson 1975, p.230). Brass et.al. (2004) broadly defines 
network as a ‘set of nodes and the set of ties representing some relationship, or lack of 
relationship between nodes’. These definitions emphasise the interactions and 
relationships among the different actors who have to work together. 
Some have defined network as a governance structure or an organisation form. Networks 
are 'structures of interdependence that exhibit both formal and informal linkages and 
include exchange or reciprocal relationships, common interests, and bonds of shared 
beliefs and professional perspective' (Frederickson 1999, pp.704-705, as cited in O’Flynn, 
Blackman, et al. 2013, p.26). Network is the governance structure that acts as a vehicle for 
the generation and distribution of public knowledge among stakeholders, which informs 
rational decision making on the reform and management of operations (Lobina & Hall 
2008, p.85). In public administration, networks refer to the interorganisational 
collaboration arrangements or new governance structures where a common goal cannot be 
accomplished by a single organisation (Kapucu et al. 2014; Agranoff & McGuire 2001; 
O’Toole 1997).  
There are those who viewed networks on the basis of a common objective or goal to be 
achieved. Rhodes (1995, p. 9) described network as the interdependence of several actors 
who need to exchange resources (money, information, expertise) to achieve their objectives. 
Network has been defined as ‘groups of three or more legally autonomous organisations 
that work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal’ (Provan & 
Kenis 2007, p.231). Network also refers to ‘initiatives deliberately undertaken by 
government to accomplish public goals, with measurable performance goals, assigned 
responsibilities to each partner, and structured information flow...to produce the maximum 
possible public value, greater than the sum of what each lone player could accomplish 
without collaboration’ (Goldsmith & Eggers 2004, p.8).  
Sorensen and Torfing (2005) proposed a more exhaustive description of governance 
network that captures most of the elements identified by other authors. They defined 
networks as ‘(1) a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent but 
operationally autonomous actors (2) who interact through negotiations (3) that take place in 
regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework (4) which to a certain extent is 
self-regulating and (5) contributes to the production of public purpose within or across 
particular policy areas’(Sorensen & Torfing 2005, p.203). 
Chapter 2 
22 
In addition to the proliferation of network definitions, the concept has also been 
synonymously linked to different terminologies, such as social interaction (of individuals 
acting on behalf of their organisations), relationships, connectedness, collaboration, 
collective action, trust, cooperation, joint ventures, consolidations, networks, partnerships, 
coalitions, alliances, consortiums, associations, conglomerates, councils, task forces and 
groups (Gajda 2004; Provan et al. 2007; O’Flynn, Blackman, et al. 2013; Donahue & 
Zeckhauser 2011). There is also an extensive literature on networks as a form of crossing 
boundaries (O’Flynn, Blackman, et al. 2013) and collaboration (Bardach 1994; Gray 1985; 
Gajda 2004; Bronstein 2003; Cross et al. 2009). Adding to these growing network 
concepts, Klijn and Koppenjan (2012, p.594) observed that the concept of network has 
also been increasingly linked to the concept of governance. Where it used to be referred to 
as policy networks and network management, we now speak of governance networks and 
network governance.  
This research does not attempt to formulate a comprehensive and unifying definition of 
interorganisational network. Notwithstanding the variety of network definitions, what is 
consistent in all these is interorganisational relationships and collaboration to achieve a 
shared or common goal (Provan et al. 2007; Kapucu et al. 2014). This thesis focuses on 
interorganisational networks as a governance structure formed as a result of implementing 
a policy designed to achieve specific objectives that serve as a common goal for the 
network. 
2.4.2 Network features of governance structures 
Network features have been identified to measure network success or effectiveness 
(Kickert et al. 1997; Provan & Kenis 2007) or conversely identified as challenges to a 
program’s success or failure (Goldsmith & Eggers 2004, p.40). These features are also 
referred to as ‘clusters of enablers’ that impact on successful interorganisational 
collaboration and if not cultivated properly, can also serve as barriers for effective 
interorganisational collaboration (O’Flynn, Blackman, et al. 2013, p.29). O’Flynn’s book, 
Crossing Boundaries in Public Management and Policy: The International Experience, is 
significant as it has compiled various case studies on cross boundary or interorganisational 
collaboration from different countries with different political and administrative traditions. 
From these different case studies, the most critical network factors were distilled, which 
included formal structure, commonality and complexity, people, culture and leadership, 
power and politics, performance, accountability and budgets, and boundary objects. These 
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factors are context-specific, some more dominant in certain settings but not others and are 
often in bundles (O’Flynn, Halligan, et al. 2013, pp.299–300).  
The purpose of these features is to understand how these contribute to or hinder network 
success. However, analysing network success creates confusion as it is unclear if the 
success being measured is collaboration or accomplishment of network goals. Success is 
defined as the realisation of collective action in order to attain formal policy goals or avert 
common threats (Kickert et al. 1997, p.7). This definition of network success requires that 
network actors agree on the policy goal as the network goal. However, agreeing on a 
network goal does not automatically result to accomplishment of network goals and vice-
versa. Network actors may agree on the network goal but may have a poor working 
relationship. Conversely, they may agree on the role of each actor in the network and have 
a high degree of work coordination but may have a poor opinion of each agency’s 
contribution to the network (Lupton et al. 2001, p.16). A network can achieve its goals even 
without the cooperation of all actors but only of one or few actors. Also, organisations may 
have agreed to join the network just because they are legally obliged to do so but may not 
agree on its purpose. The topic of network effectiveness has been one of the most 
controversial subjects in the literature and deemed inconclusive so much so that some 
scholars have suggested that discussions on the matter should be halted altogether (Kenis 
& Provan 2009, p.441) 
On the other hand, Benson (1975) and Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) have 
characterised network features as measures to understand the relationships and dynamics 
in the network. Rather than use these features to gauge a network’s success or failure, 
these features are used to understand the environment where the network operates, which 
can impact on the nature and quality of relationships or network interactions and how 
these interactions impact on the outcome. The study of interorganisational network as a 
fundamental unit of analysis in the study of advanced industrial societies was pioneered by 
J. Kenneth Benson (1975) in his ground breaking work The Interorganisational Network as 
Political Economy. In this seminal work, Benson (1975) noted that much of the research 
has been devoted to different elements, components and levels when in fact, 
interorganisational relations is a complex, variegated, multilevel phenomenon that should 
be studied as a whole and not in parts (Benson 1975, pp.229–230). He posited that 
interorganisational network is a political economy concerned with the distribution of two 
scarce resources, money and authority. The network is linked to a larger environment 
consisting of legislative authorities, bureaus and public and that the flow of resources in to 
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the network depends upon the development in this larger environment (Benson 1975, 
p.229). Table 2.1 lists some of the different sets of network features in the literature. 
Some network theorists deemed that a combination of different network features form a 
network typology (Van Waarden 1992; O’Flynn, Blackman, et al. 2013). Network typologies 
provide insights on the functioning of networks to understand why networks produce 
certain outcomes, regardless of whether networks are formed by bottom-up processes or 
strategic decisions by one or few network actors (Provan & Kenis 2007, p.233). Table 2.2 
enumerates some of the network typologies in the literature. Provan and Kenis’ (2007, p. 
237) network typologies are based on four key structural and relational contingencies: 
trust, number of participants, goal consensus and the nature of the task. The typologies 
presented by Bardach (1994) are based on factors that will measure the capacity of the 
network to organise working relationships and the capacity to transmit information 
efficiently. Abramson, Breul and Kamensky’s (2006) network typologies are similar to 
Bardach’s (1994) which are function-based (O’Flynn, Blackman, et al. 2013, p.26). 
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Table 2.1 Network features 
Concepts to analyse 
interorganisational networks 
(Benson, 1975) 
Conditions facilitating 
interorganisational  
collaboration 
(Gray,1985) 
Factors for potential 
 network success 
(Kickert, Klijn &  
Koppenjan, 1997) 
Analysis of uncertainties in  
dealing with complex problems 
 in networks 
(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000) 
Challenges of the network model 
(Goldsmith &Eggers, 2004) 
Patterns of interactions: 
Domain consensus 
Ideological consensus 
Positive evaluation 
Work coordination 
Problem-setting: 
Recognition of interdependence 
Identification of requisite number 
of stakeholders 
Perceptions of legitimacy among 
stakeholders 
Positive beliefs about outcomes 
Shared access outcome 
Political and social context Cognitive factors:  
Divergent perceptions/ joint image 
building 
Cognitive fixations/ variety of 
content 
Asymmetrical debates/ 
substantive cross-overs 
Advocative versus joint analysis  
Goal congruence 
Diversity within networks Contorted oversight 
Closed nature of networks Communications meltdown 
Leadership and commitment 
power 
Coordinating multiple partners 
Data deficits and benchmarks 
Processes influencing participants’ 
behaviour: 
Key service delivery objectives 
Public legitimacy and support for 
service agenda 
Technological-ideological 
commitment to organisation’s 
paradigm 
Direction-setting: 
Coincidence of values 
Dispersion of power among 
stakeholders 
Costs of network management Social factors: 
(Lack of) interactions 
Coupled arena/fragmentation 
Strategies and game types 
Integrative solutions 
Capacity shortages 
Number of actors  Relationship stability 
Conflict of interests 
Skills Institutional factors: 
Presence of join orientation, rules, 
language and trust 
 
 Structuring: 
High degree of ongoing 
interdependence 
External mandates 
Redistribution of power 
Influencing the contextual 
environment 
 
Management of 
Content, Processes, Institutions 
External developments 
Developments in the environment 
which lead to changing 
perceptions, changing power 
relations, or changing institutional 
structures 
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Table 2.1 Network features 
Framework for understanding  
cross-sector collaboration 
(Bryson & Crosby, 2006) 
Key predictors of effectiveness of 
network governance forms 
(Provan and Kenis, 2007) 
Clusters of enablers for successful  
working across boundaries 
(O’Flynn, 2013) 
Initial conditions (environmental factors, sector 
failure, direct antecedents of collaboration 
formation) 
Trust Formal structures 
Process components (Forging initial agreement, 
building leadership, trust & legitimacy, managing 
conflict, planning) 
Number of Participants Commonality and complexity 
Structure and Governance (Planning, structure in 
context, structural configuration, governance) 
Goal Consensus People, culture and leadership; 
Contingencies and constraints affecting process 
structure and governance (collaboration type, power 
imbalance, competing institutional logics) 
Need for Network-level Competency Power and politics;  
Outcomes (public value; 1st, 2nd & 3rd  order effects; 
and resilience & reassessment  
 
Performance, accountability and budgets; 
Accountability 
 
Boundary objects. 
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Table 2.2 Network typologies 
Provan and Kenis 
(2007) 
Abramson, Breul and 
Kamensky (2006) 
Bardach (1994) Van Waarden (1992) 
Shared participant-
governed networks 
Service implementation 
networks, which are 
intergovernmental 
programs  
Provider network, which 
performs a mix of 
services such as 
advocacy that is directed 
towards outsiders;  
Statism, Pantouflage 
Captured Statism 
Clientilism 
Pressure Pluralism 
Sectoral corporatism 
Lead-organisation-
governed networks 
Information diffusion 
networks, which are 
networks for sharing 
information across 
boundaries  
Contributors network, 
which links individuals 
and agencies that are in 
a position to provide 
financial and political 
contributions of various 
kinds to operate in new 
domains to make a 
collaborations effective 
Macro corporatism 
State corporatism 
Sponsored pluralism 
Parental relations 
Iron triangles 
Issue networks 
Network administrative 
networks 
Problem solving networks, 
which set agendas related 
to important policy areas 
Reputation network, 
which facilitate the 
workings of both the 
provider and the 
contributions network 
 Community capacity-
building networks, built to 
develop social capital to 
enable communities to 
better address a range of 
problems  
Constitution-building 
network, which combines 
planning, external 
political advocacy, and 
internal negotiating 
functions.   
 
Van Waarden’s (1992) inventory of the literature on network typology yielded 11 types, 
which are characterised by seven network factors with each factor explained by several 
variables. However, he finds this discourse to be ‘obscure and confused’ as most typologies 
are ‘crude labels’ that create misunderstanding as authors have different opinions based 
on different definitions adopted. The problem with adhering to typologies in network 
analysis is that the factors constituting each typology are numerous that makes it 
challenging to get a clear idea on the difference of each type of network (Van Waarden 
1992, p.49). 
While preconditions to understand network interactions are plentiful in the literature, such 
as network features and typologies, empirical studies on network governance are scarce 
(Klijn & Koppenjan 2012; Provan et al. 2007; Jackson & Stainsby 2000). The first decade 
of the 21st century saw a rise in studies on networks as a central concept. Koppenjan and 
Klijn’s (2012, p.593) review of the governance network theory’s history and future 
prospects reveal a growing number of comparative studies in Western countries, such as 
the US (Mandell, 2001; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Huang and Provan, 2007), the 
Scandinavian countries (Sørenson and Torfing, 2007), the UK (Sullivan and Skelcher, 
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2002), the Netherlands (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Edelenbos and Klijn, 2006), Italy, 
Belgium and Germany (Klijn et al, 2010a).  
As illuminating as these case studies were, it is noted that these are limited to the 
developed world. Empirical research within the developing world context is wanting. Peng 
and Qi Zhou’s (2005) How Network Strategies and Institutional Transitions Evolve in Asia 
ventured into the unchartered territory of theorising on network beyond the western 
borders. This article contributes to the literature on network governance by going beyond 
the discussion on network components that is prevalent in the network literature and 
delving into the importance of institutional transitions on networks in emerging economies 
in Asia. Peng and Zhou identifies a realistic and intermediate phase between the early and 
late phases of institutional transitions (Peng & Zhou 2005, p.322). In the early phase when 
formal rules of market systems are not well entrenched, firms’ strategic choices will be 
network-centred, heavily relying on the strong personal ties. However, the relative benefits 
and costs of network strategies will shift with the development of market-oriented 
institutional frameworks. At the later stage, as more mature formal rules are established in 
place, a gradual shift is expected where transactions will eventually be impersonal and rule-
based consequently, firms’ strategic choices will shift toward more market-centred 
strategies (Peng & Zhou, 2005). Peng and Zhou (2005) suggest that the strength or 
weakness of network ties during institutional transitions will impact on the effectivity of 
network strategies. Business networks in Asia differ in strength and content, and their 
evolution is driven by the impact of different dimensions of institutional transitions. Peng 
and Zhou’s framework is consistent with Benson’s (1975) caution on studying networks, 
i.e., that it should be studied in whole and not in parts and that the network is linked to a 
larger environment consisting of different institutions.  
While the importance of network-level studies has been recognised, Provan’s (2007) review 
of existing empirical studies on interorganisational networks found that little research has 
been done on network-level outcomes. In Kapucu, Hu and Khosa’s (2014, p.24) content 
analysis of 81 network articles, they observed that most network studies focused on the 
organisation or agency as a unit of analysis. Kapucu, Hu and Khosa recommend that more 
research on the substructures of networks and multilevel network research is needed to 
understand the network content and context. An analysis of the whole network, not just a 
single organisation, can provide a deeper insight on the interpersonal relationships or 
interactions between and among actors in the network and how such dynamic relationships 
impact on the policymaking, policy implementation or governance processes (Kapucu et al. 
2014, p.23-24). The literature is still wanting on interest in network-level outcomes and 
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while there is growing interest on network-level studies, these has primarily been 
conceptual, anecdotal or based on single, descriptive case studies performed at one point 
in time (Provan et al. 2007, p.485). 
2.4.3 Network governance in public infrastructure services 
Networks have been offered as an alternative to the traditional hierarchical and market 
forms of governance for implementing polices and providing services (Kenis & Provan 
2009; Provan et al. 2007; Hudson 2004). However, the common themes of 
interdependence, numerous organisations working together and goal congruence among 
network definitions indicate that public services have been delivered under different 
governance network structures. These definitions effectively describe hierarchies and 
markets as forms of networks governance structure. The change from one structure to 
another is brought about by the introduction of a new policy. With a new policy, a network 
goes into transition which can result to functional changes such as new actors, new 
resources and new network goal (Li et al. 2017).  
Prior to PPP, public services were governed by hierarchical networks that were comprised of 
purely public actors. The concept of network emerged in the post-war period where the 
increase in scope, sectoralisation, decentralisation and fragmentation in public services 
after the war has expanded the number of public actors involved in public service delivery 
(Kenis & Schneider 1991; Adam & Kriesi 2007). Market-like networks replaced hierarchical 
networks with the adoption of the PPP policy in the 1990s to early 2000 when governments 
deemed that state-owned infrastructure services were no longer effective in serving the 
public need. PPP envisioned a governance network that is purely private in nature where 
market forces are expected to improve public services. In a market-like network, actors 
interact at arms-length, there is perfect competition and the market produces the best 
outcomes for the consumer (Barnekov & Raffel 1990; Brubaker 2003). In reality, however, 
PPP has created a network governance structure of public and non-public actors that is 
relational in nature. Figure 2.1 shows the different governing networks in the pre-PPP and 
the PPP era.  
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Figure 2.1 Governance structures in public service delivery 
Hierarchy Market Relational network
Privatisation eraPre-privatisation era
 
2.4.3.1 Hierarchical networks 
Public services were governed by hierarchical networks, which were vertically organised 
hierarchical structures composed of a number of public actors (Adam & Kriesi 2007; 
Osborne 2010a). This structure is similar to ‘closed village communities’ held together by 
mutual trust, confidence, common calculations and specific ‘climates’ (Kenis & Schneider 
1991, p.29). In a hierarchical structure, the government is assumed to be a social welfare-
maximising government. Public interest is politically defined and expressed in law and 
public services are performed by a number of public organisations. The government is the 
direct provider of public services through a centralised, top-down control bureaucracy 
(Denhardt & Denhardt 2000, pp.551–552). The government itself carries out the orders 
within its hierarchy. Public managers implement the policies determined by those at the top 
of the hierarchy, who are usually elected politicians and appointed officials (Hjern & Porter 
1981, p.218). Administrators exercise limited discretion and are accountable to elected 
and appointed political leaders. Politicians, in turn, are accountable to the voters. 
Politicians are expected to formulate and implement policies that best represent the 
interests of the citizenry. In return, voters reward them by keeping them in office.  
As history has shown, however, governments have failed as providers of public services. 
Contrary to the assumption of social welfare-maximising government, politicians and 
bureaucrats behaved as rational players who maximised their own welfare and used 
government offices to advance their own interests (Shirley & Walsh 2000, p.28). With the 
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gamut of issues that the government has to address, an astute politician will prioritise the 
narration of success stories to voters. SOEs are susceptible to political intervention due to 
lack of transparency. SOEs are usually attached to a department or ministry and its 
managers are directly appointed by the minister or chief executive, which can be used by 
politicians as success stories. Votes do not necessarily translate to a demand for more 
efficient public services as the average voter may not be or not made aware of the 
performance of SOEs (Shirley & Walsh 2000, p.24).  
2.4.3.2 Market-like networks  
Following the oil crisis in the early 1970s, there was a growing disillusionment with 
government performance by the late 1970s and 1980s in the developed world (Kickert et 
al. 1997, p.1). The bureaucratic, hierarchical and control-driven mode of the public 
administration tradition had been criticised for its excessive rules, rigid budgeting and 
personnel systems that ignores citizens’ needs and shuns innovation (Denhardt & Denhardt 
2000, p.551). The failure of the hierarchical governance structure to efficiently and 
effectively deliver public services paved the way for the birth of New Public Management 
(NPM) in the early 1990s. The NPM approach to running public service organisations was 
framed from neoclassical economics, particularly the public choice theory. NPM 
encouraged public managers ‘to steer rather than row,’ i.e., government should establish an 
entrepreneurial government that ensures that public services are provided rather than 
delivering services itself (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000, p.550). Policy making and policy 
implementation were treated separately and actors pursue their own strategies.  
As governments have proven to be ineffective in delivering public services, the efficiency of 
the private sector was expected to turn around inefficient SOEs (Shirley & Walsh 2000; 
Bryson et al. 2006; Price 2007). PPP is one of the strategies under NPM. PPP addresses 
the problem of lack of transparency under a hierarchical network through the establishment 
of ‘clear and simple selection criteria for evaluating bids, clearly defined competitive 
procedures, disclosure of purchase price and buyer, well defined institutional 
responsibilities and adequate monitoring and supervision of the program’ (Kikeri, Nellis, 
and Shirley 1992 as cited Hodge & Coghill 2007, p.683). Government functions that can be 
more efficiently performed by the private sector were privatised. The policy objectives of 
PPP assumed that the superiority of the private market alone is enough to improve public 
service delivery. The introduction of superior private management efficiency and market 
mechanisms were expected to transform public services organisations into efficient and 
effective organisations (Megginson & Netter, 2001 as cited Pérard 2009, p.197). PPP has 
been viewed as abandonment of the government of its public responsibilities and the 
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failure or success of the privatised infrastructure service has become the sole responsibility 
of the private firm. 
From vertical networks, PPP has changed the governance structure of public services into 
horizontally-organised market structures (Adam & Kriesi 2007, p. 130) where the state is a 
disaggregated entity within a principal-agent context (Osborne 2010b, p.8). Government 
itself is run like a business and government units are in competition with non-profit and for-
profit sectors to ‘loosen the inefficient monopoly franchise of public agencies and public 
employees’ (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000, p.551). Whereas public interest is defined by law 
and public services are performed by the government under a hierarchical market, public 
services under a market-like network are performed by the private sector whose obligations 
are defined under a contract. Market-like networks view the public and private sectors as 
independent entities. The state takes on the role of regulator and the private sector delivers 
the public service. The performance of the private sector is measured based on its 
intraorganisational processes and management to produce the public service in the most 
efficient and economical way (Osborne 2010, p.8).  
2.4.3.3 Relational networks 
Contrary to the notion under market-like networks that public and private actors are 
independent, PPP transformed the governance structure of public services into a relational 
network where public and private actors work together. The focus of NPM on the 
contributions of individual organisations deflected attention on the impact of 
interorganisational collaboration in public management (O’Flynn et al. 2013, p.17). Unlike 
hierarchical networks, relational networks are autonomous and self-governing and resist 
government steering (Adam & Kriesi 2007, p.130). There is now an increasing number and 
wide variety of autonomous public and private actors involved in policy making and policy 
implementation whose relationships are interdependent and non-hierarchical (Adam & 
Kriesi 2007; Kenis & Schneider 1991; Herranz 2006; Provan & Milward 1991; Van Gils & 
Klijn 2007).  
While PPP has made the private sector the direct provider of public services, the private 
sector still has to work with a number of public organisations as service provider. PPP has 
created a relationship between the public and private sector that is characterised by ‘long-
term social exchange, mutual trust, interpersonal attachment, commitment to specific 
partners, altruism and cooperative problem-solving ’(Davis 2007, p.386). Relationality is 
created in PPP because contracts for privatised public infrastructure services are a result of 
rigorous negotiation between legally equal and autonomous parties (Ring & Van de Ven 
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1992, p.487). These contracts usually involve long-term and highly specific investment that 
cover a continuum of operations, including financing, design and development, operation 
and ownership that span from 20 to 40 years (Ring & Van de Ven 1992; Hodge & Greve 
2007). Contract is the device that facilitates exchange between parties, creates rights and 
duties that have legal force and sets legal sanction in case of failure to comply (Vincent-
Jones 2000, p.320). The extent, coverage, and duration of these contracts make it 
imperative for parties to commit to the contract and trust that each party will comply with 
its terms over the contract duration. 
Contracts are not self-implementing but require the commitment of parties to make it 
effective. In this contractual relationship, the ‘responsibility for service provision is 
dispersed among competing private, voluntary, and public providers, while responsibilities 
for policy making and purchasing are retained within the state sector, with purchaser–
provider relationships taking a variety of contractual, partnership and mixed ownership 
forms’ (Vincent-Jones 2000, p.319). While the contract dictates that parties be cooperative 
with each other, it is inevitable that the relationship can be conflictual at times. These 
actors come from different organisations, each having its own goals and objectives to fulfil, 
and as such, each may have different strategies to achieve their goals, which may conflict 
with one another (Adam & Kriesi 2007; Van Gils & Klijn 2007).  
2.4.4 Network effect of PPP  
The network effect of PPP refers to outcomes that are caused by the emergence of network 
features created by PPP. The network effect of PPP are created by the new network features 
created as a result of public and private actors that perform different roles whoo need to 
collaborate in delivery of a public infrastructure service. The performance of PPP has been 
evaluated using a single organisation as a unit of analysis. The theoretical and practical 
issues of policy implementation, such as PPP, go beyond the boundaries of a single 
organisation (O’Toole 2000, p.266). Stoker (1989, p.44) argues that policy implementation 
should be seen as a problem of governance wherein cooperation between independent 
authorities must be induced. For a more holistic understanding of policy implementation, it 
should be acknowledged that policy action entails the involvement of multiple institutional 
actors (O’Toole 2000, p.266). As a report by Sweden's Statskontoret (2007) argued, 
'Modern ("new") public management is much focused on the contributions of individual 
organisations, which makes it difficult to handle collaboration and complexity' 
(Statskontoret, 2007:27-28  as cited in O’Flynn 2013, p.17). The network effect of PPP has 
been overlooked in the current literature on privatisation, which largely examines the 
Chapter 2 
34 
economic and social effects (Figure 2.2). This thesis does not undermine these studies but 
seeks to supplement the literature by examining the network effect of PPP. 
Figure 2.2 Understanding the performance of public infrastructure privatisation 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the prevailing analytical framework on PPP outcomes. The black box in 
this framework is that evaluation of policy implementation should examine the interactions 
among the numerous actors in the network. The traditional methods of dealing with 
problems is no longer sufficient in addressing the wicked issues that confront relational 
networks (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004; Van Bueren et al. 2003; Bryson et al. 2006). Where 
service delivery outcomes depend on the coordinated and concerted actions of multiple 
organisations, it is more appropriate and comprehensive to examine network-level activities 
and structure. There is a need for an evaluation criteria that will address inter-subjectivity 
and exclusion in the network, i.e., the diverging interests and shifting objectives of the 
various actors in the network and that there may be interests that may be overlooked (Klijn 
& Koppenjan 2006; Provan & Kenis 2007; Klijn et al. 2010).  
The challenge of network-level analysis is the complexity of interactions in the network. 
Networks traverse different layers of government and link government actors with private 
and semi-private actors thereby creating multi-actor interaction processes with regard to 
problem solving. As a result, public service delivery becomes erratic as they are developed 
in non-linear and sequential phases (Klijn & Koppenjan 2012, p.592). Interagency 
collaboration is convoluted that makes the task of evaluating network interactions 
particularly challenging (Cross et al. 2009, p.311). Adding to this challenge is the fact that 
network-level theories examine behaviours, processes and structure, which. are measured 
based on the concepts designed by organisation-level researchers to explain the network 
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as a whole (Provan et al. 2007, p.484). The network features to analyse network-level 
activities presented in Table 2.1 are just a few of the network dimensions but the literature 
abounds. 
Figure 2.3 Analytical framework on PPP outcomes 
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2.4.5 The network features that may determine the network effects 
Benson’s observation four decades ago that discussion on interorganisational network is 
still plagued with conceptual confusion and overlap remains true to this day. Different 
authors use ‘similar labels to describe different phenomena or different labels used for 
similar phenomena’ and the difference in definitions may merely reflect differences in 
opinions (Van Waarden 1992, p.49). With the abundance of criteria to evaluate network 
interactions and effectiveness, it will be foolhardy to adjudge one set of criteria better than 
another as each network possesses distinct characteristics as result of exogenous 
conditions and the larger environment where it operates (Kenis & Provan 2009; Benson 
1975). Klijn and Koppenjan (2012) foresee that such diversity may lead to a more 
specialised and differentiated governance network theory. Networks exist in different 
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sectors and confront different issues, and the diverse and generic concepts and 
assumptions of governance network theory will be applied with other theories and specific 
questions (Klijn & Koppenjan 2012, p.601). 
One subject that can benefit from the specialised network study is PPP. Currently, there is 
limited scholarship analysing PPP with reference to the literature on network governance 
(Velotti et al. 2012; Greve & Hodge 2010; Hodge & Coghill 2007). PPP has exhibited certain 
network features that altered the rules of infrastructure service delivery and allocated new 
roles among the state, the market and civil society (Prasad 2006, p.672). This network 
features created by PPP are (1) resource interdependence between the private and public 
sector, (2) challenge of achieving goal congruence in a multi-stakeholder setting and (3) 
unclear management roles.  
2.5.1 Resource interdependence between the public and private sectors 
Most network researchers agree that interdependency is the core factor that initiates and 
sustains networks (Klijn & Koppenjan 2012, p.591). PPP created resource 
interdependence between the public and private sector. This policy reform was motivated 
by shortage or lack of resource on the part of the government, i.e., financial and technical 
capacity to deliver infrastructure services that the private sector possesses. The private 
sector, in turn, needs the cooperation of the government as implementing infrastructure 
services is regulated by the government. The delivery of public infrastructure services is no 
longer a function of a single or homogeneous organisation but a network of public and 
private organisations that have to work together because of resource interdependence. PPP 
created a contractual relationship between the government and the private sector provider 
but not in the tradition of principal-agent where one party is subordinate to another; 
instead, decision making authority is shared and negotiated.  
Resource interdependence is a precursor to cooperation. Different organisations have 
jurisdiction over different resources necessary for public service delivery. An organisation 
will seek the cooperation of another organisation that controls the resource it needs to 
accomplish its own objectives (Johnson et al. 2003; Lundin 2006; Provan et al. 2007; 
Provan & Milward 1995). Actors find mutual grounds or joint solutions because they are 
forced by their mutual dependencies in the network (Van Gils & Klijn 2007, p.143). As 
actors depend on each other for resources, the network, not just the private sector, is 
altogether responsible in ensuring the delivery of the service to all customers. Each actor’s 
resource is vital to public service delivery and each resource owner has a stake in decision 
making. Dependency, however, may not be mutual and when an actor finds itself in an 
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unreciprocated dependency, it may find itself in a weak position in the decision making 
process (Van Gils & Klijn 2007, p.143). 
2.5.2 Challenge of achieving goal congruence in a multi-stakeholder setting  
PPP created a common goal among the network of public and private actors, who have to 
ensure that each performs its obligations in the contract. However, the PPP network is 
comprised of public and private actors who have different goals, objectives and institutional 
culture. For diverse actors to be able to work effectively in the delivery of infrastructure 
services, they should cooperate. Cooperation entails understanding and defining problems 
together so they can jointly work towards the same goal. In order to work towards the same 
goal, actors have to agree on how resources will be allocated and what strategies to be 
taken to achieve the goal. Only when the actors in the network have a shared 
understanding of the problem can the network have goal consensus.  
When there is general agreement on broad network-level goals, both regarding goal content 
and process, and in the absence of hierarchy, network participants are more likely to be 
involved and committed to the network and more likely to work together (Provan & Kenis 
2007, p.240). Organisations join or form networks for a variety of reasons, including the 
need to gain legitimacy, serve clients more effectively, attract more resources and address 
complex problems. Notwithstanding organisational goals, all network organisations seek to 
fulfil some end that they cannot achieve independently. By setting out the objectives jointly, 
network actors can allocate the proper resources and identify the necessary coordinating 
activities (McGuire 2002, p.604). When all actors in the network agree on the purpose of 
the collaboration, the roles and responsibilities of each actor and the decision making 
authority, the network goal can be defined and agreed upon by the network members. 
The absence of commitment among actors to a common purpose may be a reason for 
failure (Kickert et al. 1997, p.9). Alignment of goals is important in a network but achieving 
it is not so simple. Alignment of goals should mean congruence on outcomes but 
government networks are usually formed to deliver a type of service whose outcomes are 
sometimes unclear, are difficult to measure and may take years to realise. Further 
complication arises when organisational goals in the network simultaneously overlap and 
differ (Goldsmith & Eggers 2004, pp.40–41). As each network member has its own 
organisational goals and objectives, agreement on a common network vision and purpose 
can help clarify the stake or interest that an organisation has in resolving a problem and 
the level of interdependence needed to solve the problem (Bryson et al. 2006, p.46).  
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The network goal is usually defined in the contract. Relationships in privatised public 
infrastructure service is governed by a contract that span at 20 to 40 years, or longer, and 
involve highly specific investments that cover a continuum of operations, including 
financing, design and development, operation and ownership (Hodge & Greve 2007; 
Crocker & Masten 1996; Ring & Van de Ven 1992). Long term agreements are necessary to 
attract operators to infuse the large capital investments required to deliver the vital 
infrastructure service to the community (Crocker & Masten 1996, p.16). The governing 
contract is not just a legal document with obligational force supported by the legal system, 
judicial enforcement and dispute resolution procedures. It is also extra-legal in character 
due to the contractual relationship that emanates from within and outside the contract 
(Vincent-Jones 2000, p.320-322). 
Due to the extent, coverage and duration of these contracts, it is difficult, even impossible, 
for the parties to fully specify, anticipate or control all undertakings that may arise during 
contract implementation (Ring & Van de Ven 1992; Hodge & Greve 2007). For example, the 
occurrence of unexpected natural calamities or advancement of technologies can prompt 
new legislation or policies that can be contrary or detrimental to the terms of the contract. 
Since the parties cannot possibly list all the potential risks in a long term contract, 
outcomes are uncertain (Hodge & Greve 2007, p.549). To counter potential risks, parties 
stipulate internal mechanisms in the contract in case conflicts arise to preserve the 
contractual relationship and ensure that contractual obligations are achieved (Ring & Van 
de Ven 1992, p.487). This contractual stipulation, which require the cooperation of others, 
can be a recurring source of risk in itself. The relationship itself creates obligations and the 
longer the relationship is, the more the relationship itself becomes a source of obligation 
(Vincent-Jones 2000, p.322).  
2.5.3 Unclear management roles  
PPP networks are brought together by resource interdependence to achieve a common goal 
but with autonomous organisations in the network, it is challenging to achieve goal 
congruence. It is important not only to create consensus between the representatives of 
organisations regarding a joint course of action but also to establish support for these ideas 
within the organisation. Creating network consensus greatly depends on the leadership 
qualities of the appointed network manager (Kickert et al. 1997, p.58). A network manager 
is necessary to bring organisations to work together but the proponents of PPP failed to 
consider the need for this feature in the policy design. 
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Managing interdependencies and monitoring relationships in the network can be difficult, 
costly and less desirable for the one in charge (Bel & Warner 2008, p.1343). The increase 
in the number of actors in the network has made it increasingly difficult to keep track of 
‘who is in charge’ (McQuaid 2010, p.133). Accountability issues can arise because each 
actor may only take responsibility in fulfilling its own organisation’s mandate and no single 
body assumes responsibility over the efficient and effective implementation of the overall 
policy (McQuaid 2010, p.135). The accountability challenge in a relational network is how to 
hold interorganisational systems and networks accountable for the delivery of public 
services (Osborne 2010a, p.422).  
Some network theorists argue that the government is still the most logical choice to 
perform this role as it can ensure that the interests of unrepresented or underrepresented 
groups are safeguarded (E H Klijn & Koppenjan 2000; Kickert et al. 1997). As a network 
manager, the public manager must be able to ‘initiate concerted action not only within their 
own organisations but among a set of stakeholders with different and competing interests’ 
(O’Flynn 2007, p.362). The challenge for the government is how to effectively assume and 
reconcile its new multiple roles (Greve & Hodge 2010, p.154). The challenge of having the 
government as the network manager is that while it has been divested of its service 
provider role, it is still tasked to undertake multiple, different and sometimes conflicting 
roles. These roles include that of an advocate, planner, economic developer, steward of the 
public funds, elected representative for decision making, regulator over the contract life and 
commercial signatory to the contract (Hodge & Greve 2007, p.51).  
One role that can conflict with its other public roles is contract management, which require 
a different skill set totally unlike that of a service provider. As contract managers, a public 
manager is tasked to negotiate the contract, oversee its implementation and evaluate the 
results. This role is not a principal-agent relationship where the government, as principals 
have control over managerial discretionary behaviour (Parker & Kirkpatrick 2005, p.528). 
From its previous role as a direct provider of public services where it failed, can we expect 
governments to fare better as contract manager? Coming from direct service provider role, 
the public manager is more often than not poorly prepared for contract management 
responsibilities (Kettl 2010, p.248). PPP only transfers the responsibility of delivering the 
public service but it does not remove government accountability over the results. For 
services that are of paramount public interest, the government maintains its regulatory 
function through standard-setting, performance monitoring and penalising poor or non-
performance, when necessary (Barnekov & Raffel 1990, p.136).  
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2.5 Concluding remarks  
Chapter 2 has reviewed the literature analysing PPP outcomes and there are two prevailing 
views from the literature that explain its effects, i.e., the economic and social effects, which 
are based on the objectives of government in the PPP policy. These objectives are 
supported by the theoretical foundations of PPP but these theories faced challenges when 
the needed competitive conditions for a free market were not met. These challenges are 
the tendency to form natural monopoly in the water and sewerage service sector, and the 
deficiency in competition and regulatory capability, institutional capacity and public sector 
governance capacity that usually plague governments in the developing world where most 
cases of privatised water and sewerage services took place.   
More importantly, PPP introduced a new governance network structure in service delivery. 
In this chapter, I argued that the introduction of a new policy can alter the network 
landscape. PPP created a network effect wherein the outcomes is influenced by the 
network features created by PPP, which are resource interdependence between public and 
private actors, the challenge of achieving goal congruence in a multi-stakeholder setting 
and unclear management roles in the network. These network features were a result of the 
entry of the private sector in the domain of public infrastructure service delivery. This 
chapter reviewed the network governance literature to explain how PPP effected changes 
on the governance structure of infrastructure services and proposed for a network 
perspective in analysing this policy reform. The next chapter presents the analytical and 
methodological adopted to study the Metro Manila sewerage services network. 
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Chapter 3 
Analysing the network effect of PPP 
3.1 Introduction   
This thesis argues that PPP failed to yield the expected outcomes in the Metro Manila 
sewerage services network because of the network features that can create negative 
network effects, which can hinder the network from fulfilling its intended outcomes. The 
network effect of PPP has been overlooked because the proponents of PPP assumed that, 
in transferring the service delivery functions to the private sector, this policy has completely 
divested the government of any responsibility over public infrastructure services. In reality, 
PPP is governed by relational networks comprised of public and private actors. 
This chapter presents the analytical and methodological frameworks adopted to 
understand why PPP failed to fix the sewerage services in Metro Manila, Philippines. The 
second section discusses the decision making arenas as a starting point in analysing 
privatised infrastructure services. The third section explains how network features should 
be analysed and the fourth section describes how network features influence network 
effects. The fifth and sixth sections present the methods of data collection and data 
analysis, respectively, employed to study the case of the Metro Manila sewerage services 
network. The seventh section reflects on the ethical concerns and challenges encountered 
in pursuing this research.  
3.2 Identifying decision making arenas in PPP networks 
Existing studies on the performance of privatised water and sewerage services in the 
developing world focus on the organisation as the unit of analysis (cf. Parker & Kirkpatrick 
2005; Kikeri & Kolo 2005; Cook & Uchida 2003; Megginson & Netter 2001; Shirley & 
Walsh 2000; Haarmeyer & Mody 1998; van de Walle 1989). These studies, which have 
explained the economic and social effects of PPP, provide a partial depiction and 
understanding of outcomes as these have not examined the network effects of PPP. Gone 
are the days when the government had monopoly on public service provision. No single 
organisation has a monopoly over all resources needed for a sewerage project as PPP is 
governed by a network comprised of public and private actors who are dependent on each 
other. Each actor has a stake in programme implementation and a role to play to its 
success or failure. An organisationally rooted analysis is not sufficient to understand PPP 
outcomes. 
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Mapping the PPP network starts with the identification of the arenas of decision making 
and the problems that arise in each arena. Networks are comprised of actors that come 
from different organisations that perform specialised roles, such as policy making, planning 
and intelligence, resource provision, intermediary and coordinating roles, service provision 
and evaluation (Hjern & Porter 1981, p.223). These roles are necessary to produce a public 
infrastructure service, and crucial decisions are made in these areas that impact on the 
service delivery outcomes. Identifying the decision making areas is based on the arena 
approach proffered by Klijn and Koppenjan (2004) and the domain-based, process-oriented 
approach by Gray (1985) in analysing interorganisational relations. The concept of arena is 
also similar to Hjern and Porter’s (1981) implementation structures. Hjern and Porter 
(1981, p.211) suggest that an implementation structure is the appropriate unit of analysis 
when a policy or programme is implemented by a group of public and private organisations. 
The arena or domain is where mutually dependent actors define problems, formulate 
solutions and make crucial decisions that impact on network outcomes (Koppenjan & Klijn 
2004; Provan & Milward 1991; Gray 1985). It is a multi-actor and multi-purpose setting 
where parties encounter strategic uncertainty due to the unpredictability and 
uncontrollability of the behaviour of other parties (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000, p. 45). As 
relational transactions increasingly occur across sectors, borders, cultures and languages, 
there is a need to consider the specific contexts and the complex environmental conditions 
in which these transactions take place (Ring & Van de Ven 1992, p.496). These 
transactions take place in arenas or domains, and analysing relationships among actors 
within and among arenas in a network is crucial to identifying the gap between 
implementation and outcomes.  
Network interactions are complex not only because of the numerous actors, resources and 
rules involved but also because network outcomes are often dependent on the interplay of 
numerous and, sometimes, simultaneous arenas (Figure 3.1) (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, 
p.56). Coordination, cohesiveness and interrelatedness in different arenas vary according 
to the type of public service and the different stages of production in a specific public 
service. Network outcomes are a product of a series of decisions in various arenas over a 
period of time, as shown in Figure 3.2. Interorganisational relationships also vary both 
geographically and over time. Over different periods of time, there will be an assortment of 
triggering events and conflicting situations that necessitate a corresponding strategy or 
solution, which can either solve the problem or worsen it (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.57). 
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Figure 3.1 Different sub-networks and arenas in networks 
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Figure 3.2 Series of decisions in over different periods in different arenas  
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Source: Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.57  
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The starting point for determining the arenas is to identify the vital arenas of decision 
making. In the Metro Manila sewerage services network, crucial decisions are made in 
three arenas: (1) the planning stage, which occurs during the tariff determination exercise, 
(2) the project implementation stage, which takes place in the STP construction arena and 
(3) the evaluation stage at the interagency monitoring arena. Each decision making arena 
will be examined in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, respectively.  
After the areas of decision making are identified, the next step is to determine the complex 
issue that pervades the network. Given the number of actors and the different functions, 
roles and resources that each possess, there can be a number of relationship permutations 
in the network that can make network governance more complex (Goldsmith & Eggers 
2004; Provan & Kenis 2007). These differences can give rise to problems. With numerous 
actors in the network representing their own organisational mandates, different actors will 
view the problem differently or define different problems altogether (E. H. Klijn & Koppenjan 
2000, p.135). Koppenjan and Klijn (2004, pp.135-138) suggest two ways of identifying the 
network problem: (1) researcher takes the position of a stakeholder as the problem owner 
or initiator and gives it the status of initial problem identity or (2) researcher formulates its 
own idea of the problem on the basis of its own problem exploration.  
Choosing one actor’s perspective among a network of actors of diverging interests can 
create selection bias as it may seem to favour the interest of one actor over others. 
However, the selection bias can be neutralised by using the initial problem identification 
only as a working hypothesis to be validated by interviews with other actors in the network. 
The ex-post judgment of actors about the problem, process and the outcome will be 
assessed in combination with the evaluation criteria and external effects (E. H. Klijn & 
Koppenjan 2000, pp.149–150). This is an evaluation viewed in hindsight and the starting 
point of assessing policy process outcomes is based on the subjective judgments of 
individual actors. 
I chose to formulate the research problem from the perspective of a stakeholder, i.e., the 
two private concessionaires of sewerage services in Metro Manila. It is important to identify 
the problem from the perspective of a specific actor because there are numerous actors in 
a network that may perceive problems differently thereby formulate different strategies to 
solve the problem. I adopted this perspective because the concessionaires, as the main 
implementers of sewerage projects in Metro Manila, have first-hand experience and 
comprehensive knowledge of the issues that plague the network. Among all actors in the 
network, the private concessionaires are the ones who are most immersed in all aspects of 
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sewerage activities: policy making, project implementation, monitoring and coordinating 
with all actors in the network. This perspective provides for a more accurate description and 
in-depth analysis compared to formulating the problem based on my own exploration. 
Moreover, the academic literature on the Metro Manila water concessions is curiously 
lacking analysis from the concessionaires’ perspective. 
3.3 Identify the network features in the arenas  
After establishing the network problem, the next step is to identify the strategies 
undertaken by the parties concerned to address this issue as it relates to the three network 
features of PPP. The public and private sectors enter into a promise-centred contract that 
obliges parties to perform certain acts that are binding in nature (Macneil 1985, p.497). 
The contract creates resource interdependency and this interdependency is the basis of 
goal congruence among the actors (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004; Klijn et al. 2010; Hajer & 
Wagenaar 2003; Agranoff & Mcguire 2003). This network is complex because it is 
comprised of a diverse set of autonomous actors that have to work together but may have 
conflicting perceptions on issues and solutions (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004; Klijn et al. 2010; 
Hajer & Wagenaar 2003). With numerous actors having to share resources towards a 
common goal, a network manager is needed to guide the network members to effectively 
work together.  
3.3.1 Resource interdependence 
The allocation of resources defines the quality of relationships among actors within the 
network (McGuire 2002, p.605). Resource interdependency within the network is 
measured by first identifying the resource needed and which actor controls this resource 
(Hjern & Porter 1981, p.222). Second is to measure the degree of dependency by 
determining the importance of the resource for the realisation of objectives and the 
substitutability of the resource, i.e., if the resource can be acquired from other actors 
(Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.47).  
The different resources are financial resources, production resources, competency 
resources, knowledge resources and legitimacy resources (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.144-
145). Financial resources are deemed the most important resource to solve complex 
problems because they provide ‘opportunities to realise solutions’ as well as ‘cover the 
(extra) organisational costs attached to complex decision making processes for complex 
problems’ (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.144). Production resources are the resources 
necessary for enabling policy initiatives, such as land for a public housing project or a new 
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technology to modernise a government procurement system, and the initiators can only 
acquire these resources through other actors (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.144-145). 
Competency resources are the formal or juridical authority to make certain decisions that 
are usually vested with a public or semi-public organisation, such as the authority to issue 
permits for certain activities. Knowledge resources are necessary to develop solutions or 
investigate the nature of a problem and are usually embodied in documents. This can also 
be obtained from implicit or experiential knowledge, which is not easily transferable. The 
last type of resource is legitimacy, which is considered the vaguer resource but not the least 
important. This refers to the authority to give or withhold legitimacy to solve difficult 
problems, such as political bodies or elected officials whose support can ensure 
implementation of a policy or project, or the media or advocacy groups whose public 
pronouncements can influence public acceptability of a policy initiative (Koppenjan & Klijn 
2004, p.144-145).  
If the resource has low substitutability, the resource user is highly dependent on the 
resource owner, thereby increasing probability of cooperation among actors. On the other 
hand, if the resource has high substitutability, there is low dependence of the resource user 
on the resource owner, thereby reducing reasons to cooperate. The permutation also varies 
if there is one-way or mutual dependence. If there is mutual dependence, there is a higher 
degree of cooperation and if it is one-way, the resource owner can use this to wield power 
over the resource user. A power imbalance is created when organisations that do not have 
direct access to resources become dependent on and vulnerable to the actions of others in 
the network, thereby dictating the actors’ positions in the network (Gray 1985, p.926). 
When actors find themselves in this situation, they will remedy the situation by taking 
actions based on the moral and social conventions and institutions surrounding them 
(Hjern & Porter 1981, p.221).  
Resource dependence creates power interplay within the network, which can generate 
conflicting and uncertain situations in decision making. Some actors hold greater control 
over critical resources for solving problems than others (Gray 1985, p.926) but no single 
organisation can have control over all resources (Hjern & Porter 1981, p.214). The resource 
owner can use the resource either as a ‘hindrance power’ or ‘realisation power’ (Koppenjan 
& Klijn 2004, p.47). The resource is used as a realisation power when it is employed as a 
solution. Realisation power is rarely concentrated within one party but requires the 
cooperation of various parties to pool their resources towards joint problem solving. When 
the interests and perceptions of mutually dependent parties align, realising a solution is not 
that difficult. On the other hand, if the interests and perceptions of actors conflict with one 
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another, the resource can be used as a hindrance power. The resource owner can use the 
resource to leverage for a better position or to block actions that can threaten his own 
interests (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.47).  
3.3.2 Goal congruence 
Conflicts arise in the network when network members have different aims and expectations 
and differing views on strategies and tactics on resolving this problem. With these 
differences, each actor makes decisions and takes actions that will protect its own interest 
(Bryson et al. 2006, p.48). To avoid conflict, it is important that actors, at the outset, agree 
on a common network vision and purpose that also incorporates the stake or interest of 
each member and the level of interdependence needed to solve the problem. 
Even when the network goal is clearly defined in the contract, getting all network members 
to agree on the goal does not come automatically. Interorganisational collaboration 
requires the identification and mutual acknowledgment of the problem to allow the parties 
to negotiate issues of legitimacy and recognise the interdependencies that exist among 
themselves (Gray 1985, p.917). When network actors have a shared understanding of the 
problem that they need to address jointly, they can come to a consensus on the network 
goals. Formulating solutions is not difficult when the interests and perceptions of the 
parties are congruent. Breakthroughs occur when crucial decisions are made that serve to 
reformulate the problem, reconcile conflicting solutions or change the composition of the 
group involved. They can also pave way to a new round of interaction (Koppenjan & Klijn 
2004, p.60). 
In situations where problem solving requires cooperation, it is easy for a network actor to 
assume that other actors perceive the problem the same way it does (Koppenjan & Klijn 
2004, p.31). However, organisations are primarily governed by their mandates, which can 
influence the way they interpret problems. Each actor in the network can have different 
frames of reference on the situation that needs to be resolved. Their ideas about facts, 
interests, norms and values are shaped by their previous experiences and perceptions. This 
may be a cause of misunderstanding and gaps and create a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ where 
parties talk past each other (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.33). With numerous actors in the 
network, each representing their individual agency’s mandate, numerous strategies may be 
formulated that may not be satisfactory for all parties and may result in an impasse. An 
impasse can either result in stagnation where actors are unwilling to participate further in 
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the process or a blockage where some parties veto the initiative altogether (Koppenjan & 
Klijn 2004, p.60). 
Problem solving in the network is not just an intellectual design activity meant to address 
substantive uncertainties but, more importantly, it is altogether an exercise of cooperation 
to manage divergent perceptions (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.50). This process is not 
hassle-free as parties can go through several rounds of impasses and breakthroughs in the 
course of the problem solving process. Problem solving occurs in arenas where mutually 
dependent actors jointly deliberate on problem definitions and solution (Figure 3.1). The 
complexity of decision making and the multiplicity of actors require investments in forming 
and maintaining relations (Agranoff & Mcguire 2003; Klijn et al. 2010). In maintaining 
relationships, parties establish social elements and relational norms and adopt process 
elements to safeguards a more durable, stable, long-term relationship (Zaheer & 
Venkatraman 1995, p.380; Ring & Van de Ven 1992; Klijn et al. 2010). These social 
elements and relational norms are network rules and trust, which can help regulate 
relationships among actors in the network.  
Network rules can lend order to the complexity in the network. Rules provide the general 
procedure to guide the actions and regulate the behaviour of the actors in the network by 
prescribing the permitted actions, the activities to partake in and the quality of products or 
services produced in the network (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.77). Network rules offer 
understanding into the institutional structure of the network and provide vital information 
on both the opportunities and limitations of actions in the network. Rules can be formal or 
informal. Formal rules are deliberately created like laws, jurisprudence and contracts, while 
informal rules are formulated during the course of interactions, such as verbal agreements 
or interviews (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.75). In the course of implementing formal rules, 
actors interact and collaborate, which give rise to informal rules, such as personal 
relationships, psychological contracts, and informal understandings and commitments. 
Policies also develop when actors make their resources available to others (Koppenjan & 
Klijn 2004, p.143). However, for networks that are self-initiated and not created by law or 
contract, conformity to rules and procedures is purely voluntary, which gives network 
participants limited formal accountability to network-level goals (Provan & Kenis 2007, 
p.232). Organisational rules should be distinguished from network rules. Actors are 
primarily committed to their own organisational goals and are likely to adapt to the goals of 
the network if it will be beneficial to their own organisations (Bryson et al. 2006; Gray 1985; 
Hjern & Porter 1981; Kickert et al. 1997). A problem occurs when an organisation’s own 
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mission and goals conflict with the overall network goals, and vice-versa (Goldsmith & 
Eggers 2004; Provan & Kenis 2007).  
Trust among network actors enhances governance process outcomes (Zaheer & 
Venkatraman 1995; Klijn et al. 2010; Vincent-Jones 2000). The need for parties to work 
cooperatively over the contractual duration means that each must bank on the 
trustworthiness of other parties to observe the deal (Ring & Van de Ven 1992, p.488). Trust 
reduces risk because it creates stability and greater predictability in relational networks 
(Klijn et al. 2010; Koppenjan & Klijn 2004; Ring & Van de Ven 1992). When there is trust, 
parties negotiate and agree to address fairly the potential gaps that cannot be identified or 
predicted at the time of contract signing and comply to the contractual terms in the future 
(Ring & Van de Ven 1992; Zaheer & Venkatraman 1995). When there is trust, it is highly 
likely that actors will invest their resources, such as money, expertise, knowledge and so 
on, thereby creating a further basis for cooperation (Klijn et al. 2010, p.197). To achieve 
the desired outcomes, it is assumed that when the issue is more complex, trust is more 
important. The more strategies used and the more intensive these strategies are, the 
higher the level of trust (Klijn et al. 2010, p.199).  
3.3.3 Network management 
With multiple actors functioning under different interests, problem perceptions and 
strategies, it is challenging to get actors to agree on rules on resource allocation and a 
common network goal (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.118). In this complex setting, a network 
leader is necessary to inspire goal congruence in the network, coordinate the strategies of 
actors and make hard decisions when needed. To solve complex problems, network leaders 
should be able to ‘initiate concerted action not only within their own organisations but 
among a set of stakeholders with different and competing interests’ (Broussine 20013 as 
cited in O’Flynn 2013, p.33).  
Leaders need formal and informal authority, vision and long-term commitment to the 
collaboration, integrity, and relational and political skills to be effective. Formal leadership 
positions, such as committee chairperson or project director, attract a higher level of buy-in 
among the collaborating partners. Informal leadership positions need to be developed 
when the network does not have a centralised direction and network leadership is not 
clear-cut (Bryson et al. 2006, p.47). A network manager is faced with a big challenge when 
there is distrust among network partners caused by different cultures and values, which 
can reduce the efficacy of the network. Thus, a network manager must have a legitimate 
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authority to organise the network, be able to foster mutual exchange and be able to 
manage a multitude of different professional cultures to harness cooperation among 
network actors (Jackson & Stainsby 2000, p.15). It must also have a sense of timing, the 
ability to scan the environment and see the wisdom in appraising the consequences of 
future actions (Goldsmith & Eggers 2004, p.165). 
There are two key leadership roles: sponsors and champions. Sponsors are not closely 
involved in the day-to-day collaborative work but have considerable prestige, authority and 
access to resources they can use to advance collaboration. Champions, on the other hand, 
are more focused on managing the collaboration and use process skills to achieve network 
goals (Bryson et al. 2006, p.47). The activities of each arena should be coordinated by 
relationship managers or boundary spanners whose specific task is to manage and build 
interorganisational relationships, not just to make sure collaboration requirements are 
being met (Thomson & Perry 2006; Williams 2002). The role of boundary spanners are: (1) 
build and sustain effective interpersonal relationships among partners, (2) play an ‘honest 
broker role’ in the event of contested power structures and (3) manage interdependency, 
which is a skill that is developed through ‘accumulated ‘on-the-job’ interorganisational 
experience” (Thomson & Perry 2006, p.25).  
3.4 Determine the network effects of PPP in each arena 
The different network features shape the relationship and interactions in the network and 
the likely network effects are a result of the interplay of these features. Depending on the 
actions and interactions of and among actors in the network, network features can be 
supportive or critical of coordinated efforts to achieve a common policy objective (Kenis & 
Schneider 1991, p.30). In analysing the network effect of PPP, I propose that when network 
strategies recognise the network features, the network is more likely to produce a positive 
network effect. A positive network effect occurs when the objectives of the network are 
achieved. Conversely, when the network does not have clear rules on resource allocations, 
the actors do not agree on a common network goal and there is no legitimate network 
manager leading and coordinating the network strategies, the network is more likely to 
produce a negative network effect. There is a negative network effect when the goals of the 
network are not achieved within a timely and efficient manner or not achieved at all. 
Table 3.1 provides a summary on evaluating network features.  
The network produces a positive outcome if its objectives are achieved. The network is 
conducive to collaboration when actors agree on how the resources will be shared or 
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allocated. Control over resources is dispersed among several actors and resources are 
used to realise network goals, not just organisational objectives. The network is managed 
by a legally mandated network leader whose authority is recognised by the network 
members. The network leader’s management style is consultative, participatory and able to 
facilitate goal consensus among network members. When issues arise, the network 
manager enables network members to formulate a common problem definition. When 
actors are collaborative, they contribute to the establishment and enhancement of 
governance process outcomes (Zaheer & Venkatraman 1995, p.380). 
Table 3.1 Analysing network features  
Network features Nature of relations 
Resources interdependence 
 Do actors need the resource of 
another to perform its functions  
Yes No 
 Is resource dependence mutual 
or one way? 
Mutual One way 
 Do actors agree on how the 
resources shall be allocated or 
shared? 
Yes No 
Goal congruence 
 Does the network have a clearly 
defined goal?  
Yes No 
 Do all actors agree on the goal?   
 Do the individual mandates of 
each organisation align or 
conflict with the common goal? 
Yes No 
 Do they actually perform 
towards the goal? 
Yes No 
 Are there rules set on how to 
jointly achieve the goal? 
Yes No 
 Are the rules:    
a. Formal or informal? Formal:  
stable and predictable 
Informal:    
flexible and negotiable 
b. Specificity Detailed Broad 
c. Time-bound Yes No 
Network leadership/management 
 Authority   
a. Is there an authoritative 
decision maker? 
b. Does the authority have 
legitimacy?  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 Management style Participatory/consultative Top to bottom/hierarchical 
Network effect Positive outcomes: 
 objectives achieved 
Negative outcomes:   
objectives not achieved 
 
The network produces negative outcomes when its objectives are not achieved. 
Interorganisational collaboration cannot be achieved when the network is not conducive to 
cooperation, or interactions between actors stagnate, are blocked or have led to undesired 
or unforeseen consequences (E. H. Klijn & Koppenjan 2000, p.143). In which case, This 
network is more likely to yield negative outcomes because actors have conflicting and 
Chapter 3 
52 
contested relationships brought about by unsettled expectations and poor interaction 
patterns (Hjern & Porter 1981, p.223). There is poor interaction when the network features 
are not managed. Control over resources is concentrated in one or a few actors that are not 
willing to make these resources available to actors that need them. The network is 
governed by broad and informal rules that can be changed and negotiated over different 
time periods. The network does not have a formal network manager, and if there is one, the 
network manager is managing in an ad hoc capacity. The management style is usually 
hierarchical. Because the network leader does not have legitimate authority, its leadership 
is not recognised by most or all network members. It is difficult to motivate goal consensus 
in the network as actors prioritise the objectives of their own organisations. Each actor 
perceives problems differently. With different problem definitions, there will also be a 
proliferation of strategies. These create conflicting and contested relationships among 
actors and impede the development of trust among actors thereby hindering parties from 
establishing cooperative processes and fully achieving network outcomes. 
3.5 Methods of data collection  
Data collection for this research was conducted in Metro Manila, Philippines in two stages. 
The first stage was the scoping work for two weeks in July 2012. The second stage was the 
fieldwork conducted in 20 February to 15 May 2014 and 20 July to 27 October 2014. The 
scoping work was undertaken to gather background information on the sewerage sector in 
Metro Manila, particularly on the engineering and governance aspect of the service. The 
scoping activity was undertaken to gather sufficient information to formulate my research 
questions and draft my research proposal. During the scoping work, I interviewed engineers 
from the private concessionaires, local government units (LGUs), an international 
specialised agency working on local sanitation projects and the sanitary engineering 
association in the Philippines. The major takeaways from these conversations were that 
there were numerous organisations involved in the sewerage sector and that there is no 
clear coordinating mechanism in place. These became the foundations of my thesis 
proposal, but since I did not secure ethics approval for the scoping activity, no references or 
information from these conversations were used for this research.   
The second stage of data collection was conducted during fieldwork in Metro Manila. Metro 
Manila is the only region in the Philippines where water and sewerage services were 
privatised. I am particularly interested in sewerage services and the interorganisational 
collaboration aspect in the services. Information for this research was collected from 
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various sources, as enumerated in Table 3.2, to ensure that a solid and comprehensive 
narrative is created (Yin 2009, p.101). 
Table 3.2 Data collection matrix 
Information/ Information Source Documentation Interviews Direct observation 
Arena 1: Tariff setting    
Private concessionaires Yes Yes  
Regulator Yes Yes  
Arbitration Panel Yes   
Financing institution Yes Yes  
Arena 2: STP construction    
Private concessionaires Yes Yes Yes 
Local government units Yes Yes Yes 
National government agencies Yes Yes Yes 
Community/local residents  Yes Yes 
Arena 3: Interagency monitoring    
Private concessionaires Yes Yes  
Inter-agency committee Yes Yes Yes 
Activist/consumer groups Yes Yes Yes 
Sectoral experts Yes Yes  
 
3.5.1 Documentation 
In evaluating partnerships or relationships success, Hodge and Greve (2007, p.548) 
suggest three possible information sources: policy rhetoric, the legal contract and historical 
outcomes experience. These were the main documentary information sources for this 
research.  
PPP is an economic policy adopted by the Philippine government to improve the operations 
of water and sewerage services in Metro Manila. This policy was operationalised through a 
legal contract entered into between the government and the winning private 
concessionaires in 1997. The legal contract spelled out the duties and obligations of all 
parties to the contract. Historical outcomes experience as a source of information is 
relevant for this research because the Metro Manila concessions had been riddled by a 
number of issues and controversies since 1997. News articles, reports from government, 
non-government organisations (NGOs) and multilateral international agencies were secured 
through internet searches. One of the most relevant documents on the policy’s historical 
outcomes is chronicled in The Manila Water Concession: A Key Government Officials Diary 
of the World's Largest Water Privatization Official by the World Bank (Dumol 2000).  
The topic of privatised sewerage services in Metro Manila has not been a subject of 
academic research and much of the information found on this topic related to reports 
produced by multilateral aid agencies. Official government documents related to Metro 
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Manila sewerage were also referred to, which were obtained from government agencies 
such as the MWSS Regulatory Office (MWSS-RO), Department of Environment and Natural 
Resource (DENR), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the Department 
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Most importantly, since the problem perspective 
adopted by this research is from that of the private concessionaires, important documents 
were also secured from the two private concessionaires, Maynilad and Manila Water, 
specifically the Business Plans for the Rate Rebasing for the years 2008 and 2012. 
These pieces of documentary information were corroborated with the data gathered from 
interviewees and other sources, and vice-versa. In identifying which agencies and 
organisations are involved in the sewerage sector, I pored over voluminous legal issuances, 
studies and evaluation of multilateral funding agencies that funded sanitation and 
sewerage projects in the Philippines, and news articles. The initial network map was 
validated through the interviews, i.e., confirmed with the respondents if the organisations 
that I initially identified are part of the sewerage sector. Prior to my interviews, I did my 
preparation mainly through internet searches about the respondent, organisation and/or 
the particular project/event/activity of the respondent. I also requested the interviewees for 
pertinent documents from their agencies, such as minutes of interagency meetings, 
feasibility studies and reports. News articles were a particularly valuable source of 
information because, at the time of the fieldwork, the concessionaires and the regulator 
were locked in arbitration. As legal documents were not made available to the public, I was 
advised to rely on the information released to the media.   
3.5.2 Interviews 
Interviews, considered to be as the most important data source for case studies (Yin 
2009:106), are a key source of information for this thesis. Interviews are the best way to 
elicit information on the respondents’ interorganisational relationships and dynamics and 
how such interactions impact on the service delivery outcomes as documentary information 
mainly provided information on the legal, political and performance aspects of the Metro 
Manila water and sewerage concessions. 
I adopted the snowball or referral sampling process in selecting the interviewees by first 
identifying key informants who could introduce me to other potential interviewees and from 
then on the snowball became larger (Edwards & Holland 2013; Burnham et al. 2008). 
Since the research problem was formulated from the perspective of the concessionaires, I 
conducted the initial interviews with key personnel from the two companies who were 
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involved or had some involvement in the implementation of sewerage projects. The 
interviewees were asked to identify the organisations they worked with in order to fulfil their 
company’s sewerage service obligations. I interviewed a total of ten persons from the two 
concessionaires whose designation ranged from project staff to the vice-president level.  
In determining the number of interviewees, I was guided by the concept of saturation. This 
concept does not set a prescribed or ideal number of interviewees; instead, it guides the 
researcher to gauge the number of interviewees based on the range of meanings gathered 
from the interviews (Edwards & Holland 2013, p.66). The saturation point of interviews has 
been reached when the interviewees are not telling anything that has not been mentioned 
by other interviewees or when the interviews are not adding anything new to the stock of 
information (Edwards & Holland 2013; Burnham et al. 2008). I did not set a particular 
number of interviewees but aimed to interview at least one person from each of the 
organisations identified by the concessionaires. Most respondents were interviewed 
exclusively for one arena but a few acted as resource persons for at least two arenas. A 
total of 34 people coming from the public, private and non-government sectors were 
interviewed for this research, yielding around 40 hours of interview, as enumerated in Table 
3.3. Of the 34 interviewees, 12 are from the private sector, ten hail from national 
government agencies, six work at the local government level in five different cities, two from 
the House of Representatives, while the rest are consumers or from non-government 
organisations. Some respondents acted as informants in more than one arena.  
Table 3.3 Number and types of interviewees 
Arena Number of informants Organisations/affiliations 
Tariff setting 8 Private sector 
National government agency 
Financing institution 
STP construction 21 Private sector 
National government agency 
Local government units 
Local resident 
Interagency monitoring 11 National government agency 
Private sector 
Sectoral experts 3 Former high ranking national 
and local government officials 
 
The interviews were open-ended and guided conversations, which is characteristic of case 
study interviews (Yin 2009, p.106). I prepared an interview schedule based on the 
analytical framework that would elicit responses addressing the research questions. The 
questions were formulated based on four themes: (1) the interviewees’ role and functions 
related to sewerage service, (2) their experiences in working with other 
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agencies/organisations in performing their functions, (3) the challenges they encountered 
when dealing with agencies/organisations and (4) the strategies or actions undertaken to 
overcome these challenges and the outcomes of these strategies. To ensure that the line of 
inquiry would prompt interviewees’ to share their experiences, questions were framed in 
the form of ‘hows’ and ‘whys’. For instance, a question I asked on the collaboration process 
was, ‘How does working with actor A help your organisation fulfil its sewerage function?’ or 
if they encountered difficulties in interorganisational collaboration, I asked, ‘Why is it 
challenging or difficult working with actor A?.’ My line of inquiry was organised based on the 
arena in the sewerage network that the interviewee belonged to (Table 3.4). The interviews 
also served as an opportunity to corroborate the data gathered from documentary sources 
and other interviewees. Table 3.4 shows the thematic framework for the interviews. 
Table 3.4 Thematic framework for interviews 
Interview themes Interview questions Analytical framework 
The interviewee’s and 
his/her organisations 
direct or indirect role in 
providing sewerage 
service 
What is your role/participation in the 
implementation of this project? 
Decision making 
arenas  
The organisations they 
have to work with in 
order to perform their 
functions 
 Did you have to work with other agencies in the 
course of this project? 
 Which agencies did you work with? What are 
the support/resources you require from these 
agencies? 
 How does working with these agencies help 
your organisation fulfil its sewerage function? 
 Are you satisfied/dissatisfied in with your 
working relationship with these agencies? 
Network features   
(resource 
interdependence, 
goal congruence) 
The challenges they 
encounter in the 
pursuit of their 
functions 
 What were the challenges/obstacles you 
encountered when working with agencies?  
 Why do you think it is difficult to work with 
these agencies? Where/with whom do you 
think the problem lies? 
 Do you think working with these agencies is 
important to your project? Do you think they 
can be eliminated from the process? How and 
Why? 
Network feature 
(resource 
interdependence), 
network effect   
The strategies adopted 
or actions undertaken 
to overcome these 
challenges. 
 What actions did you take to overcome these 
challenges? 
 How are problems resolved and decisions 
made to resolve these problems?  
 How do you think these difficulties/challenges 
can be eliminated? What would be the ideal 
situation? 
Network feature 
(network 
management), 
network effect  
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I conducted in-depth and focused interviews. In-depth interviews are useful for case study 
interviews because respondents are asked not just about facts but also their opinions on 
and insights to certain events, which can be the basis of further inquiry (Bouma & Ling 
2004; Yin 2009). The interviewees in in-depth interviews are considered to be informants 
because they can suggest other persons who can be interviewed or initiate access to 
corroboratory or contrary sources of evidence (Yin 2009, p.107). My key informants for this 
research were the interviewees from the two private concessionaires in view of their 
extensive involvement in all aspects of sewerage services and their constant interaction 
with other actors in the network. The rest of the interviews conducted were focused 
interviews wherein the respondents are interviewed at one time for a short period of time 
(Yin, 2009, p. 107). The focused interviews usually lasted from 30 to 45 minutes. It is 
similar to in-depth interviews in the way that these interviews are also open-ended and 
conversational in nature. In addition to eliciting information for my main line of inquiry, 
these interviews also served as an opportunity to corroborate data gathered from other 
interviewees or other sources such as news articles. 
The interviews were conducted either one-on-one, in couples or in groups. Most interviews 
were conducted one-on-one but there were a few interviews that I conducted in couples or 
groups. The couple or group interviewing technique is useful in yielding the best information 
when a respondent may be hesitant to provide information in one-on-one interview, the 
interviewees are cooperative with each other and/or when time to collect information is 
limited (Creswell 1998, p.124). A few organisations opted for the couple or group interviews 
for practicality and accuracy, i.e., to save time by setting the interview with the team in one 
interview appointment and to verify information with other team members right away. 
During these interviews, I had to ensure that all participants talk and no individual 
dominate the conversation. A total of eight couples or group interviews were conducted for 
this research: five with the two private concessionaires (three management teams and two 
project teams), one with the secretariat of the monitoring committee, one with a 
government department, and one with a legislator who invited the president of an activist 
group to join the interview.  
The elite interviews conducted were one-on-one interviews. Elite respondents possessed 
‘high levels of knowledge of the subject matter under discussion,’ favoured for their 
‘general intellectual and expressive abilities’ and wielded more influence than others on the 
decision making process (Burnham et al. 2008, p.231). Because of their stature, these 
people are usually very busy and getting an appointment for an interview is the biggest 
challenge for the researcher, which is ‘more art than science’ (Goldstein, 2002 as cited in 
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Burnham et al. 2008,p.235). In the latter part of this chapter, I will discuss the challenges I 
encountered in getting elite interviews and how I managed them.  
For the interview protocols, I initially sent letters to the targeted respondents, stating the 
purpose of the interview and the nature of my research, followed by a phone call to 
schedule the date and time for the interview. Most, if not all, interviews were conducted in 
the workplace of the respondents located around Metro Manila. Before every interview, 
respondents were given a copy of the research information sheet and verbally informed of 
the nature of the research project and their rights as interviewees. My research information 
sheet, consent forms and interview guide were in English. Interviews were mostly 
conducted in English and Taglish, which is a term for mixing English and Tagalog when 
speaking.1 Most interviews were audio recorded with the consent of the respondents. For 
the few interviews that were not audio recorded, I took notes and informed the respondents 
that all data gathered during the session will be used for my research. 
3.5.3 Direct observation 
A case study should take place in the natural setting of the ‘case’ that creates the 
opportunity for direct observations to perceive reality from the viewpoint of someone 
‘inside’ the case study and at the same time ‘critically examine research assumption and 
beliefs’ DeWalt & DeWalt 2011, p.1; Yin 2009). This approach, however, has been criticised 
for potential biases and the tendency for the observer or researcher to become a supporter 
of the group (Yin 2009, p.112-113). These perils were countered by validating the data 
gathered from direct observation with other data sources and vice-versa. The criteria for 
site selection were: (1) the site allows for maximum comparability and access to a diverse 
range of data on activities, places and actors, and (2) the role that the researcher assumed 
in the setting and whether such a role allowed sufficient access to the subject matter of 
interest (DeWalt & DeWalt 2011; Yin 2009). 
Construction of STP is the crux of the concessionaires’ service obligations so I chose a STP 
construction site as the setting for direct observation. Direct observation provided me 
firsthand and in-depth information on their operations that I would not have been able to 
extract from on an interview alone. This was conducted from 12 to 16 May 2014 at the 
Talayan STP construction site. The STP construction site provided a number of 
opportunities to collect data. For one, project documents were stored on that site. Second, 
                                                          
1 Tagalog is one of the major languages in the Philippines, mainly spoken in the NCR where Metro Manila is 
located. English is an official language of communication in the Philippines. 
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spending one week at the project site permitted me to observe the project team’s normal 
workday: discussing day-to-day tasks, attending meetings and even joining them for lunch. 
After a day, I noticed that they were more comfortable with my presence and seemed more 
candid and natural by the time I conducted the interview on the third day. Third, I was able 
to physically inspect the project site and verify the physical obstructions that caused 
construction delays. The STP was constructed in a vacant lot adjacent to a creek in a 
residential area that is mainly comprised of low income households. The major reasons for 
the delay identified by the project team were road congestion at the project site and the 
lack of cooperation of the residents in the area, which I confirmed during my site visits. I 
also interviewed a resident and a barangay 2official of the community. I decided against 
taking photographs as I might be mistaken by residents as a journalist, which might have 
jeopardised the relationship that the project team had built with the local residents.  
Another opportunity for direct observation came by attending interagency committee 
meetings. I was meant to attend the meeting as a passive observer but was given the 
opportunity to raise questions. The participants were candid and unguarded around my 
presence and revealed invaluable information I would not have been able to elicit from one-
on-one interviews. Being a former government employee, the participants did not see me as 
an outsider. From a passive observer, I became an active participant in the discussion — 
probing on the interagency committee meetings and decision making processes and the 
relationship between the committee and agencies. The statements made by the agency 
representatives corroborated information gathered from interviews and documents.  
3.6 Methods of data analysis  
I used the qualitative analysis of a single case study design to evaluate the network effects 
in the Metro Manila concessions to illustrate how relational networks impact on network 
outcomes. A case study allows for an in-depth study of the network effects of PPP on the 
Metro Manila sewerage services sector to reveal the complex interactions of multiple actors 
at different levels (Yin 2009; Creswell 1998). While multiple case studies are deemed more 
compelling and more robust (Yin 2009, p.53), a single case study is more appropriate for a 
revelatory case, i.e. the subject matter to be observed and analysed was ‘previously 
inaccessible to social science inquiry’ (Yin 2009, p.48). This thesis can be considered a 
revelatory case because the case of the Metro Manila concessions has not been studied 
from a network perspective. Existing studies have analysed the Metro Manila Water 
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concessions from a principal-agent and organisation-set perspective and mainly examined 
the water aspect and not the sewerage services (cf. Fabella 2012; Malaluan & Wu 2008; 
Hale 2006; Cuaresma 2006; Argo & Lacquian 2004; Esguerra 2003).  
The analytic strategy I employed for this research was to follow the theoretical propositions 
of the case study (Yin 2009, p.130). The analytical framework presented in the first part of 
this chapter was derived from network governance theories, which defined the general 
objectives and design of the case study. It is imperative to identify the theoretical 
proposition and formulate the research questions prior to data collection as it helps 
organise the entire case study and focus attention on the necessary data and ignore the 
unnecessary data (Yin 2009, p.130). However, the analysis of case study evidence is 
challenging because it is one of the least-developed qualitative research method and 
investigators usually commence their case studies without having an idea of how to analyse 
the data to be collected (Yin 2009, p.127).  
I also adopted the program-level logic model as a data analytic technique for this thesis. 
This logic model traces the events surrounding the implementation of a public program 
intervention intended to produce a certain outcome or sequence of outcomes (Yin 2009, 
p.150). This model also looks into the immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes of a 
policy, as well as the rival chain of events and the value of spurious external events, if any. 
In this case study, PPP is the public program intervention that the Philippine government 
adopted. Through this model, I will purposely narrate in Chapter 4 the complex chain of 
events in the Metro Manila sewerage service over an extended period of time leading to the 
sector’s current state. In section 4.2 of Chapter 4, the history of sewerage services in Metro 
Manila was narrated, highlighting the major legislations, policies and programs adopted 
and implemented by the Philippine government. The effect of these government decisions 
and actions are explained in Section 4.3 by mapping out the resulting institutional 
framework of the Metro Manila sewerage network. As a result, there is no single 
government agency in the Philippine government that has oversight on all aspects of 
sewerage service. These developments over time have shaped the sewerage sector’s 
current institutional design What was created over the years of were numerous agencies 
and interagency bodies that have no clear delineation on how these agencies collaborate in 
performing their sewerage-related functions towards a common goal, if there is one. As a 
result, the sewerage sector in the Philippines has no precise configuration.  
Through the program-level logic model, this research explores the main and rival 
explanations as to why the intermediate outcomes were not achieved by organising the 
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Metro Manila sewerage sector in arenas of interaction. The arena is where mutually 
dependent actors define problems, formulate solutions and make crucial decisions that 
impact on network outcomes (Provan & Milward 1991; Koppenjan & Klijn 2004; Gray 
1985). In each arena, the main and rival explanations are identified by establishing the 
main problems encountered by the actors in the arena, explaining how the network 
features of PPP contributed to these and discussing how the network features created 
negative network effects and its impact on the concessionaires’ performance. The following 
section further explains how the program-level logic model was operationalised in analysing 
the data. 
3.6.1 Organising the data 
The first step is to convert all the recorded interviews into written text. Transcribing the 
interviews allowed me to become familiar not only with the contents but also on the tone or 
emotion of the respondents during the interview. Interview notes and summaries were also 
taken during the interviews. For all other sources of evidence, a brief description and 
summary were also written. Since this research guarantees the anonymity of interviewees, 
electronic and hard copies of the interviews will be coded using a three-part identification 
number: (1) type of actor; (2) year of fieldwork; and (3) interviewee number. There are six 
types of actors in the Metro Manila sewerage network: (1) government officials (GO), (2) 
private concessionaires (PC), (3) non-government officials (NG), (4) local government 
officials (LG), consumers (C) and elite respondents (E). The field notes gathered during the 
direct observation are labelled according to date and activity.  
3.6.2 Converting texts to explanations 
After the recordings were converted into texts, the next step is to convert these texts into 
explanations to answer the research questions (Gläser & Laudel 2013). The first step in 
converting texts to explanation is to link the raw data to the research question. This entails 
identifying, locating and structuring the relevant data gathered during the data collection 
process. Identifying and locating raw data includes two tasks. First is to select the texts that 
are relevant for answering the research question and second is subsume these texts under 
the appropriate category. The categories can be derived from theory and changed or 
supplemented according to empirical information in the text or vice-versa. I grouped the 
texts under the three different headings. I familiarised myself with the interviews by 
listening to them a number of times and re-reading the transcripts and field notes. This 
made it easier for me to locate the relevant texts in each file once I decided on the 
categories. The texts were uploaded into NVivo software and the relevant texts were tagged 
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according to the categories or nodes identified. I went through a number of categories 
before settling on the final categories below (Table 3.5): 
Table 3.5 Categorising interview texts 
Decision making 
areas/code 
Actors Issues/network effect Network features 
Tariff setting(TS)  Private 
concessionaires 
 Regulator 
 International 
arbitration panel 
 Contract 
implementation 
 Regulatory risk 
 Dispute resolution 
 Resource 
interdependence 
 Goal congruence 
 Network 
management 
STP construction (STP)  Private 
concessionaires 
 Other private actors 
 National government 
agencies 
 Local government 
units 
 Local communities 
 Consumers 
 
 Land acquisition 
 Informal settlers 
 Permits &licenses 
acquisition 
 Right of way 
 Competency and 
integrity of local 
officials 
 Buy-in of local 
governments on the 
project 
Interagency monitoring 
(IM) 
 Private 
concessionaires 
 National government 
agencies 
 Non-government 
actors/activist groups 
 Interagency 
monitoring body 
 Absence of data and 
system to generate 
that data 
 Unclear interagency 
coordination 
processes 
 Different interpretation 
of problems/rules 
 
After the relevant texts were tagged to the categories, the next step was to search for 
patterns in the data. The patterns in the data include (1) more-than-once-occurring 
sequences of events, (2) more-than-once-occurring combinations of conditions, processes 
and outcomes and (3) conflicting accounts of events or processes (Gläser & Laudel 2013). 
The NVivo software is able to populate the number of times a certain category has been 
tagged and the number of sources. Searching for patterns serves as a tool to triangulate 
data and test internal validity. For example, an actor cited ‘permits and licenses acquisition’ 
as a major cause of delay for STP construction. I used this as one of my categories and all 
texts or statements in the transcripts that mention this category are tagged. At least eight 
different respondents from the private, national government agencies and LGUs have 
mentioned ‘securing permits and licenses’ as a source of delay. This step also provides 
rival explanations as LGUs were interviewed on their processes in issuing permits and 
licenses.  
Once patterns have been identified, the third step is to integrate them. Integrating patterns 
means determining if the patterns are different or can be merged into one or link those 
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data that do not fit into the pattern, i.e., how do those data that do not form a pattern fit 
into the overall story? In this research, integration was done by subsuming the actors, 
network features and network effects under the different decision making arenas. The 
issues raised by respondents are confirmed or disproved by validating with other sources of 
evidence. The empirical evidence is then juxtaposed against theory, assertions are 
presented and conclusions are made on how network relationships impact on the 
outcomes within an arena and the broader sewerage services network.  
3.7 Ethical concerns and challenges of doing fieldwork 
Prior to my fieldwork, I did not anticipate any major cultural and social sensitivity issues that 
may affect or hinder my interaction with the respondents. I am a Filipino citizen and, more 
importantly, I have lived and worked in Metro Manila where my study is situated. Moreover, 
I surmised that my previous experience of working with the Philippine government might be 
an advantage when interviewing respondents from the government. I assumed that 
interviewees would see me as someone relatable and not as an intruder out to find fault in 
what they do.  
My main concern prior to my fieldwork was the difficulty in securing appointments for 
interviews given their busy schedule. As expected this was my single most challenging 
concern as it gravely affected my timeline, which led me to extend my fieldwork for another 
two months from my original target of five months. Because of their profile, conducting the 
interview with elite respondents is relatively easier compared to the process of getting the 
interview (Burnham et al. 2008; Edwards & Holland 2013). When potential interviewees 
were contacted by normal channels, most of them did not respond. Normal channels refer 
to writing a letter to their heads of agencies to ask permission to interview personnel from 
their organisations who are involved in sewerage projects or sewerage related activities. 
This was followed up by phone calls. For the most part, this strategy did not yield responses. 
I then resorted to using my personal network to get appointments for interviews. In one 
instance, I had to contact a fraternity brother occupying a senior government position 
through a social network site to request an interview with his brother who holds a senior 
position at DPWH. In a span of one week, I was able to schedule interviews in the 
department. In another case, I had to ask several persons to intercede and waited for three 
months before I finally got an interview with an elite respondent. Another expert initially 
declined my request but I persisted and he eventually obliged, acknowledging that that I am 
‘one persistent lady.’ For another interviewee, I was told over the phone that my letter was 
misplaced and I was asked to re-submit another request. When I asked a friend who 
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worked in the same organisation to personally follow-up on my request, the letter was 
located and an interview was arranged within the same week.  
In some cases, however, resorting to personal connections did not work. For one 
interviewee, the intercession of her son (after numerous emails) did not yield an interview. 
Eventually, I chanced upon her in one interagency committee meeting that I attended. I 
approached her after the meeting and informed her of my several requests for an interview. 
She acknowledged receiving all of them and was willing to be interviewed but her busy 
schedule did not permit her. Fortunately, she had the time at that very moment and I was 
able to get 48 minutes of interview while waiting for her driver to pick her up.  
3.8 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has described the analytical and methodological frameworks adopted for this 
research. The complex nature of the relationships in relational networks has guided the 
choice of network governance theories as the foundation for the analytical framework 
developed in this chapter. The adoption of multiple qualitative methods of data collection 
such as documentary analysis, in-depth interviews and direct observation are deemed most 
appropriate in capturing network complexity. The information gathered from different 
sources were analysed using the program-level logic model of data analysis. Finally, I 
reflected on the challenges I encountered while doing my fieldwork. The findings that these 
methods have yielded are presented in the next four chapters. 
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Chapter 4  
History and the current state of the  
Metro Manila sewerage services network  
4.1 Introduction 
This research argues that PPP has created a relational network governance structure. This 
governance structure is confronted by wicked problems rooted to its networked 
environment and the traditional method of dealing with problems is not sufficient in 
addressing such complexity. Wicked problems are created by the involvement of many 
actors working from different organisations, administrative levels and networks (Koppenjan 
& Klijn 2004, p.7). Since actors are guided by the values and objectives of their own 
organisations, each actor can have a different frame of reference and thereby form 
different perceptions of problems and interpretations of information, and eventually 
develop different strategies (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.3,6-7). Each network has its own 
history and, over periods of time, the network has been organised and reorganised where 
rules have been formed, revised or rescinded, all of which have an effect on the current 
state of the network (Klijn & Koppenjan 2006, p.144).  
To understand how and why the Metro Manila sewerage services network is confronted by 
wicked problems, this chapter maps out and examines the institutional design of its 
network environment. The second section of this chapter presents a historical overview of 
sewerage services in Metro Manila — from its establishment during colonial era to the 
current concession arrangement — and how these have shaped the governing structure of 
the sewerage sector in Metro Manila. The third section maps out the existing institutional 
framework and governing structure as a result of historical development in the sector over 
the years. It also identifies the arenas of interaction where crucial decisions that impact 
most on service delivery outcomes are made.  
4.2 History of sewerage services in Metro Manila 
Located along the north western Pacific and sitting astride the Pacific Ring of Fire, the 
Philippines is a natural path for typhoons (averaging 20 a year) and is vulnerable to 
earthquake and volcanic eruptions (Bankoff 2003, p.225). The country’s capital region, 
Metro Manila lies on a semi-alluvial plain bounded on the north by the Malabon-Tullahan 
river basin, the Pasig Marikina river basin in the east, and opens to the low lying coast of 
Manila Bay and the large lake of Laguna de Bay of the southeast (Bankoff 2003, p.227).   
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Due to its naturally flat topography and coastal location that lies below sea level, sewerage 
is particularly an indispensable and relevant urban infrastructure for Metro Manila. The 
metropolis is highly prone to flooding and the lack of sewerage services creates a gamut of 
other problems. Manila was the first city in in Asia to establish a sewerage system in 1909 
(Argo & Lacquian 2004, p.6) and, more than a century later, less than 10% of the of the 14 
million inhabitants of the Philippine capital are connected to the sewerage network 
(Kearton et al. 2013, p.10).3 Untreated wastewater produced in the capital ends up in 
canals, rivers and the sea. Heavily polluted waterways, recurring typhoons and constant 
flooding, not to mention the looming peril of earthquake, have rendered Metro Manila a 
cauldron for disasters and a hotbed for disease. It has been reported that cholera, which is 
largely associated with poor access to sanitation, is still an endemic disease in the 
Philippines (Lopez et al. 2015, p.2). 
4.2.1 Emergence of the early sewage system  
The earliest public health and sanitary program in the Philippines was organised in 1863 
under the Spanish colonial rule when provincial and municipal officials were directed to 
assist health officials in garbage collection and enforcement of sanitation laws in public 
places (Torres 2010, pp.106–107). In 1878, works for the Carriedo Waterworks 
commenced. The public utility was inaugurated in 1882 to serve the city of Manila covering 
a service area of 1,800 has. Funding came from the endowment fund left in 1743 by 
Spanish philanthropist and former member of the Manila cabildo (municipal board) Don 
Francisco de Carriedo for the construction of a potable water supply system. The 
construction of Carriedo Waterworks was deemed to be one of the greatest 
accomplishments of Spanish rule. Other than a scientific acknowledgment of disease 
transmission, the Spanish administration established the water system to avoid the 
recurrence of anti-Spanish occupation riots that occurred during the first cholera epidemic 
in 1820 (Doeppers 2009,p. 494). By the time the three centuries old Spanish colonial rule 
ended in 1898, the country had no sewer system, water supply service was only available in 
some parts of Manila and the rest of the country had no water system, reservoirs or 
artesian wells (Heiser 1918, p.61). 
Barely a month and a half after the Americans occupied Manila, the Board of Health was 
created on 29 September 1898 to implement effective sanitation policies and programs to 
clean up Manila and elevate it into a sanitary and liveable city (Mactal  2009, p.19). The 
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American occupants largely blamed the country’s unsanitary state to the indifference of the 
Spaniards to the health and comfort of the Filipino populace (Mactal  2009, p.16). Only 
1,800 homes were connected to the water system and the poorer classes had to source 
their water from shallow wells, ponds, esteros or other unsafe water sources (Doeppers 
2009, p.494). Like the Spaniards, the Americans also blamed the poor Filipinos for their 
unsanitary habits and surroundings, lack of education and superstitious beliefs for 
epidemic outbreaks (Mactal 2009; Heiser 1912). For the first ten years of the American 
occupation, Manila was ravaged by the cholera epidemic and other waterborne diseases. In 
1901, the Board was confronted by a severe outbreak of the bubonic plague and the 
following year, Asiatic cholera (Doeppers 2009, p.494). In 1902, with a population of 
219,928, Manila had no sewer system and no system of solid waste collection. All forms of 
waste and human discharges were directly disposed of into the ground causing soil 
pollution or into the over 30 open canals all over the city, which stretched to a combined 
length of 31 miles (Mactal 2009; Heiser 1912).  
American policy was largely credited for the sanitary regeneration of the Philippine islands 
(Heiser 1918, p.63). High on its priorities were augmenting the water system and 
installation of a sewer system. Unlike the British authorities in 19th century Bombay, the 
Americans made the commitment to make water services available not just to themselves 
but to the entire population (Doeppers 2009, p.494). Artesian wells were introduced by the 
Americans in 1906. In 1908, the urban water supply system was renamed to ‘Manila Water 
Supply System’. The first dam, Wawa Dam, was constructed on the Marikina River located 
25 miles east of the urban area, chlorine was added to piped water and a total of 38.4 
miles of pipe network were installed (Torres 2010, p.82). By 1913, there was a noticeable 
decline in the death rate in the city and there was no case of cholera and typhoid reported 
in 1912-1913 (Doeppers 2009, p.494). 
Among the sanitary reforms was the establishment of septic tank systems and flush water-
closets for residential houses and buildings and, for the majority of the population, the Pail 
Conservancy System (Mactal 2009, p.44). The canals were cleaned, streets were swept 
daily and garbage was collected every night. In April 1905, planning commenced for the 
construction of a sewerage system in Manila, which was the first in the country. In 1909, 
the sewerage system was completed to serve 223,000 residents of Manila. The system 
was designed for a maximum population capacity of 440,000 and expected to last until 
1959. The sewerage system was a combined system that diverts stormwater and 
discharges sewage and wastewater from residential and commercial establishments into 
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the bay near the mouth of the Pasig River by means of strong pumps located at the end of 
Azcarraga (Mactal 2009, p.46).  
The next challenge was to compel the residents of Manila to connect to the sewerage 
system. An ordinance was passed for mandatory connection but by 1910, only 516 
residents were connected to the sewerage system (Torres, 2010, p.84). Poor compliance 
was attributed to the lack of information dissemination and the indifference of the 
population to the American regime. Also, sewers did not reach slum areas that did not have 
streets or lanes. To address this issue, the Governor General directed the construction of 
sanitary barrios (neighbourhoods) on government lands where house lots faced a street or 
alley and only one house was allowed per lot to prevent congestion (Torres 2010, p.84). 
In 1919, the water supply system was renamed ‘Metropolitan Water District’ and its service 
was expanded to cover the 14 adjoining cities and municipalities. Throughout the 1920s, 
the piped water system was struggling to cope with the growing demand, especially during 
the dry season. By 1930, a new dam was constructed in Novaliches, located north of 
Manila. In 1935, water quality improved with the construction of filters in Balara in Quezon 
City (Doeppers 2009, p.494). In 1938, another dam was built that would bring water to the 
city from the Angat River, located 40 kms north of Manila (Arnold 1968, p.393). By 1938, 
the system was serving around 900,000 people and the water production capacity 
increased to around 200 mld (Kearton et al. 2013, p.9). During World War II, the water 
system was severely damaged by bombing and shelling (Arnold 1968, p.393). In 1945, the 
system was serving 1,025,000 residents or around 60% of the Metro Manila population. 
After the Philippines was liberated from the Japanese occupation in 1946 and until 1955, 
the responsibility over the provision of water and sanitation services was transferred to 
local governments (Kearton et al. 2013, p.9).  
4.2.2 Nationalisation of water and sewerage services 
In 1955, the operation and management of the water supply and sanitation systems in the 
country, including Metro Manila, was centralised and consolidated under the management 
of the newly founded National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) created by 
virtue of Republic Act  No. 1383 (Ilustre 1975, p.294). The management of water and 
sewerage system was nationalised to provide qualified supervision and management that 
small communities did not possess  
Like many cities in Southeast Asia, the population of Manila rapidly increased after the war 
(Arnold 1968, p.393). The water supply and sewerage system had not been upgraded to 
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meet the demands of the city’s population, which had increased to three million. In 1960, 
NAWASA received a loan from the World Bank to finance the construction of infrastructure 
to increase water supply. The project was completed in 1968, which was two years behind 
schedule. Among the causes were delay in the opening of bids and awarding of contracts, 
the rebuilding of structures damaged by typhoon, and the contractors’ limited experience 
and insufficient equipment for heavy construction (Arnold 1968, pp.393–394). The World 
Bank loan also financed the reorganisation of NAWASA. NAWASA was reorganised in 1964 
to improve organisational efficiency and create a clear-cut chain of command. The 
organisation was divided into four principal areas: engineering, operations, administration 
and provinces, each headed by an area manager who reported to the general manager 
(Arnold 1968, p.394). In 1965, procedures and assignments were made in the divisions 
and sections, staffing patterns were rightsized and surplus personnel were trained and 
reassigned to new jobs (Arnold 1968, p.396).   
While water supply improved, sewerage services did not. The majority of the wastewater 
generated in areas not connected to the sewerage system ended up in the canals, rivers 
and seas untreated. On 18 June 1964, the National Pollution Control Commission was 
created to control water pollution in Metro Manila, in coordination with NAWASA (World 
Bank 1980, p.12). At that time, the biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) concentration of 
Pasig River was measured at 2.5 to 10 mg/l. While it was within the 7mg/l BOD limit 
required to sustain aquatic life, the water was described as ‘black and gaseous’ (CTI 
Engineering International Co. 2009, p.4–1). In 1969, after 60 years of inactivity, the 
sewerage sector was finally given attention with the formulation of the Master Plan on 
Sewerage System for the Metropolitan Manila Area, which was funded by the United 
Nations Development Program and the World Health Organisation. The Master Plan 
recommended, among other things, the implementation of a diverse centralised sewerage 
system but this was never implemented due to high implementation costs (CTI Engineering 
International Co. 2009, p.4–2). 
4.2.3 Corporatisation of water and sewerage services in Metro Manila 
In the 1970s, the government adopted a policy of connecting every household to the water 
system. To operationalise this, NAWASA was dissolved and management of water supply 
and sewerage services were once again localised nationwide, except for Metro Manila 
where a government corporation was created to manage the water and sewerage services 
of the capital region. In 1971, the MWSS was created by the Republic Act No. 6234 to 
manage the water supply and sewerage system in the National Capital Region (NCR), the 
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entire province of Rizal, and part of the province of Cavite (Ilustre 1975, p.294). The service 
area forms eight drainage basins and covers 150,103 has, with about one-third of the area 
or 51,710 has classified as urban areas (World Bank 1980, p.2). In 1975, MWSS was 
serving 4.6 million or 82% of the 5.6 million inhabitants of the MWSS service area, with the 
remainder of the population depending on deep wells and other water sources (Caoili 
1999, p.76).  
Outside Metro Manila, local water districts were created under the Provincial Water Utilities 
Act in 1973. The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) was established as a 
specialised lending institution to provide financing and technical assistance in the 
development of the local water districts (Elazegui 2004; Kearton et al. 2013). By 1980, the 
population of Metro Manila was estimated at 6.73 million. Sewage produced was about 
760 mld. About 1.14 million of the population were served by public sanitary or combined 
sewer systems, some 2.28 million area were served by communal or single septic tanks of 
varying standards of efficiency and the remainder had pit privies or no service at all where 
sewage was directly discharged into street gutters, open canals or rivers (World Bank 1980, 
p.3). 
The National Health Plan (1975-1985) identified poor sanitation as a major factor in the 
high incidence of communicable diseases in the Philippines, such as typhoid, cholera and 
gastroenteritis. In 1972, morbidity and mortality from these diseases were 1,800 and 80 
respectively per population of 100,000 (World Bank 1980, p.1). These, along with the 
growing trend of environmentalism globally, prompted the Philippine government to enact 
numerous environmental legislations in the 1970s, which included the Environment Code, 
Water Code, Environmental Impact Assessment System and the Sanitation Code (CTI 
Engineering International Co. 2009, pp.6–4). These impelled the government to take more 
concrete steps in improving the sanitation and sewerage services in the metropolitan area.  
In 1977, the capital’s sewerage infrastructure received capital infusion for an upgrade and 
expansion through a World Bank loan, which was the Bank's first major involvement in a 
sewerage and sanitation project in the Philippines. The Master Plan was prepared by MWSS 
in 1979, which recommended the following: (1) rehabilitate existing sewerage facilities 
through the Metro Manila Sewerage and Sanitation program (METROSS), (2) use of 
combined sewers, (3) employ secondary treatment of sewage with four outfalls in the 
Manila Bay and (4) implement sanitation program comprising of minor drainage projects for 
the depressed areas (PROGRESS) and a septic tank desludging programme (STAMP). Parts 
of PROGRESS and STAMP were implemented under the METROSS-1 Project which was 
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funded from the World Bank loan and by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to the amount 
of US$73 million (CTI Engineering International Co. 2009; World Bank 1990; World Bank 
1980).  
The project was targeted for completion by 1985 but the loan was closed only on 31 
December 1988, three years behind the project schedule. Around half of the loan was 
cancelled at the request of the Philippine government due to peso devaluation, and 
cancellation and partial implementation of some project components. The ADB component 
took four years longer to complete (World Bank 1990, p.4). The reasons identified for the 
delay are as follows: 
1) Contractors' problems and shortcomings. Many of the contractors had limited experience 
with sanitary and combined sewer construction. Due to poor performance, one of the 
two major contracts for sanitary sewer construction had to be cancelled after three years 
of work. The remaining works (70%) were awarded to new contractors. The local 
contractors also had difficulty in obtaining commercial credit to meet cash flow 
requirements. 
2) Government bureaucratic processes. The change in government and MWSS leadership 
held back the project for two to three years. MWSS underwent three changes in top 
management during project implementation. Outside MWSS, approvals from different 
agencies had to be secured as well. Contracts had to be reviewed by the Government 
Corporate Counsel, Commission on Audit and Board of Investments before contract 
award. Philippine flag vessels had to be used for imported materials and clearances 
from the Ministry of Finance and the Bureau of Customs had to be secured prior to 
delivery of goods. There were also delays in the issuance of letters of credit or making 
payments that were required before delivery of imported equipment.  
3) Problems beyond the control of the contractor and MWSS. Environmental conditions, 
such as soil quality, high groundwater, numerous overhead and underground utilities, 
restricted working areas and heavy traffic caused substantial delays. Also, the worsening 
economic conditions in 1983-85 caused inflation and devaluated the peso from 
PhP7.40 to PhP21.50 to the US$. This affected the government’s ability to provide 
equity, which resulted in rescheduling of the project (World Bank 1990, p.4).  
Prior to and after the 1979 Master Plan, a number of master plans to address the 
sewerage and sanitation requirements of Metro Manila had been prepared but were not 
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implemented due to financial, social and institutional constraints (Kearton et al. 2013, 
p.36). These included the Master Plan by Black & Veatch in 1969, the 1988-2000 Water 
Supply, Sewerage and Sanitation Master Plan, the 1996 Water Supply and Sewerage 
Master Plan and the West Zone Sewerage Master Plan in 2000 (CTI Engineering 
International Co. 2009, pp.4-1 to 4-3).  
4.2.4 PPP of water and sewerage services in Metro Manila  
It took at least 60 years before the sewerage system in Metro Manila was upgraded after 
the first sewerage system was constructed in 1909. During those years, infrastructure 
upgrades were focused on expanding water supply in Metro Manila. By the early 1990s, 
Metro Manila’s rivers are heavily polluted as majority of wastewater produced in the 
metropolis end up in waterways untreated. Deep in debt, the MWSS was in no position to 
upgrade the sewerage system. It was during this time that the PPP wave hit the developing 
world, the Philippines included. Figure 4.1 illustrates the timeline for sewerage 
development in Metro Manila. 
4.2.4.1 Distressed state of the water and sewerage sector 
In the early 1990s, only 7.3 million of the 11 million residents of the MWSS service area 
were connected to piped water, with water flowing from their taps at an average of 16 
hours a day. Some 61% or 1,830 million litres of water pumped into the network was 
‘nonrevenue’ due to pilferage, runoffs from old leaky pipes, illegal connections and 
defective water meters (Malaluan & Wu 2008; Buenaventura et al. 2004; Dumol 2000).  
Sewerage service was practically non-existent as less than 5% of the population in the 
MWSS service area was connected to sewerage services  (Hartman & Werhane 2009; 
Kearton et al. 2013). Around 85% of the population were served by over two million, ill-
maintained septic tanks that overflow to the storm drains, toilets that are connected 
directly to the storm drains or by pit latrines (World Bank 2012, p.2). The rest had 
rudimentary toilet facilities or practised open defecation. There were only four STPs  
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Figure 4.1 Timeline for sewerage development in Metro Manila  
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servicing the entire MWSS service area and 38 communal septic tank systems. MWSS 
provided limited desludging services as it only had one septage management facility, which 
was decommissioned in September 1995. Residents had to hire private desludging 
companies to get their septic tanks cleaned. These companies were allowed to operate 
even if they did not have septage treatment facilities. These companies were reportedly 
disposing of the untreated sludge into the drainage system or open bodies of water  
(Kearton et al. 2013, pp.17–18). Thus, most of the wastewater produced in the capital end 
up in storm drains or open waterways into the Pasig River and Manila Bay (Kearton et al. 
2013; Tetra Tech & Berkman 2013).  
The Philippine government was not in a financial position to improve the service and 
physical infrastructure of MWSS. In 1997, the debt of MWSS amounted to US$800 million, 
which was 1% of the Philippine government’s national debt of US$82.347 billion 
(Buenaventura et al. 2004; Dumol 2000). Compounding the MWSS’s financial problems 
was its tarnished credibility with allegations of corruption and inefficiency (Llorito & Marcon 
2003; Dumol 2000). Insiders attributed inefficiency of MWSS operations to rigid and 
complicated government procurement procedures, which slowed down the procurement 
process and delayed project implementation. Further exacerbating these problems was the 
bloated bureaucracy of the MWSS. With 8,000 employees or 13 employees for every 1,000 
connections, MWSS’s workforce was two to five times more than similar water utilities in 
the region (Dumol 2000; Malaluan & Wu 2008). Civil servants enjoyed the legal right to 
security of tenure, which made hiring and firing subject to rigid government procedures 
(Malaluan & Wu 2008, p.212). The inefficiency of MWSS was manifested by its high non-
revenue water (NRW), which averaged at 61% daily, which is the water lost through leakage 
through holes in the pipes, illegal connections or measurement problems due to faulty 
meters (Xun and Malaluan, 2008, p.226). MWSS is unable to bill NRW which translates to 
its high inefficiency in billing consumers’ water consumption. Table 4.1 summarises the 
pre-privatised conditions of MWSS. 
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Table 4.1 Pre-privatised MWSS operational highlights (1996-97)  
Service area population 11 million 
Population served  
1. water supply 7.3 million 
2. sewerage 780,000 
Official number of water service 
connection 
779,380 
Average daily water production 3,000 million liters 
Average daily non-revenue water 61% (1,830 million liters) 
No. of  treatment plants 3 
Total length of pipeline 12,000 kms. 
Average daily water availability 16 hours 
Water losses per capita daily 133 liters 
Consumption billing efficiency 42.87% 
Source: MWSS Regulatory Office 
4.2.4.2 Design and award of PPP contract  
When President Fidel Ramos (1992-98) assumed the presidency in 1992, he was 
immediately confronted with a power crisis. To resolve this issue, the government turned to 
the private sector for the construction power plants through build-operate-transfer4 (BOT) 
arrangements. This experience inspired the administration to enlist the private sector in 
addressing yet another crisis — the water crisis (Fabella 2011; Dumol 2000). In the face of 
a looming water crisis and riddled with debts, the national legislature, by virtue of Republic 
Act No. 8041 or the National Water Crisis Act of 1995, empowered then President Ramos 
to privatise the MWSS. The law gave the executive department two years from 1995 to 
complete the PPP process (David 2000; Dumol 2000). PPP of government enterprises was 
a condition under the 1995-1997 SAP agreement signed by the Philippine government with 
the IMF (Bello 2004, p.12).  
With the legal mandate to privatise MWSS, the Ramos administration proceeded to set the 
wheels of PPP in motion. The first step was to divide the MWSS service area into two zones: 
the West zone and the East zone as shown in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.2., each of which 
would be operated by different concessionaires. The West zone was the larger zone, in 
terms of geographical size and population served, that covered 17 cities and municipalities 
in Metro Manila while the East zone served 22 cities and municipalities.5The government 
                                                          
4 Section 2(a) of Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as “The Philippine BOT Law” defines build-operate-
transfer as a contractual arrangement whereby the project proponent undertakes the financing, construction 
and operation maintenance of an infrastructure facility over a fixed term. During this period, the operator is 
allowed to charge appropriate tolls, fees, rentals, and charges to facility users to recover its investment and 
operating and maintenance expenses. 
5 Metropolitan Manila was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 824 on 7 November 1975 as an 
integrated unit, originally comprised of four cities and 13 municipalities, originally governed by the Metro Manila 
Commission. Over the years, new cities were created and added into the fold of Metro Manila. The Metro Manila 
Commission was later on abolished and replaced by the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority by viture of 
Republic Act No. 7924 on 1 March 1995. The governing board and policy making body of the MMDA is the 
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referred to the Paris water system, which was divided in two zones: the left and right banks 
of the Seine River. The Parisian model appealed to the government as it was deemed to 
promote quasi-competition wherein consumers could compare service quality of the two 
concessionaires (Dumol 2000; Llorito & Marcon 2003).  
For the bid structure, the Philippine government referred to the experience of the Buenos 
Aires water concession in Argentina due to similarity in size and coverage of service area 
and inefficiency of the public utility. The Buenos Aires water concession used a two-
envelope bidding system. Bidders were required to submit both a technical and a financial 
proposal, the former to be evaluated on a pass-fail basis and only the financial proposals of 
those who passed this stage would be opened (Dumol 2000; Esguerra 2003). The financial 
bid comprised of the bidders’ business model over the contract lifetime, the debt service, 
the tariff bid warranted by the capital and operations expenditure via the ‘net present value 
equals zero (NPV= 0).’ The MWSS’s existing debts were apportioned at a ratio of 90:10 for 
the West zone and East zone, respectively. The government apportioned a bigger portion of 
the debt to the West zone because it covered a bigger geographical area and customer 
base (Dumol 2000; Llorito & Marcon 2003). The government aimed to attract the best 
multinational water companies to participate in the bidding process. However, the 
Philippine Constitution restricts majority ownership over all public utilities to Filipino-owned 
companies but at that time, there were no local firms with previous experience in managing 
water utilities. Thus, foreign firms were required to partner with a local firm, with 60% of the 
consortium to be owned by a Filipino company (Dumol 2000; Fabella 2011). In January 
1997, the government received the financial bids and technical bids from the four 
prequalified bidders.6 The winning bids were based on the proposed water tariffs, which the 
government deemed should be lower than the existing tariffs to gain support from the 
public and politicians (Dumol 2000,p.42).7 
                                                          
Metro Manila Council, composed of the mayors of the cities and municipalities   
6 The four bidders were the consortium of (1) Ayala Corporation, Bechtel, United Water and Mitsubishi (2) 
Benpres Holdings and Lyonnaise de Eaux (3) Aboitiz Equity Ventures and Compagnia Generale de Eaux and (4) 
Metro Pacific and Anglian Water International. 
7 The Ayala group’s bid for both zones (East: P2.32 per m3 and West: P2.51 per m3.) was the lowest but the rules 
only allow one group to operate one concession; otherwise the objective of competition is defeated. With the 
hub of its business operation located in the East zone,7 the Ayala group and its partners, incorporated as Manila 
Water Company, 7 opted for the East zone.  The West zone concession went to the Lopez-group-owned Benpres 
Holdings, incorporated as Maynilad Water Services Inc. with its second lowest bid of PhP4.97 per m3. (Dumol 
2000, p.97). 
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Heralded by the World Bank as the largest water concession in the world in terms of 
geographical area and population served, MWSS was privatised in 1997 (Dumol 2000, 
p.1). Two separate 25-year concession contracts were awarded to Maynilad Water and 
Manila Water to undertake the rehabilitation and expansion of the waterworks and 
sewerage system. The West zone was awarded to Maynilad and the East zone to Manila 
Water. Championed by President Ramos himself, it was but fitting to hold the signing of the 
CA at the Presidential palace on 21 February 1997 (Fabella 2011, p.67).  
The government chose the concession-type arrangement to privatise the MWSS (Dumol 
2000, p.29). The World Bank recommends concession contracts water and sewerage 
services because ‘head-to-head competition does not operate’ in naturally monopolistic 
services (Kerf et al. 1998, p.12) (see Section 2.3.1 Natural monopoly characteristics of 
water and sewerage services on page 15). This arrangement is best employed where a 
substantial amount of investment is required to solve problems related to faulty distribution 
system or poor collections performance (Delmon 2001; World Bank 1997). Under a 
concession-type PPP, a public entity awards the right and the obligation to provide an 
infrastructure service to a private company (the concessionaire) under terms and 
conditions specified in a contract or license. The concessionaire assumes operational 
responsibility, the commercial risk of service provision and the responsibility to achieve the 
specified results (Kerf et al. 1998, p.12).  
Under the CA, the Philippine government assigns the rights to use its existing assets to the 
two concessionaires. At the end of the contract, all assets shall revert to the government. In 
return for all these, the private companies have the right collect a fee from users to recover 
their costs, which is regulated by the MWSS-RO (Esguerra 2003, p.14). The winning bidders 
had to pay an initial fee of US$5 million to cover for the consultancy fees of the 
International Finance Corporation. The Philippine government also required a minimum 
capital base of $100 million and a performance bond of US$200 million each (Esguerra 
2003, p.15). On an annual basis after the contract award, each concessionaire shall pay 
concession fees of PhP50 million for the operating budget of MWSS-RO and another 
PhP100 million for the MWSS Residual office (Dumol 2000; Llorito & Marcon 2003).  
The CA is designed to ensure full cost recovery, with water revenues partially subsidising 
sewerage infrastructure. In other countries, sewerage investments are typically financed by 
the government but in the case of Metro Manila, grant financing is not available so 
sewerage investments and operating costs have to be recovered through tariffs (NG-2014-
022).  
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Figure 4.2 Map of MWSS Concession Area  
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Table 4.2 MWSS Service Area  
Concession 
Area 
Concessionaire Land Area 
(sq.km.) 
Population 
(as of 2010) 
Cities/Municipalities 
East Manila Water 1,400 8.4 million Cities in Metro Manila: Makati (part), 
Manila (part), Quezon City (part), 
Mandaluyong, Marikina, Pasig, San 
Juan and Taguig 
Cities outside MM: Antipolo City 
Municipalities in the province of Rizal: 
Angono, Baras, Binangonan, Cainta, 
Cardona, Jalajala, Morong, Pililia, 
Rodriguez, San Mateo, Tanay and 
Taytay 
West Maynilad 540 6.8 million Cities in Metro Manila: Makati (part), 
Manila (part), Quezon City (part), 
Caloocan, Las Pinas, 
Malabon ,Navotas, Munitnlupa, 
Paranaque and Pasay 
Cities outside MM: Cavite City 
Municipalities in the province of 
Cavite: Bacoor, Imus, Kawit, Noveleta, 
Rosario 
 Total 2,730 15.2 million  
Source: Tetra Tech & Berkman 2013; Pham & Kuyama 2013  
 
4.2.4.3 Regulating the concessionaires 
The government recognised that water is not an ordinary commodity and tariff setting can 
be a highly political and sensitive issue, thus the need to regulate the concessionaires. 
Under Article 11 of the CA, the MWSS Board of Trustees ‘shall establish an independent 
regulatory office to be funded from the concession fees received from the concessionaires’ 
(Dumol 2000, pp.56–57). The MWSS-RO’s main functions are to monitor and/or enforce 
the CA, audit the activities of the concessionaires and ensure that appropriate measures 
are undertaken in case of noncompliance, review water supply and sewerage rates, and 
implement extraordinary price adjustment (EPA) and rate rebasing provisions.8 Under a 
concession-type of PPP, the government became the regulator of the service it used to 
provide. 
There are three grounds upon which tariff would be adjusted. The first is inflation. The 
regulator allows for annual automatic increases on standard rates based on changes in the 
consumer price index to allow concessionaires’ revenues to keep pace with inflation. The 
second is EPA, which is brought about by unforeseen events that financially affects the 
                                                          
8 Exhibit A of the Concession Agreement. The corporate powers and functions of MWSS not transferred to the 
two concessionaires continues to be performed by the MWSS Board of Trustees (Board) and the residual 
Corporate Office (CO), such as administer and manage retained assets and existing loans, provide bulk water 
and development of new water sources and facilitate the exercise by the concessionaire of its functions under 
the CA.  
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concessionaire, such as force majeure, peso devaluation or unanticipated costs arising 
from future legislations, for instance, new health or environmental standards. The MWSS-
RO determines whether an extraordinary event occurred based on a strict set of validation 
procedures. Inflation adjustments and EPAs may also be made on a quarterly basis 
(Esguerra 2003, p.14). The third ground for tariff adjustment is rate rebasing. Rate 
rebasing is conducted every five years to ensure that the concessionaires’ do not exceed 
the ‘fair returns’ stipulated in the contract. Any disputes arising out of the CA that cannot be 
resolved through consultation and negotiation among the parties would be finally settled by 
a three-member arbitration panel. The members of the panel would be appointed by the 
concessionaire and the MWSS-RO and the chairperson by the President of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC).9 
4.2.3.4 The fall and rise of the Metro Manila concessions  
There were two extraordinary events that prompted Maynilad and Manila Water to file their 
first petition for rate increases: (1) the Asian financial crisis of 1998 that resulted in peso 
devaluation and (2) the El Niño phenomenon from June 1997 to September 1998 that 
reduced the water supply in the capital region by 40% (Esguerra 2003, pp.19, 22). This 
unravelled a chain of events that undid the Metro Manila concessions.  
In March 1998, Manila Water petitioned the MWSS-RO for an EPA citing the two unforeseen 
events as grounds for extraordinary adjustment, as well as network deterioration, cost 
overruns in ongoing projects and increase in employees’ salaries.10 When its petition was 
not approved, Manila Water elevated the case before the ICC, which allowed for an 
adjustment at a lower rate of PhP0.18/m3 based on a discount rate of 9.3% (Esguerra 
2003, pp.21–22). The MWSS-RO challenged the decision before the Philippines’ Court of 
Appeals, despite the contract stipulation that parties would resolve all issues through the 
international arbitration panel. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the arbitration 
panel (Esguerra 2003, p.22). Due to the delay in implementation of the tariff increase, the 
tariff had to be adjusted higher than the approved rate, which was PhP0.26 /m3 (Esguerra 
2003, p.43). 
In December 2000, Maynilad petitioned the government for the imposition of currency 
exchange adjustment (Auto-CERA), which the company first filed during the Estrada 
                                                          
9 Article 12 of the Concession Agreement. 
10 MWC petitioned for a tariff increase of PhP0.27 per m3 based on an appropriate discount rate of 18% but 
MWSS-RO approved an EPA of only PhP0.04 per m3 based on a discount rate of 5.2%. 
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administration.11 The petition was re-filed under the Arroyo administration, which was 
rejected by the President in February 2001. The following month Maynilad stopped paying 
its concession fees to the MWSS (Esguerra 2003; Chiplunkar et al. 2008).  
In October 2001, the first amendment to the CA was issued, which authorised Maynilad 
and Manila Water to impose charges for AEPA12, FCDA13, and CERA14 (Padilla 2004). The 
amendment, issued via MWSS Board Resolutions 487-2001 and 512-2001, allowed 
Maynilad and Manila Water, respectively, to adjust their water tariffs to adequately 
compensate for the financial losses suffered from the Asian financial crisis. The 
amendment also scheduled the first rate rebasing period from the tenth year (2007) of the 
contract to the fifth year (2002) (Chiplunkar et al. 2008, p.3). 
In March 2002, MWSS extended the deadline for the payment of Maynilad's concession 
fees from November 2002 to 30 June 2003. Notwithstanding the extension, Maynilad 
continued to suffer heavy financial losses. By the end of 2002, the company filed a notice 
of early termination of the concession. This signalled the start of a long, drawn-out legal 
battle between Maynilad and the government. The matter was elevated to the international 
arbitration panel. In November 2003, the panel ruled that neither the MWSS nor Maynilad 
had any grounds for the termination of the concession. The panel ordered Maynilad to pay 
the overdue concession fees and directed the parties to resolve the matter through 
extrajudicial means. A few days after the panel decision, Maynilad filed a petition in a local 
court seeking debt relief and corporate rehabilitation. The MWSS then attempted to 
withdraw on Maynilad's performance bond to satisfy its maturing loans. Eventually, MWSS 
elevated the case to the Supreme Court (Chiplunkar et al. 2008, pp.3–4). Three years later, 
the legal battle was still ongoing and the government noted that these lawsuits were 
detrimental to the consumers. In March 2004, the government took over the Maynilad 
concession through the issuance of Amendment No. 2 for the quasi-organisation and 
restructuring of Maynilad to restore its financial viability. In April 2005, MWSS and Maynilad 
                                                          
11 Maynilad filed the petition at the height of former Philippine President Joseph Estrada's impeachment trial for 
corruption charges before the Philippine Senate in 2000. The administration was not able to rule on the 
petition. Estrada, who was elected into the Presidency in 1998, was forced to step down from office in January 
2001 following days of street protests clamouring for his resignation. 
12 AEPA is a fixed rate (PhP4.21 per m3 for Maynilad and PhP1 per m3 for Manila Water) that the 
concessionaires could collect from 15 October 2001 to 31 December 2002 only 
13 FCDA is equivalent to 49.598% of the basic charge, which is the actual water consumption of the consumer. 
The FCDA is a quarterly adjustment as a percentage of the basic charge to reflect the impact of the FOREX 
starting on Jan. 1, 2002. 
14 CERA is PhP1 per m3 of water consumed. 
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finally agreed on a debt and capital restructuring agreement (DCRA). On June 2005, the 
Rehabilitation Court approved Maynilad’s Rehabilitation Plan, which included the DCRA 
(Chiplunkar et al. 2008, p.4).  
With the ailing Maynilad given temporary life support by the DCRA, MWSS set in motion a 
renewed effort to find a new operator for Maynilad. Learning from its past mistakes, a more 
stringent, comprehensive and relevant bidding process was laid down.15 The rebidding of 
Maynilad attracted more bidders than the first bidding process in 1997. A total of 11 
investor groups expressed interest, of which only five firms submitted the complete 
requirements to qualify for the second phase, and eventually narrowed down to three.16 The 
contract was eventually awarded in December 2006 to a 100% Filipino-owned company, 
DMCI-MPIC, with its winning bid of $503.9 million.17 The new owners signed the same CA 
entered into by the previous owners of Maynilad and would be measured under the same 
performance and service coverage targets.  
After the new owners of Maynilad took over, the company aggressively implemented its two-
stage recovery plan to increase revenues while reducing commercial losses. The first stage 
covers a system-wide water audit to enhance water supply and pressure management, 
upgrade reservoir and pump station efficiencies and improve software and information 
technology. This was followed by a widespread network rehabilitation, maintenance and 
connection expansion. The company also embarked on various human resource 
                                                          
15 Unlike the previous tender, a two-part minimum conditions for bidders were imposed: (1) the setting of the 
minimum bid at US$56.7 million to cover the actual value of the 84% equity and the US$31 million financial 
assistance provided by MWSS and (2) a financial supplement of US$2.5 million in cash for the arbitration costs 
incurred and additional resources to finance capital expenditures and assumption of Maynilad’s obligations 
under the DCRA (Chiplunkar et al. 2008, p.8). Steeper requirements were imposed to ensure that the bidders 
were financially healthy to run the concession, which were not imposed during the first-round bidding. These 
included (1) a standby letter of credit (SBLC) of US$2.5 million in favour of MWSS as a bid guarantee to ensure 
that the bidder would assume all the obligations of MWSS and (2) a minimum capitalisation of US$120 million, 
supported by an irrevocable SBLC issued by a bank with a high credit rating (Chiplunkar et al. 2008, pp.8–9).  
16 These were Rubia Holdings-Noonday Asset Management Asia, Pte. and two fully Filipino-owned firms; the 
current operator of the East Zone, Manila Water and DMCI-MPIC, which is a consortium of a construction and 
real estate company, and a major player in telecommunications, shipping and real estate industries. DMCI has 
experience in the water sector, while MPIC Chairman Manuel Pangilinan is known for his ability to rehabilitate 
ailing public utilities. Of the three, Rubia Holdings-Noonday consortium was disqualified for failure to comply 
with the SBLC of US$2.5 million, while the two other companies passed the technical requirements and 
advanced to the final stage, the financial bid.  
17 This is not the first time that MPIC acquired a company previously owned by the Lopez family, having acquired 
majority shares of MERALCO in 2009. MERALCO is Metro Manila's sole electric power distributor and holds the 
power distribution franchise for some 22 cities and 89 municipalities, including the whole of Metro Manila and 
the Mega Manila region. 
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development programs to further its commercial and marketing abilities and image, as well 
as improve efficiency of its employees.  
The DMCI-MPIC was given until 2013 to pay off Maynilad’s creditors but it managed to 
settle these debts as early as September 2007 (Chiplunkar et al. 2008, pp.9–10). In its 
first two years of operation, the new Maynilad infused PhP13 billion for capital expenditures 
and set aside another US$20 billion up to 2015 (Chiplunkar et al. 2008, p.11). As of 
December 2011, Maynilad reported in its 2012 Business Plan that water service coverage 
was at 92% of the service area’s population of 8.4 million, customers with 24 hours 
continuous water supply reached 84% and NRW averaged at 48% (from 66 % in 2007) 
(World Bank 2012; Tetra Tech & Berkman 2013). 
Manila Water, on the other hand, managed to fast track and upgrade service provision in its 
franchise after the turbulent early years of the Metro Manila concessions. As of 2009, the 
World Bank reported that Manila Water had reached 100% compliance for 24-hour water 
supply in its service area, from 26 % in 1997. The company also expanded water 
connections to 99% of its customers due to its aggressive civil works and upgrading of the 
pipe network, exceeding its regulatory target for the period by 8% for total water service 
connections. The NRW was brought down to 11.2% in 2011 from the pre-concessions level 
of 63% (World Bank 2012; Tetra Tech & Berkman 2013). 
4.2.3.5 Status of sewerage services  
Metro Manila generates 2,000 million m3 of wastewater every day. Without adequate 
sewerage facilities, only around 17% of this volume gets treated before being discharged 
into water channels in and around the metropolis (World Bank 2012, p.1). Sewerage and 
sanitations systems comprise of individual septic tanks, public toilets, communal septic 
tanks, sewage and septage treatment facilities, desludging and recycling of sludge and 
effluent.  
Sanitation services offered by the concessionaires involve the cleaning up of septic tanks 
and the construction of septage treatment plants for the treatment of sludge (World Bank 
2012, p.2). The two water utilities offer septic tank siphoning services to its customer, the 
cost of which is incorporated in the customer’s monthly invoice and billed as environmental 
charge. This fee constitutes 20% of the customer’s total bill (World Bank 2013, p.32). The 
water utilities usually coordinate with the local barangay on the schedule for desludging 
services. Should the resident miss this, emergency septic tank cleaning for a fee may be 
scheduled with the water utilities. Sewerage services, on the other hand, involve the 
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construction of separate sewer lines that bring wastewater to STPs for treatment before 
disposal in the nearest waterway or recycled for other use (Kearton et al. 2013; World Bank 
2005).  
The original performance targets of the concessionaires for sewerage and sanitation 
services required the implementation of a large, highly centralised sewerage treatment 
system with separate sewer lines systems in Metro Manila. It was envisioned that septic 
tanks would be phased out as individual households would be directly connected to the 
sewerage network. The original population targets for sanitation and sewerage services 
coverage in each service area are shown in Table 4.3. As sewerage coverage increased, the 
sanitation targets decreased because the original CA worked on the assumption that all 
households would eventually be connected to the sewer system (Tetra Tech & Berkman 
2013; CTI Engineering International Co. 2009). 
Table 4.3 Sewerage service coverage targets for East and West service areas 
Concessionaire 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 
MWSI      
Sewerage 16% 20% 21% 31% 66% 
Sanitation 43% 46% 43% 39% 27% 
MWCI      
Sewerage 3% 16% 51% 52% 55% 
Sanitation 38% 32% 27% 24% 19% 
*% of water served population 
Source: Preparatory Survey for Metro Manila Sewerage and Sanitation 
Improvement, 2009 
 
After the concessions were awarded, it became apparent that it would be challenging to 
implement these targets. Metro Manila is one of the most densely populated metropolises 
in the world and there is a shortage of suitable land for the proposed centralised treatment 
plant. In 2001, Manila Water’s actual coverage in 2006 for sewerage was at 1.3% and 
sanitation at 9%. Maynilad, on the other hand, met its sewerage target of 16% in 2006, 
mainly because two of the three existing STPs were located in the West zone and were 
upgraded and rehabilitated under the Manila Second Sewerage Project (MSSP). The MSSP 
was a World Bank funded project entered by the Philippine government in 1996. This 
dropped to 10% in 2007 as water service connections increased, which is the denominator 
for sewerage coverage. Also, the sewerage program was suspended during the period 
between 2003 and 2007 as the company went through debt restructuring, rebidding and 
eventually, was awarded to a new operator (Tetra Tech & Berkman 2013; CTI Engineering 
International Co. 2009). 
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During the first rate rebasing exercise in 2003, the government agreed to revise the 1997 
performance targets for sewerage to ensure affordable tariffs and overcome 
implementation constraints. The concessionaires were allowed to implement a 
decentralised sewerage strategy, which involved the construction of small STPs of at least 
one per city. The existing drainage system would be converted into combined sewerage-
drainage system. This was cheaper to implement compared to separate sewer lines 
because it would utilise the existing drainage system to catch the wastewater from the 
households and storm run-off going into the drainage (Kearton et al. 2013, p.18). 
Interceptor boxes on junctions of the drainage pipes would be installed, which would divert 
the untreated wastewater to interceptor lines leading to the STPs. Under this system, 
individual household connections to the sewer lines are no longer necessary. At a later 
stage, these systems could be gradually converted to separate systems (GO-2014-004) 
(Tetra Tech & Berkman 2013, pp.2–17). As combined sewer systems were new to the 
Philippines, the World Bank provided technical and financial assistance to ensure viability 
of such systems in the Philippine context (World Bank 2012; Tetra Tech & Berkman 2013). 
The first STP with the combined sewer systems was the Pineda STP in Pasig City completed 
in 2008 by Manila Water (Pham & Kuyama 2013; Olchondra 2011). 
In 2009, with sewerage coverage at barely 10% of the service area and with the contract 
almost halfway through, the concessionaires anticipated that cost recovery would result to 
higher tariffs for consumers. It is estimated that the capital cost of sewerage infrastructure 
in Metro Manila, would be at least US$250 per capita, which would be a substantial 
amount to entirely recover through tariffs (World Bank 2013, p.2). In 2009 and 2010, 
Manila Water and Maynilad’s contracts were respectively extended for another 15 years to 
allow the concessionaires to accelerate and double the investment for sewerage and 
sanitation and to support the development of new water sources. The extension also gave 
the concessionaires a longer investment recovery period, thus trimming future tariff 
increases for its customers (Go 2009; Go 2010). As a result of the contract extension, the 
concessionaires committed to double their capital investments in sewerage and sanitation 
and increase coverage target to 100% by 2037, from 55% for Manila Water and 66% for 
Maynilad under the original CA expiry in 2022 (Tetra Tech & Berkman 2013; CTI 
Engineering International Co. 2009). Table 4.4 shows the sewerage and sanitation services 
targets under the original CA, the 2008 business plans and the CA extension. 
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Table 4.4 Original and revised sewerage service coverage targets 
 
Year 
Manila Water  Maynilad 
1997 CA 
% 
2008 Rate 
Rebasing 
% of 
households* 
CA 
Extension 
% 
1997 CA 
% 
2008 Rate 
Rebasing % 
CA 
Extension  
% 
2001 3%   16%   
2006 16%   20%   
2011 51% 144,300 hh 
(16%) 
 21% 13% 11% 
2016 52% 154,775 hh 
(14%) 
 31% 29% 31% 
2018   63%    
2021 55% 278,175 hh 
(22%) 
 66% 39% 66% 
2025   100%    
2026      76% 
2031      88% 
2036      100% 
Note: Sewerage coverage given as percentage of water-served population 
Source: 2013 MWSS Master Plan, update of 2005 Master Plan, 2008 MWCI Business Plan, 2008 MWSI 
Business Plan 
*The 2013 Master Plan did not provide a comparable breakdown for Manila Water’s 2008 sewerage 
targets.  
 
As of December 2011, it was reported that Manila Water’s service coverage was at 13% of 
the population with a treatment capacity of 128 mld while Maynilad Water was at 6% of 
service area population with a treatment capacity of 468 mld (Kearton et al. 2013, p.37). 
4.3 The resulting institutional framework  
Sanitation and sewerage concerns have always been relegated as a subset of water 
governance (Black & Fawcett 2008, p.67). In the Philippines, the water governance sector 
has been judged to be ineffective due to the weakness of individual agencies to perform 
their mandates as well as the setbacks to interagency linkages at the national and local 
levels (Hall et al. 2015; Elazegui 2004; Malayang 2004). There are at least 30 agencies 
involved in the management of Philippine water resources (Paragas 2012 as cited in Hall et 
al. 2015, p.946), and sewerage services are also a function of some of these agencies. As 
poor as the management of the water sector is in the country, sewerage is in a worse state. 
Sewerage was low in the government’s priorities as evidenced by the fact that only 4% of 
the entire country’s population were connected to a sewer network (World Bank 2005, p.3). 
While sewerage infrastructure system was introduced in Metro Manila as early as 1909, it 
took more than half a century before the next wave of government reforms and activities to 
update the sewerage system took place. In an attempt to catch up, numerous laws, 
agencies and master plans were created to address the burgeoning sewerage and 
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sanitation issues in the capital. The Metro Manila concessions signalled that sewerage 
service has finally been given equal attention along with water supply after decades of 
neglect. These efforts have seen the assignment and reassignment of authority over water 
and sewerage activities to different agencies at the local, national, regional level and 
currently, to the hands of the private sector (Figure 4.1).  
The entry of the private sector in the provision of water and sewerage services transformed 
its governance structure into a relational network where public and private actors had to 
collaborate and negotiate over public service delivery. The provision of sewerage services 
occurs in different stages and there are different actors involved in each stage whose 
actions and interactions have a direct impact on the service delivery outcomes. Sewerage 
projects impact on other policy sectors such as health, environment, public works, urban 
planning, economic development and utilities regulation. Sewerage concerns also 
encompass vertical and horizontal jurisdictions, i.e., the national, regional and local 
governments, and the private sector. The Philippine government at the national level is 
organised by sectoral concerns, i.e., public works, environment, health, among other things.  
Different aspects of sewerage service such as policy setting, project planning and 
implementation, tariff setting and regulation are distributed across different departments. 
Figure 4.3 and Table 4.5 encompass the sewerage sector for the entire Philippines but this 
thesis only examines the Metro Manila sewerage sector. 
There is no single government agency that has overall responsibility for all aspects of 
sewerage services and there is no clear delineation on how these agencies work with each 
other on sewerage-related functions. As a result, the sewerage sector in the Philippines has 
no precise configuration. These developments over time have shaped the sewerage 
sector’s current institutional design, as shown in Figure 4.3. The following subsections 
attempts to organise the sewerage sector by first identifying the sub-networks and arenas 
of interaction within the overall sewerage network. At the core is the service delivery sub-
network. At the periphery are the jurisdictional, sectoral and functional networks whose 
roles, while not directly connected with service delivery, are related or adjunct to the private 
sector’s sewerage service delivery functions. The arenas of decision making are tariff 
setting, STP construction and interagency monitoring. Figure 4.4 illustrates the numerous 
sub-networks and arenas of interaction co-existing within the Metro Manila sewerage 
network 
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Figure 4.3 Philippine sewerage governance network  
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Table 4.5 Functional areas in Philippine sewerage network 
Functional areas Departments/agencies Functions 
Policy setting/oversight National Economic 
Development Authority 
 
Department of Public 
Works and Highways  
 
NSSMP Office* 
 
Department of Agriculture 
Evaluate and approve sewerage and sanitation 
projects for inclusion in national infrastructure 
programming  
Tasked to prepare a national sewerage and septage 
management plan (NSSMP) under the Philippine 
Clean Water Act   
Manage and oversee the implementation of the 
NSSMP 
Formulate guidelines for the re-use of wastewater 
for irrigation and other agricultural purposes, and 
for the prevention, control and abatement of 
pollution from agricultural and aquaculture 
activities 
Environmental 
protection and 
regulation 
Department of 
Environment and Natural 
Resources  
 
 
Environmental 
Management Bureau  
 
 
 
Laguna Lake Development 
Authority (LLDA)*  
 
 
Pasig River Rehabilitation 
Commission *  
 
 
 
 
Water Quality 
Management Authority *  
 
 
 
 
 
National Solid Waste 
Management 
Commission*  
 
 
Manila Bay Coordination 
Office * 
 
 
Philippine Coast Guard 
Primary government agency responsible for the 
implementation and enforcement of the Philippine 
Clean Water Act of 2004; review and set affluent 
standards, review and enforce water quality 
guidelines 
Monitor water quality and discharge/effluent 
monitoring and enforcement for areas outside LLDA 
jurisdiction; issue Environmental Compliance 
Certificate (ECC) be secured for environmentally 
critical projects 
Monitor water quality and discharge/effluent 
monitoring and enforcement for the Laguna de Bay 
Region; issue discharge permit if wastewater is 
discharged in Laguna de Bay 
Rehabilitate the Pasig River and its tributaries, 
including preparation of master plans, coordinating 
with other implementing agencies, relocation of 
informal settlers and abate wastewater discharge to 
the Pasig River; monitor water quality for the Pasig 
River 
Formulate strategies to coordinate policies 
necessary for the effective implementation of the 
Philippine Clean Water Act and monitor the 
compliance with the action plan; establish and 
affect water quality surveillance and monitoring 
network including sampling schedules and other 
similar activities; issue discharge permit 
Prescribe policies to effectively achieve the 
objectives of RA 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste 
Management Act; oversee the implementation of 
appropriate solid waste management plans by end-
users and local governments 
Facilitate the efficient and effective implementation 
of the Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal 
Strategy (OPMBCS), including the rationalisation of 
the OPMBCS priority actions and reporting systems 
Enforce water quality standards in marine waters, 
specifically from offshore sources 
Public health 
management 
Department of Health Create and enforce standards for drinking water, 
septage and sludge disposal; review and issue 
Environmental Compliance Certificates for both 
stationary (treatment) and mobile (collection and 
transportation) septage services 
Infrastructure planning 
and construction 
Department of Public 
Works and Highways  
 
Metro Manila 
Development Authority 
Plan, design, construct and maintain road drainage 
and flood control projects; issue excavation permits 
and right-of- way for national roads 
Responsible for integrated planning, monitoring, 
coordination over the delivery of metro-wide 
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Functional areas Departments/agencies Functions 
services such as transport and traffic management, 
solid waste disposal and management, flood control 
and sewerage management; issue traffic permit 
and excavation permits for road diggings in Metro 
Manila 
Local governance Local government units  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barangays 
Appropriate the necessary land, including the 
required rights-of-way/road access to the land for 
the construction of sewage and/or septage 
treatment facilities; sit on Water Quality 
Management Areas governing boards, which will set 
policy for septage management and perform water 
quality surveillance and monitoring 
Issue barangay clearance as prerequisite for 
permits/clearance issued by city hall 
Coordination and 
monitoring 
Manila Bay Advisory 
Committee* 
Committee created by the Supreme Court to 
oversee the implementation of the SC decision on 
the Manila Bay Clean-up: ordered DENR, through 
MBCO to implement OPMBCS 
Public education and 
information campaign 
Department of Education  
Philippine Information Agency 
Commission on Higher Education 
Department of Interior and Local Government 
NSSMP Office 
*interagency committees 
 
Figure 4.4 Different arenas under the Metro Manila sewerage network  
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4.3.1 The core and peripheral networks 
At the core of the Metro Manila sewerage network is the service delivery network. The 
central actors in the network are the two private concessionaires, Maynilad and Manila 
Water, which are contractually obliged to implement sewerage projects towards providing 
100% sewerage coverage for the service area by the end of the CA in 2037.  
Also, part of the core network is the financial institutions, such as commercial banks and 
the World Bank. Financing was the main constraint that prompted the Philippine 
government to privatise the MWSS and private capital was the air that resuscitated the 
then-ailing MWSS. Today, financing is no longer a big issue. There is no shortage of 
financing sources for the two concessionaires as both concessionaires are part of the 
biggest conglomerates in the Philippines and possess good credit standing. Many of the 
water supply projects are financed through commercial bank loans. Sewerage 
infrastructure, on the other hand, is more expensive to construct and maintain but 
willingness to pay by consumers is low. Since interests from loans cannot be recovered 
from the tariff and interests from commercial banks are usually higher, financing by 
multilateral development banks is usually the route taken to finance sewerage projects. 
Concessionaires prefer multilateral development banks due to low interest rates and a 
longer repayment period (PC-2014-004).  
The core network also includes partners and suppliers of the concessionaires, such as 
landowners, contractors and other utility providers. The concessionaires need land for the 
construction of STPs. Republic Act No. 9275 otherwise known as the Clean Water Act 
specifically directed LGUs to appropriate land in their jurisdiction for this purpose18 but in 
the event that the LGUs cannot provide lands, the concessionaires would have to purchase 
from private landowners (PC-2014-004) (Baffrey & Adis 2012; Tetra Tech & Berkman 
2013). The concessionaires also have to coordinate directly with other utility companies to 
ensure that the sewage pipe network will not damage other existing underground 
installations. Above ground, the concessionaires also need electricity lines to power the STP 
(PC-2014-003).  
The peripheral network of the Metro Manila sewerage networks can be categorised into 
sectoral, jurisdictional and functional networks. Sewerage and sanitation has always been 
appended to the broader water governance sector. These are mostly the same agencies 
                                                          
18 Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9275 entitled ‘An Act Providing for a Comprehensive Water Quality Management 
and for Other Purposes enacted on 22 March 2004. 
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that comprise the peripheral network of the sewerage sector in Metro Manila. The private 
sector as the service provider has to work with all these organisations across sectors, 
jurisdictions and functions as each one has a stake in water and sewerage management.  
Sewerage service is a vital public service that impacts on other sectoral policy concerns, 
particularly on the environment, health, and infrastructure planning and development. The 
first sectoral network is the environment network. Sanitation and wastewater, if not 
managed safely and properly, can have disastrous effects not only on the environment but 
on human health. The organisations in this network formulate policies to protect the 
environment, particularly water bodies, and set and enforce the standards for treatment 
and disposal of wastewater and sludge to prevent, control and abate pollution. The health 
network is where policies, technical standards and guidelines on sanitation and wastewater 
management are formulated to ensure that these facilities will prevent the outbreak and 
spread of diseases among the population. Construction of sewerage infrastructure is 
regulated by legal standards on building and maintaining safe and sustainable structures in 
the urban setting. These legal standards are formulated and enforced by the infrastructure 
planning and development network.  
There are three jurisdictional levels of governance that are involved in the Metro Manila 
sewerage network: the national, regional and local governments. At the vertical level, the 
national government through its departments and their attached agencies sets policies and 
formulates and enforces regulatory standards. The local government, on the other hand, 
implements these policies and sometimes issues additional local ordinances, as well as 
regulates the construction of STPs in their jurisdiction through the issuance of permits and 
clearances. Across the horizontal level, national government agencies have to work with 
each other to ensure that the different sectoral concerns of sewerage services are 
consistent with each other. LGUs also work with each other particularly when a sewage 
project traverses multiple localities. At the regional level, the MMDA ensures the integration 
and coordination of metro-wide services such as sewage treatment.  
The national government is traditionally organised by sectoral concerns. The different 
functional areas of sewerage and sewerage-related activities are spread across different 
agencies, such as policy formulation, project planning and implementation, service delivery, 
project monitoring and evaluation. Project planning and implementation, and service 
delivery are functions of the core network. Under the functional sub-network are the policy-
setting and the monitoring and evaluation functions. Policy setting on matters relating to 
sewerage infrastructure is the function of the National Economic Development Authority 
History and the current state of the Metro Manila sewerage services network 
93 
(NEDA) and DPWH. The NEDA is the lead national agency responsible in ensuring that the 
socio-economic policies, plans, programs and projects of different government agencies, 
such as infrastructure development, are consistent with established national priorities at 
both the national and regional levels prior to their adoption. The Clean Water Act of 2004 
decreed the formulation of a national strategy to revive and rehabilitate the country’s 
surface water by sanctioning all highly urbanised cities in the country to provide sewerage 
and septage services. The formulation of this national strategy was vested in NEDA.  
The function of monitoring and evaluation of sewerage projects is implemented in three 
different modes: customer satisfaction administered by the concessionaires, regulatory 
monitoring by MWSS-RO and sectoral interagency monitoring undertaken by the Manila Bay 
Advisory Committee (MBAC). The first two are undertaken in the core network. Under the 
peripheral network, the MBAC, a separate monitoring body was created to monitor all 
activities for the rehabilitation, restoration and conservation of Manila Bay. The 
concessionaires are part of this network because all treated wastewater is disposed of into 
Metro Manila’s estuaries, canals and rivers, which eventually empty into Manila Bay. 
4.3.2 Arenas of interaction 
With the existence of numerous sub-networks and actors, there can be an abundance of 
explanations and permutations that can explain why sewerage obligations were not 
achieved. Simply identifying the actors in the sewerage network by sector, function or 
jurisdiction does not sufficiently explain the outcomes in the sewerage sector. Vital 
decisions occur in arenas and, as such, I will analyse the network behaviour in the arenas 
that impact on sewerage outcomes the most. To determine the factors that influenced 
performance of the concessionaires, it is important to identify the arenas or domains of 
interaction in the sewerage network. The decision making arenas are determined based on 
the problem definition by the concessionaires, Maynilad Water and Maynilad. I take the 
position of the concessionaires in defining the research problem because they are the 
actors that are most actively involved in implementing sewerage projects in Metro Manila.  
The arenas identified by the concessionaires are the tariff setting arena, the STP 
construction arena and the interagency monitoring arena. The decisions and interactions in 
each arena impact on the outcomes in that arena, other arenas and the broader sewerage 
network. Sewerage outcomes are a product of the series of decisions in these three arenas 
over a series of time, as shown in Figure 4.5. The Metro Manila concessions have been 
researched extensively but none of it has evaluated this subject in this manner (cf. Chng 
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2008; Cuaresma 2006; Fabella 2011; Fabella 2012; Malaluan & Wu 2008). The following 
subsections offer background information about each arena. The complexity of these three 
arenas will be examined in great detail in the next three chapters. 
Figure 4.5 Time and decision series in arenas of interactions in Metro Manila  
sewerage services network  
 
4.3.2.1 Tariff setting arena 
In the tariff setting arena, Manila Water and Maynilad are mainly dependent on the MWSS. 
In simple terms, both utilities have to secure authority from MWSS-RO to increase tariff and 
implement their sewerage projects. Tariff is determined during the rate rebasing review that 
both concessionaires have to submit themselves to every five years and administered by 
the MWSS-RO. In this review, the past cash receipts and future expenditures of the two 
concessionaires are examined by the regulator to determine whether or not these expenses 
were prudently and efficiently incurred. These receipts and expenditures will be the basis 
for the revision of the tariff to be imposed by the concessionaires. Maynilad and Manila 
Water relies on the legitimacy that the MWSS-RO grants through the rate rebasing review to 
be able to implement their sewerage projects. Without this legitimacy, they are constrained 
from pursuing their projects. When their projects are not approved, they fail to comply with 
their contractual obligations. 
Should any disputes arise out of the contract which cannot be resolved through 
consultation and negotiation among the parties, another actor is brought into the arena. 
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The parties can escalate the matter for resolution before the international arbitration panel 
to circumvent the clogged dockets of the Philippine judiciary system. 
4.3.2.2 STP construction arena 
In the STP construction arena, there is resource interdependence between the private 
concessionaires and the LGUs. On one hand, the LGUs need the concessionaires to build 
STPs in their locality because, other than for health and environment benefits, these 
facilities are potential political capital for locally elected executives who can showcase the 
project as one of their accomplishments. On the other hand, the concessionaires need land 
for the construction of STPs and LGUs can help identify and appropriate lands in their 
locality. The construction of STPs is governed by numerous legal standards, national 
policies and local ordinances. The concessionaires depend on national government 
agencies and LGUs to grant them the licence and permits necessary to construct sewerage 
infrastructure, such as construction permits, health and environment clearances and traffic 
clearance. 
The two concessionaires are also dependent on other private utilities as the construction of 
STPs includes the installation of kilometres of pipelines to divert wastewater into the STP 
and electricity lines to power the STP. There is no government agency that maintains an 
integrated mapping of existing utilities, thus the Maynilad and Manila Water take it upon 
themselves to coordinate with other utility providers, such as gas, water lines, phone, 
electricity and cable companies, to ensure that their underground works will not damage 
any existing underground installation.  
4.3.2.3 Interagency monitoring arena 
Of the three modes of monitoring and evaluation of sewerage projects, this research will 
examine the sectoral interagency monitoring. The sectoral interagency monitoring is a 
peripheral yet crucial activity that affects sewerage activities. A separate monitoring body 
was created to monitor all activities for the rehabilitation, restoration and conservation of 
the Manila Bay, which is the MBAC. The concessionaires are part of this network because 
all treated wastewater is disposed of into Metro Manila’ s estuaries, canals and rivers that 
eventually empty into the Manila Bay. Under the interagency monitoring arena, the 
dependency of the private utilities on the MBAC was created by the writ of mandamus 
issued by the Supreme Court directing government agencies to keep the Manila Bay clean 
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and safe by performing their ministerial duties19 and non-compliance shall result to 
sanctions from the Court. The Court ruling specifically directed all concerned agencies to 
coordinate among each other in order to achieve the goal of cleaning up Manila Bay.  
The government agencies named in the mandamus are those that are responsible for some 
aspect of waste management, water quality, budget allocation or law enforcement directly 
bearing on the problems of Manila Bay. The MWSS was a named respondent in the case. 
The concessionaires were not named as respondents but as contractors of MWSS, they 
were considered to be de facto mandamus agencies of the MBAC. The Court ordered the 
MWSS and its concessionaires to submit their plans and projects for the construction of 
wastewater treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite and the completion period 
for said facilities, which will not go beyond 2037. This task is already a major obligation of 
the concessionaires under the CA. 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has provided a broad survey of how the sewerage sector in Metro Manila has 
grown into a complex multi-layered system comprised of multiple actors with diverse 
interests. The long history of the sewerage sector in the Philippines created a broad 
network comprised of several sub-networks with no clear lines of coordination. This chapter 
organised the sewerage sector by categorising the organisations by the sub-networks that 
they interact in. However, grouping the actors in the sewerage network by sector, function 
or jurisdiction is not enough to explain the outcomes in the sewerage sector. This chapter 
went further to identify the three most crucial arenas in the Metro Manila sewerage 
services network where vital decisions and negotiations on sewerage services take place: 
(1) tariff setting (2) STP construction and (3) interagency monitoring.  
In the next thee chapters, each arena will be examined in detail by identifying the pressing 
issues confronting the arena and strategies taken by actors to address such issues, 
examining the issues created by the network features of PPP and analysing the network 
effects in each arena. 
  
                                                          
19 A ministerial duty is one that a ‘simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and 
imposed by law that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment‘ (Supreme Court of the 
Philippines 2008). 
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Chapter 5 
The network effects in the arena of tariff setting  
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the tariff setting arena where crucial decisions on the planning of 
sewerage infrastructure and pricing of sewerage services are made. This chapter explains 
how the network features of PPP created network effects in the tariff setting arena. PPP has 
reshaped the governance structure of public infrastructure services, such as water and 
sewerage, by bringing in in new actors, changing the role of old actors and establishing 
contractual relationships among these actors.  
The public and private actors brought together by PPP enter into a legal and binding 
contract that specifies the rights and duties of the contracting parties and failure to comply 
is subject to legal sanctions (Vincent-Jones 2000, p.320). For contracts to be successful 
and effective, they require mutual trust, commitment, altruism and cooperation of all 
parties (Ferris and Graddy 1991:40 – 1 as cited in Davis 2007: 386). The nature of the 
relationship of the contractual parties in a long term public infrastructure contract is 
dynamic. Throughout the contract duration, the conditions under which the parties interact 
are in a constant state of flux. Changes that can affect the relational contract can be 
political (e.g., elections, cabinet change, enactment of new laws, change in policies, change 
in actors, etc.), economic (e.g., currency fluctuation, financial crisis, etc.), environmental 
(e.g., natural disasters) or technological (e.g., obsolescence of and availability of new 
technologies) (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.61). Thus, the terms and conditions of the 
contract do not guarantee certainty in interorganisational transactions in the network.  
In this chapter, it is argued that negative network effects in privatised infrastructure 
services are created when any one or all of the network features are not taken into 
consideration in policy implementation. In the tariff setting arena, the negative network 
effect was a result of an unclear network management role. The Metro Manila water 
concessions have divested the government of its direct service provider role but it has 
created multiple roles for the government that can potentially conflict with each other and 
affect network outcomes. The second section identifies the pressing problems confronting 
the concessionaires in the tariff setting arena. The third section explains how the network 
features of PPP contributed to the problems confronted by actors in this decision making 
arena. The fourth section discusses how the network features created negative network 
effects and its impact on the accomplishment of the concessionaires’ sewerage obligations.  
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5.2 Tariff setting arena problems 
Prior to PPP, the then state-owned MWSS was solely responsible for the management, 
operation, repair, construction and decommission of water and sewerage facilities and the 
right to set the tariff, bill and collect payment from customers for water and sewerage 
services in Metro Manila. In 1997, these functions were transferred to two private 
companies, Maynilad and Manila Water, under a 25-year concession agreement (and 
extended for another 15 years in 2009 and 2010, respectively). The life cycle of sewerage 
projects starts from tariff setting otherwise known as the rate rebasing exercise. Proposed 
water and sewerage projects of the private utilities are reviewed and approved under this 
exercise by the government regulator, MWSS-RO, before any water and sewerage 
infrastructure can be constructed. The tariff is set every five years using a financial formula 
that allows the concessionaires to recover their operating, maintenance and investment 
expenditures efficiently and prudently incurred over the life of the contact.20 The 
concessionaires propose tariff revisions based on their past and future cash receipts and 
expenditures for water and sewerage projects.  
No later than 31 March of the rate rebasing year, the concessionaires are required to 
furnish the MWSS-RO all information on their expenditures, receipts, cash flows, opening 
cash position and future cash flows to aid the rate rebasing review. The regulator reviews 
the viability, prudency and effectiveness of the proposed tariff based on the expenditures 
incurred for water supply and sewerage services in the preceding five years and the 
proposed expenditures in the next five years. Based on this review, the MWSS-RO 
recommends a new tariff, which is subject to approval by the MWSS Board of Trustees. 
Simply put, it is during the rate rebasing review where the parties decide and negotiate on 
how much money will be spent on which projects and how much the concessionaires can 
charge to recover their investments. 
In 2013, the concessionaires and the MWSS were scheduled to go through the third rate 
rebasing review since the water and sewerage services were privatised in 1997. For the 
third rate rebasing, MWSS-RO adopted a process that was different from the two previous 
                                                          
20 Article 9.3.4 of the Concession Agreement states that ‘the rates for water and sewerage services provided by 
the Concessionaire shall be set at  level that will permit the Concessionaire to recover over the 25-year term of 
the Concession (net of any grants from third parties and any possible Expiration Payment) operating, capital 
maintenance and investment expenditures efficiently and prudently incurred, Philippine business taxes and 
payments corresponding to debt service on the MWSS Loans and Concessionaire Loans incurred to finance 
such expenditures, and to earn a rate of return (referred to herein as the “Appropriate Discount Rate”) on these 
expenditures for the remaining term of the Concession in line with the rates of return being allowed from time to 
time to operators of long-term infrastructure concession arrangements in other countries having a credit 
standing similar to that of the Philippines.’ 
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tariff determination exercises. The third rate rebasing was more meticulous and detailed 
compared to the previous reviews as the auditors reviewed transactions amounting to tens 
of thousands of vouchers, receipts, records and documents (Landingin 2013). According to 
former MWSS Acting Chief Regulator Emmanuel Caparas,21 the past two rate rebasing 
reviews were ‘table audits’ that simply entailed checking if an expense was allowable or not 
based on the description of the item. As a result of the detailed audit, numerous 
expenditures, such as corporate donations and corporate income tax (CIT) incurred by the 
concessionaires, were not approved by the MWSS-RO. These expenditures were allowed 
under the previous reviews. Thus, the proposed tariffs by the concessionaires were rejected 
and the regulator directed Manila Water to cut its basic water charge by 29.47% and 
Maynilad by 4.8% (Bernal 2014). In an interview with MWSS Technical Regulator Gerry 
Sullano, it was revealed that it was merely correcting the mistake of previous 
administrations in allowing the concessionaires to pass on the CIT because the past 
reviews did not carefully scrutinise the receipts of the concessionaires.22  
The two concessionaires filed separate cases before the international arbitration panel to 
contest the decision of MWSS-RO in the rate rebasing review of 2013. Almost two years 
after the third rate rebasing commenced, the two arbitration panels finally ruled on the 
cases. While the issues presented by the two concessionaires were substantially the same, 
i.e., to dispute the expenditures disallowed by the MWSS-RO, the panels issued 
contradicting rulings on these cases. On 29 December 2014, the arbitration panel that 
heard Maynilad’s case ruled favourably on the petition and upheld the proposed tariff 
increase by the company. Maynilad was also allowed to recover its CIT, which is equivalent 
to PhP2 of the average increase in basic water charge. On the other hand, the arbitration 
panel for Manila Water’s petition denied Manila Water’s petition in April 2015. The panel 
                                                          
21 Caparas resigned on 30 June 2014 over a potential conflict of interest. He was the acting Chief Regulator 
during the 2013 rate rebasing review. According to an audit observation memorandum by the Commission on 
Audit, Caparas violated a provision in the regulating body's agreement with its concessionaires for holding the 
post of chief regulator and sitting as MWSS trustee at the same time. It provides that a regulator cannot have a 
prior or existing affiliation with parties to the agreement, including MWSS (Bernal 2014). 
 
22 The MWSS-RO referred to a previous Supreme Court ruling that public utilities are not allowed to charge CIT to 
the consumer. The question of whether or not the two water companies can pass on income taxes to their 
customers goes back to 2004, two years after the Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling disallowing the 
Manila Electric Co. (Meralco) as a public utility from including its income taxes in electricity rates. The high 
court’s ruling forced Meralco not only to cut rates, but also to refund up to PhP28 billion to customers. In March 
2004, the MWSS-RO tried to apply the Meralco ruling, believing that the two concessionaires are public utilities 
like Meralco and moved to cut Manila Water’s rates (Maynilad was losing money at that time and did not pay 
income taxes). The MWSS Board of Trustees, however, did not support the position of its regulatory unit. Instead, 
it formed a technical working group (TWG) composed of MWSS officials and water company representatives to 
study the matter. The TWG took the view that the concessionaires are not public utilities but are mere agents of 
MWSS. In July 2004, the MWSS-RO adopted the TWG report and rescinded its previous resolution. The MWSS 
Board also issued a resolution adopting the TWG report (Landingin 2013). 
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adjudged Manila Water as a public utility and therefore not entitled to recover CIT as a 
corporate expense and ordered Manila Water to roll back its tariff to a rate lower than what 
was approved in the MWSS’s original ruling (Rappler.com 2015a). Analysts cannot seem to 
explain the variance in the rulings despite the fact that the two concessionaires presented 
similar set of problems (Gagni 2015). 
The regulator delayed the implementation of the first panel’s decision, which was final and 
enforceable, until the decision on the petition filed by Manila Water was issued to ensure 
consistency in the exercise of its regulatory mandate. After the second ruling was issued, 
the MWSS-RO only chose to implement the ruling for Manila Water and disregarded the 
panel’s favourable judgment on Maynilad’s petition. The regulator is contractually and 
legally bound to implement the two decisions but in denying Maynilad’s tariff increase, the 
MWSS-RO argued that it was merely performing its duty to set just and equitable rates for 
all water consumers in Metro Manila. According to MWSS-RO Chief Regulator Joel Yu, the 
regulator is within its duty to reduce the rate in the panel ruling as the implementation of 
the panel’s decision is subject to the approval of MWSS-RO (Rappler.com 2015b).  
The refusal of the MWSS-RO to implement the panel ruling on Maynilad spurred another 
round of legal cases. In February 2015, Maynilad sought sovereign compensation from the 
DOF based on the existing sovereign undertaking between the Philippine government and 
the concessionaire. The undertaking is a form of government warranty that guarantees 
government agencies involved in a project will fulfil their obligations. Maynilad alleged that 
the MWSS-RO’s refusal to implement the panel decision is in violation of this undertaking 
and has caused the company revenue losses amounting to PhP3.44 billion (US$77.56 
million) from 1 January 2013 to 28 February 2015 (Rappler.com 2015c). Maynilad expects 
the amount to increase until MWSS implements the rate hike. The concessionaire also filed 
a new arbitration case before the ICC to protest the regulator’s disregard of the panel ruling 
and seek payment for foregone revenues as result thereof. In April 2015, Manila Water also 
filed a claim for sovereign compensation before the DOF for the company’s projected losses 
due to the arbitration ruling that prohibits it recovering CIT. The company claims that it 
stands to lose about PhP79 billion (US$1.79 billion) from 2015 to 2037 as a result of the 
decision of the arbitration panel. In December 2015, Manila Water also filed another notice 
of arbitration against the Philippine government before the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
in Singapore for the DOF’s failure to honour the performance undertaking issued in 
connection with the CA. 
The network effects in the arena of tariff setting 
101 
On 20 February 2015, then DOF Secretary Cesar Purisima issued a memorandum to then 
President Benigno Aquino III expressing the Department’s position that the MWSS-RO 
should have granted the petition for tariff increases by the concessionaires. Secretary 
Purisima surmised that the call on the undertaking letter by the private utilities may 
negatively affect the country’s credit rating. The MWSS-RO’s refusal to implement a valid 
arbitral award may be perceived by foreign investors as a breach of contractual 
commitment (De Vera, 2015). Notwithstanding the DOF’s position, the regulator filed a 
petition before the Philippine Supreme Court in April 2015 to seek its opinion on whether or 
not the two concessionaires are public utilities and thereby entitled to recover CIT from the 
public.  
The rate rebasing exercise is intended to be a routine review that the parties submit to 
every five years and is supposed to conclude within one year from its commencement. In 
July 2017, four years after the rate rebasing commenced, the international tribunal ordered 
the Philippine government ‘to pay Maynilad Water Services Inc. PhP3.424 billion in revenue 
losses from unimplemented rate adjustments’ (Cordero, 2017). There is no ruling yet on 
the case filed by Manila Water. The MWSS has not released a statement on the decision. In 
the meantime, both concessionaires are complying with the tariff rates approved by the 
MWSS and implementing water and sewerage projects in their respective service areas. 
Regardless of who will be pronounced the winner in these cases, the final bill on the 
arbitration costs will eventually be charged to the consumers.23 Past arbitrations cost over 
Php140 million (Table 5.1) (Sabillo, 2013). The arbitration cost for the third rate rebasing is 
yet to be disclosed (Padilla, 2013). 
Table 5.1 Cost of past arbitration proceedings  
Summary of Issues Concessionaires involved Cost of arbitration  
(PhP million) 
On the determination of the MWSS-
RO of extraordinary price adjustment 
(EPA) using an ADR of 5.2% (1999) 
Manila Water 23.14 
Notice of early termination (2003) Maynilad 109.66 
On the issue of the accelerated EPA 
and FCDA 
Maynilad 7.23 
TOTAL  140.03 
Source: MWSS Regulatory Office; Sabillo, 2013 
  
                                                          
23 Article 12.6 of the Concession Agreement states that the ‘Costs incurred by the Appeals Panel in connection 
with any proceeding (including the fees and expenses of panel members and legal, economic or technical 
consultants retained by the Appeals Panel), shall be apportioned between the parties as the Appeals Panel shall 
direct and the Concessionaire’s share of such costs shall be treated as an Expenditure.’ 
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5.3 Network features in the tariff setting arena  
Since networks are inherently complex and plural, service delivery outcomes rely on how 
interorganisational relationships and processes are managed. The past and current issues 
that the concessionaires have encountered (see Section 4.2.3.4 The fall and rise of the 
Metro Manila concessions on page 80) and continues to encounter is symptomatic of the 
network features that emerged as a result of PPP. This section discusses how the network 
features influenced the occurrence of these problems.  
5.3.1 Arena actors and their resource interdependencies 
One of the claimed advantages of PPP is that it has improved accountability arrangements 
compared to the traditional procurement method (Greve & Hodge 2010, p.156). PPP has 
broadened accountability arrangements, which is deemed superior to traditional 
procurement: interlinked financial incentives across a network of actors, risk-sharing 
through contractual legal relationships and more flexible decision making processes 
between government and service provider (Greve & Hodge 2010, p.156). Resource 
interdependence has improved transparency and checks and balances in the management 
and distribution of resources. Accountability under a hierarchical network emanated from 
government supervision and checks and balances over allocation of resources was 
concentrated in government hands. PPP is deemed to have improved accountability and 
transparency of government transactions by expanding this role to multiple actors and 
institutions (Hodge & Coghill 2007, p.693).  
Resource dependency is determined by the importance of a resource owned by one actor to 
others and its substitutability or whether the resource can be acquired from other actors. 
The nature of interorganisational relationships is largely shaped by the distribution of 
resources among network members (McGuire 2002, p.605). The degree of resource 
dependency defines the position of the actor in the network. An actor who is dependent on 
a resource owned by another to achieve its objectives but the latter is not dependent on the 
former is in a weak position (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.145). With more actors in the 
network, there will be more configurations of dependencies. Resource allocation 
mechanisms, therefore, have to be negotiated at the interorganisational and interpersonal 
levels to make the network work (Osborne 2010b, p.9).  
The MWSS-RO and the two concessionaires are the indispensable actors in the tariff setting 
arena. There are secondary actors in the tariff setting arena whose resources, while not 
central, are still relevant to the performance of the functions of the two main actors. Table 
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5.2 below summarises the level of dependency among the actors in the rate rebasing 
arena. 
Table 5.2 Resource dependencies in the tariff setting arena 
Actors Very important 
resources 
Degree of  
substitutability 
Dependency:   Low, 
medium, high 
Critical actor: 
yes/no? 
MWSS Competency Low High Yes 
 Legitimacy Low High  
Maynilad 
Manila Water 
Knowledge 
Financial resources 
Medium 
Medium 
High 
High 
Yes 
Lending 
institutions 
Financial resources Medium Medium to high Yes 
International 
arbitration Panel 
Legitimacy Low Medium to high No 
Rate rebasing 
consultant 
Knowledge Medium Medium to high Yes 
Department of 
Finance (DOF) 
Legitimacy 
Competency 
Low 
Low 
Medium 
Medium 
No 
Consumers Legitimacy Low High Yes 
Activist groups Legitimacy High Low No 
 
Maynilad and Manila Water were expected to pour in the much-needed substantial capital 
investment and provide the technical expertise to upgrade and rehabilitate Metro Manila’s 
decaying water and sewerage infrastructure, maintain and operate these facilities, bill and 
collect water and sewerage charges and pay the old debts incurred by MWSS. By the end of 
the CA, both concessionaires are expected to have achieved 100% potable water supply 
connection for the entire population and 100% treatment of the sewage produced.  
The two private utilities either fund the projects themselves or borrow from lending 
institutions, either commercial banks or multilateral development banks (MDBs). Many of 
the water supply projects are financed through commercial bank loans because this is the 
profitable aspect of the service. Sewerage infrastructure, on the other hand, entails higher 
capital and operating cost but willingness to pay by the consumers is very low. Financing by 
MDBs, through a local financial conduit such as the Land Bank of the Philippines, is usually 
the route that the concessionaires take for sewerage projects. According to the executives 
of Maynilad’s Wastewater Planning and Project Development, it is more favourable for the 
company’s cash flow to secure a MDB loan as the interest rate is lower and repayment 
period is longer, i.e., 1.5% interest and 30 years. The World Bank also offers a grace period 
of five years, which means the borrower does not have to commence repayment while the 
project is still being constructed. Commercial banks, on the other hand, impose an interest 
rate of 7% with a maximum repayment period of ten years. Interest on loans is not a 
recoverable expense under the CA.  
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Once the financial dependency between the government and the private sector was sealed 
through the CAs, other resource interdependencies were created. The framers of the Metro 
Manila concessions acknowledged the need to regulate the concessionaires because water 
is not an ordinary commodity and tariff setting can be a highly political and sensitive issue. 
The MWSS-RO was created to ensure effective regulation of the concessionaires and 
guarantee equitable tariff rates (see Section 4.2.4.3 Regulating the concessionaires on 
page 79). As regulator, it possesses intangible resources that the concessionaires need for 
continued public acceptability of their status as service providers, i.e., legitimacy and 
competency. MWSS-RO grants Maynilad and Manila Water the legitimacy to implement 
sewerage projects through the rate rebasing review. The allocation of financial resources 
has to pass the scrutiny of the MWSS-RO before any water or sewerage projects can 
commence. Legitimacy is not a one time, continuing resource that the concessionaires 
secure but is renewed every five years through the rate rebasing review. Without this 
legitimacy, they are constrained from implementing projects and when their projects are 
not approved then they fail to comply with their contractual obligations.  
The power to grant legitimacy, in turn, is dependent on another resource that the regulator 
possesses, which is the competency to conduct a fair, objective and adept evaluation and 
decision on the business proposals of the concessionaires. As regulator, the MWSS-RO is 
expected to have the competency to evaluate and monitor the financial and technical 
and/or engineering aspects of the concessionaires’ operations. Prior to the Metro Manila 
concessions, the government had no experience in regulating water and sewerage services. 
Recognising this shortcoming, the framers of the CA provided an option for the regulator to 
hire consultants during the rate rebasing process when it is deemed necessary. In the three 
rate rebasing exercises thus far, the MWSS-RO had enlisted the services of consultants to 
assist in the technical and financial analyses of the concessionaires’ business plans. The 
regulator depends on an important resource, i.e., knowledge, to proceed with the rate 
rebasing review, which is held by the concessionaires.  
The MWSS-RO and the two concessionaires are highly dependent on the resources that the 
other possesses because each of these resources has a low degree of substitutability. The 
main motivations of the Philippine government to work with the private sector in the 
provision of the water and sewerage services in Metro Manila are to overcome the lack of 
financial resources and technical expertise (Dumol, 2000 pp.16-20). These resources can 
neither be substituted with another resource nor can these be secured from another actor. 
In turn, the concessionaires are highly dependent on the resources that the MWSS 
possess, i.e., the competency to conduct the rate rebasing review and the legitimacy 
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granted to the concessionaires by virtue of the review, as these resources cannot be 
substituted from any other agency because the MWSS is the sole regulator of the Metro 
Manila concessions. As both regulator and concessionaires have monopoly over such 
resources, the mutual co-dependency requires the parties to work together and resolve 
their issues, if any, because the consuming public has no alternative providers for the 
resources they possess. 
The dependency of the concessionaires on lending institutions is at the medium range 
because the substitutability of the financial resource is medium to high in view of the 
different options available to the concessionaires to finance their projects. Both companies 
have a large capital base and good credit rating and can also opt to fund the projects 
themselves or choose from different types of banking institutions for financing. 
Both the international arbitration panel and the DOF possess the competency to rule on 
legal issues that may arise between the regulator and the concessionaires and the 
resolution of these issues provide the legitimacy that either party expect from the 
arbitration. These resources have low substitutability as these agencies are the only ones 
empowered to rule on the issues between the regulator and the concessionaires. 
Dependency is medium to high because these resources are critical only when they are 
activated, i.e., when they are called on to decide on issues that cannot be resolved by the 
concessionaires and the regulator themselves. During the first and third rate rebasing, the 
international arbitration panel was activated to rule on the proposed tariff increases, 
among other things. The DOF was activated in 2015 when the two concessionaires called 
on the sovereign undertaking and sought for compensation for failure of the MWSS-RO to 
implement the arbitral ruling. 
The regulator also refers to the satisfaction rating by consumers in evaluating the 
performance of the concessionaires as it is a key performance indicator (KPI) in the CA. 
This legitimacy resource is neither substitutable nor can be secured from other actors, as 
the consumers are the recipients of the water and sewerage services delivered by the 
concessionaires. Both concessionaires consistently garnered good ratings in the Public 
Assessment on Sewerage and Sanitation Service.  
The activist groups, while not a central actor in the tariff setting arena, possess legitimacy 
resource that can be helpful to the concessionaires. The court cases filed by these groups 
against the concessionaires can delay or halt water and sewerage projects should the court 
rule favourably in any of these cases. In an interview with Rodolfo Javellana, president and 
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spokesperson of Water for All Refund Movement (WARM), he revealed that his group has 
filed a total of five cases before the local courts assailing the different aspects of the Metro 
Manila concessions. A positive endorsement from the activist groups could be an added 
legitimacy for the concessionaires but, according to one project executive working for one 
of the concessionaires, they do not factor these cases into their decisions as their 
obligations are mainly guided by the CA. Moreover, according to the project executive, their 
company does not view these cases as a threat as a number of earlier cases filed by 
individuals and NGOs had been dismissed by the courts (PS-2014-007).  
5.3.2 Goal congruence 
As networks are comprised of numerous and diverse actors, achieving goal congruence has 
been deemed crucial to effectively work across interorganisational networks (Goldsmith & 
Eggers 2004; O’Flynn, Blackman, et al. 2013; Provan & Kenis 2007). Achieving goal 
congruence is challenging when each actor is governed by its organisational mandates. For 
the private sector, ‘Money is the end…while money is a means in the public sector to 
achieve social outcome’ (Moore, 2000 as cited in Greve & Hodge 2010, p.158). Actors can 
have different interest, perception and strategies that can diverge and conflict (Koppenjan 
& Klijn 2004, p.51). To agree on a common goal, it is important that actors first define the 
problem that they jointly need to address. A common problem definition can clarify each 
organisation’s stake or interest in resolving a problem and the level of interdependence 
needed to solve the problem (Bryson et al. 2006, p.46).  
In the case of the Metro Manila concessions, the CA defines the rules that the 
concessionaires and the MWSS have to observe. The two concessionaires are contractually 
obliged to operate, maintain, renew, appropriate and decommission water and sewerage 
system facilities in their respective service areas. In terms of water services, the 
concessionaires are required to increase water connections to meet service coverage 
targets, provide uninterrupted 24 hours of water supply, facilitate connections to the water 
main and ensure that drinking water supply are within the health and safety standards. The 
service obligations of the two concessionaires in the CA are basically the same, differing 
only on the targets, which are based on the concessionaires’ financial models. The 
sewerage obligations of the concessionaires, as provided under Article 5.2 of the CA, are as 
follows: 
1) Offer sewerage connection to consumers in services areas where the sewer lines are 
available and comply with the sewerage coverage targets per city and municipality, 
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2) Comply with all national and local laws and standards on wastewater treatment and 
3) Provide septic and sanitation cleaning services to consumers every five to seven years.24  
The long term nature of concession contracts exposes the parties to changing conditions 
that can undermine or challenge the contract and the relationships among parties. The 
Metro Manila concessions span 40 years and the long term nature of the contract creates 
uncertainties. The proponents of the Metro Manila concessions instituted multiple and 
overlapping checks to safeguard the contract over the contract duration: (1) creation of 
MWSS-RO as regulator and contract manager, (2) institution of procedural controls, such as 
the rate rebasing review and other reporting requirements, (3) option to hire consultants to 
assist in the technical and financial review of the concessionaires’ business plans and (4) 
opportunity to resort to international arbitration in case of conflict.  
The CA created the MWSS-RO to evaluate and monitor the performance of the 
concessionaires. The MWSS-RO evaluates the performance of each company based on the 
KPIs and business efficiency measures (BEM), taking into consideration the expenditures 
and investments to achieve such targets. The KPI and BEM are assessed alongside the 
concessionaires’ business plans, which lay the framework for new service obligations and 
anticipated future investments. These targets are measured based on population coverage 
and service quality defined in their five year business plans. The CAs allow for renegotiation 
of performance targets and tariffs during the rate rebasing review. The review commences 
on the 31st of March of the rebasing year and should be concluded within one year. In case 
conflict arises between the concessionaires and MWSS-RO from the implementation of the 
CA and the parties cannot resolve the issues among themselves, the parties can resort to 
international arbitration. The decision of the international arbitration panel is final, binding 
and executory. 
The CA laid down the rules that are supposed to mitigate uncertainty by defining the roles, 
duties and obligations of the actors in the network and providing sanctions in case of non-
compliance. These rules are formal, specific and time-bound. However, these were not 
enough to guarantee smooth and controversy-free Metro Manila concessions. As we now 
know, the first ten years of the Metro Manila concessions was turbulent at best, 
characterised by a battery of legal cases, bankruptcy and rebidding of contract (see Section 
4.2.3.4 The fall and rise of the Metro Manila concessions on page 80). However, the early 
                                                          
24 The Sanitation Code, however, requires periodic desludging of septic tanks every three to five years. 
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disputes can be considered the inevitable teething problems when new policies are 
implemented. The turbulence in the early days can be attributed to the fact that the parties 
were still learning the ropes of PPP. These served as a learning experience that ‘tested the 
robustness of the arrangement, forged trust between the parties and helped shape future 
expectations’ (Kumar & Brock 2012, pp.6–7).  
The third rate rebasing is still in a legal quagmire. The turn up of events in the third rate 
rebasing exercise has proven that the only thing constant in a relational network is 
uncertainty. Uncertainty is brought about by the different perceptions among the network 
actors, which have created a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.115). While 
the CA has clearly laid down the goals, each actor has a different opinion on the nature of 
the problem and solutions. When actors are discussing different things, it is difficult to find 
a solution.  
Not only are the regulator and the private utilities at odds but the government itself is 
divided over the tariff issue. The regulator believed that by conducting a more detailed audit 
and disallowing certain expenses of the concessionaires, it is correcting the mistakes of 
past administrations. The regulator corrected these mistakes by construing the contract 
terms in favour of the consumers. The change in the interpretation of the CA prompted the 
two concessionaires to resort to international arbitration. After the arbitration panel ruled 
on the cases, the regulator refused to comply with the decisions of the arbitral court. The 
regulator views the decisions of the arbitral court as prescriptive and it is still within its right 
to implement its own decision. The DOF, on the other hand, viewed the act of MWSS-RO as 
a breach of the arbitral award, which was final and binding and the latter had no basis for 
delaying the execution of the rate increase (De Vera 2015). The argument of NGOs is 
beyond the interpretation of the contract terms but on the validity of the CA itself. Each 
actor’s arguments are backed by their own research that has resulted in a ‘war of reports’ 
that served to escalate the conflict and uncertainty (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.115).  
The contract is the main instrument of service provision and mode of regulation (Freeman 
2000, p.668) but these were not enough to get actors to cooperate towards the network 
goal. The CA included provisions for check and balance, such as the option to hire 
consultants to provide technical and financial expertise during the rate rebasing exercise, 
the leeway to negotiate between the parties in case of disagreement and if issues cannot 
be resolved, the availability of international arbitration. These safeguards, however, may 
also be the reason for the long, drawn out legal dispute that has started in 2013 and 
continues to this day. These accountability measures were intended to put the private actor 
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in check but in the tariff setting arena, it is the government regulator who refuses to 
implement a valid court decision. The expansion of accountability in the Metro Manila 
concessions served as a constraint because accountability is now negotiated at the 
interorganisational and interpersonal levels in a relational network (Osborne 2010a, p.9).  
5.3.2 Network management  
Amidst the uncertainties that are inherent in network, network leadership is deemed as key 
to the successful functioning of interorganisational networks (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004; 
Goldsmith & Eggers 2004; Bryson et al. 2006; Jackson & Stainsby 2000). The network 
manager must master the challenges of governing by network: aligning goals, providing 
oversight, averting communications meltdown, coordinating multiple partners, managing 
the tension between competition and collaboration and overcoming data deficits and 
capacity shortages (Goldsmith & Eggers 2004, p.40). A network manager is expected to 
navigate and lead the network out of a dialogue of the deaf.  
Some network theorists suggest that the government is in the best position to assume the 
role of network manager (E H Klijn & Koppenjan 2000; Kickert et al. 1997). With PPP, the 
government has relinquished its role as service provider but its governance responsibilities 
do not end as it usually retains a regulatory role to ensure the quality and safety of vital 
public services (Kettl 2010, p.239). The government retains its regulatory role to ensure 
that the availability, accessibility and affordability of this vital public service, especially to 
the poor, are guaranteed. In addition to its regulatory role, the government is also the 
contract manager. Managing a contract requires a fundamentally different skill set from the 
government — negotiating a contract, overseeing its execution and assessing its results — 
compared to its previous role of managing direct service provision (Kettl 2010, p.246). 
These roles can potentially conflict because as regulator, the government has to ensure 
that consumer welfare is protected and as contract manager, the government’s role is to 
ensure that the contract is implemented. There may be actions arising from the contract 
that may be deemed detrimental to consumers, the most common of which is tariff 
increase. 
The concessionaires and other national agencies engaged in sewerage-related activities 
expect the MWSS-RO, as the government regulator, to take on the role as network 
manager. With the numerous agencies involved, each representing its own functions and 
interests (see Section 4.3 The resulting institutional framework on page 86), other 
stakeholders in the sewerage network believes that the MWSS-RO can act as arbiter and 
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lead the network towards mutual understanding of problems and convergence of ideas for 
solutions. Achieving goal congruence is challenging when the two lead actors in this arena 
have opposing goals i.e. whereas the private sector engaged in public service delivery to 
earn money, the public sector views the money from the private sector to achieve social 
outcome. Negotiations for PPP contracts have been criticised for lacking transparency as 
the process is often kept among the consultants and the parties to the contracts. Since 
these contracts are often highly technical in nature and can be difficult for laypeople to 
understand, the public is often not included in the negotiation process (Greve & Hodge 
2010, p.153). The public interest is supposed to be safeguarded by the government as 
regulator.  
For regulatory regimes that lack capacity, it would be difficult to strike a balance between 
the interests of the consumers and the operators. To avoid conflicts, the potentially 
conflicting functions should be independent from each other: (1) the contract manager, (2) 
the regulating body and (3) the policymaker. This does not exist in the Metro Manila 
concessions as the MWSS-RO was created by the MWSS Board of Trustees, which is 
mandated to set the policy directions of MWSS. Mark Dumol, a crucial actor in making the 
Metro Manila concessions happen, explained in his book The Manila Water Concession: A 
Key Government Official’s Diary of the World’s Largest PPP that an independent regulatory 
office created by legislation was initially envisioned but was not pursued. The executive 
department was given by the legislative branch two years from 1995 to privatise MWSS. 
Getting Congress to create an independent regulatory body could be a lengthy process and 
may delay the PPP (Dumol 2000,p.56).25 Due to the tight timeline to effect the Metro 
Manila concessions, the CA included a provision creating a semi-autonomous regulatory 
office to be created by the MWSS Board instead of taking the legislative route. In an 
interview, Mark Dumol maintained that a regulatory body created by legislation would not 
have been much different from the current set-up as a legislated regulatory office does not 
guarantee against political interference. According to Dumol, this has been the experience 
of other legislated regulatory bodies in the Philippines where the decisions of the Board 
have usually been subject to political influence. 
With no previous experience of managing and monitoring contracts, how does government 
monitor expenditures, outputs and outcomes? When regulatory enforcement is weak, the 
                                                          
25 After privatisation, several bills have been filed in Congress to establish an independent economic regulator 
for the water and sewerage sector, none of which has been enacted as of the writing of this thesis. The most 
recent proposed legislation calling for the creation of a Water Regulatory Commission, filed in November 2013, 
is still pending before the current 16th Congress. The 16th Congress ends in 2016 and if this bill is not enacted 
then it has to be refiled before the 17th Congress and once again go through the legislative process. 
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government relies on the private sector on aspects where it is lacking to address 
information issues. When the government does not have the resources necessary to 
research, inspect and pursue all regulated entities that violate regulations, it relies 
considerably on self-monitoring, recordkeeping and reporting by regulated entities 
(Freeman 2000, p.660). The establishment of performance monitoring tools is meant to 
mitigate the information asymmetry issue. Following the controversy that riddled the first 
rate rebasing exercise, the MWSS-RO in 2003 exhibited network leadership when it 
established two measures to improve its capability to monitor and assess the performance 
of the two operators: the KPIs and BEMs. Both the KPIs and BEMs address the information 
issue as these measures were intended to establish baselines as reference for future rate 
rebasing exercises, as well as allow the regulator to monitor concessionaires’ performance 
continuously. This was the practice of the MWSS-RO in the past two rate rebasing exercises 
by relying on the expenditure reports submitted by the concessionaires. The human capital 
issue is addressed by the fact that as the contract progresses and with more rate rebasing 
review experience, the MWSS-RO managers are expected to have learned more in 
managing the concession contract over time, along with working with its consultants. 
The long term nature of the contract requires the contractual parties to work cooperatively 
with each other to effectively implement the terms of the contract. Over time, the constant 
interaction develops into a relationship and trust is built. Trust, however, is not automatic; it 
takes time to develop and trust is sustained because it is confirmed and not violated with 
regular interactions (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.86). Trust is a stable perception on the 
intentions of others. There is trust when an actor expects the other actor will not behave 
opportunistically when an occasion for it arises (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.72). However, 
the perceptions, objectives and strategic positions of the actors in the network may change 
significantly under the influence of societal, economic or political changes in the 
environment (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.61). Over different periods of time, there will be 
numerous triggering events and conflictual situations that require a specific strategy or 
solution. Uncertainty in long term relational contracts is high and the higher the uncertainty, 
a higher degree of trust is necessary to reduce the transaction cost brought about by 
uncertainty (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.86).  
Trust is challenging to build and maintain in the tariff setting arena when actors are 
constantly changing over the contract duration. The concessionaires have to deal with 
different leadership in MWSS-RO every rate rebasing review. The President of the 
Philippines, who is elected every six years, appoints the MWSS Board of Trustees. The 
Board, in turn, appoints the executive officers of the MWSS-RO. The first and second rate 
Chapter 5 
112 
rebasing exercises, in the years 2002 and 2007 respectively, occurred under the 
presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Following the issue-ridden first rate rebasing, the 
second rate rebasing was free of arbitration. It can be assumed that the parties have 
learned to work together that prevented another legal impasse in the second rate rebasing. 
While trust can help create stability and greater predictability in the relationships of network 
actors, distrust of the private operators by the government is supported by the public 
interest theories of administrative law, which is generally suspicious of private participation 
in public governance (Freeman 2000, p.649). The private role in governance is viewed as 
diverse, pervasive and not uniformly dangerous and to protect national interest or general 
welfare, it is within its right to implement laws or policies that shall safeguard public 
interest from self-interested third parties (Freeman 2000, p.558). Distrust seems to have 
guided the MWSS-RO during the third rate rebasing review when it gave precedence over its 
role as a regulator in safeguarding the interest of the consumer over its responsibility to 
implement the CA with the concessionaires. The MWSS-RO maintains that its decision to 
adapt a more detailed audit in the 2013 rate rebasing exercise, which is a departure from 
the interpretation of the contract by its predecessors, without judicial fiat or a valid contract 
amendment is within its duty to ensure just and equitable tariff. Former Chief Regulator 
Emmanuel Caparas maintains that the essence of a regulatory audit is a detailed review of 
expenses used in setting rates and correcting the mistakes of the previous administrations 
is in the best interest of the public (Landingin 2013).  
5.4 Network effects in the tariff setting arena 
The network features of PPP created a negative network effect in the tariff setting arena. 
The arena produced negative outcomes because its objectives were not achieved. The ideal 
outcome in the tariff setting arena is that the contractual parties agree on the revised tariff 
based on past receipts and future expenditures for proposed projects within one year from 
the commencement of the rate rebasing exercise. Four years after the rate rebasing in 
2013, parties are still locked in legal battle. Eventually, the cost of the long and protracted 
legal battle will be paid for by the Metro Manila consumers as the cost of international 
arbitration is treated as expenditure under the contract. The fourth rate rebasing review is 
scheduled in 2018 and it is unknown if the issues of the 2013 rate rebasing will be 
resolved by then and how these will affect the conduct of the next rate rebasing review.  
The network features of PPP in the tariff setting arena hindered the concessionaires from 
delivering the expected benefits of the Metro Manila concessions. PPP was expected to 
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improve public service delivery by improving accountability arrangements by spreading 
resource management to different actors. The resource interdependence between the 
concessionaires and the MWSS-RO in the tariff-setting arena was not sufficient to get the 
actors to work towards the same goal. The main actors in this arena, i.e., the MWSS-RO and 
the concessionaires are mutually dependent on each other’s resources, which according to 
the network governance literature, would have encouraged a higher degree of cooperation 
between and among the actors in this arena. However, interorganisational cooperation 
issues arise when an actor does not recognise the mutual dependency and a power 
imbalance is created. Even when the CA spelt out the duties and obligations of the 
contractual parties and included measures for checks and balances, resource 
interdependence can serve as a hindrance power when any one of the actors is unclear 
about their accountability role in the network. Such is the case in the tariff setting arena. 
The regulator withheld from the concessionaire an important resource that the latter needs, 
which is legitimacy. The MWSS-RO did not see itself as the network manager than can lead 
the actors in this arena towards a goal consensus. Even when the CA has specified the 
roles and obligations of the contractual parties, it does not guarantee goal congruence. 
When actors interpret the rules differently, it can make the behaviour of actor unpredictable 
and the network outcomes uncertain. There is power imbalance in this arena because the 
concessionaires are dependent and vulnerable to the actions and decisions of the regulator 
during the rate rebasing exercise. 
A major obstacle to achieving goal congruence under a long term concession contract is 
that the conditions surrounding the rate rebasing exercise change continuously. Since the 
concession is a 40-year contract, the concessionaires have to work with different 
administrations in the MWSS-RO. The change in the political environment brought forth 
change in leadership at the MWSS-RO that prompted a shift in policy and new 
interpretation of the CA. Mark Dumol, the chief architect of the Manila Water concessions, 
explained that the change in government leadership dictated the directional change in the 
2013 tariff determination exercise and this is regulatory risk that the private utilities have 
to endure. The change in government leadership brought a change in interpretation of the 
CA that is different from previous administrations. According to analysts, the change in 
policy stems from the representation made by the government in 1996 to the then bidders 
that MWSS-RO would remain a public utility while the concessionaires would be treated as 
agents or contractors. What is ‘woefully wrong’ with the policy change, analysts said, is that 
the change of status of the concessionaires to being a public utility from contractor means 
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they cannot recover income tax payments as expenditure. This results in huge losses that 
often translate to operational inefficiencies (Gagni 2015).  
The contract extension was meant to give the concessionaires a longer investment recovery 
period to cushion the cost of sewerage infrastructure in the tariff. In other countries, 
government financing has been provided for wastewater management infrastructure 
(Kearton et al. 2013, p.5). In my interview with the Senior Sanitary Engineer of the World 
Bank in the Philippines, Christopher Ancheta, such a scheme is being considered in the 
Philippines through the NSSMP where the government plans to provide 40% subsidy for 
capital costs. This scheme, however, is not available in Metro Manila. For operating costs, a 
study conducted by the World Bank and Australian Aid found that it is difficult for service 
providers to meet full costs through water tariffs in developing countries in Southeast Asia 
and South Asia (World Bank 2013, p.5). In Metro Manila, the wastewater operation is 
subsidised through water tariffs. The World Bank recommends that policy should support 
the recovery of operational costs through tariffs to improve the sustainability of the 
services, taking into consideration the concerns of the poor (Kearton et al. 2013, p.5). 
The MWSS-RO, however, does not seem to support the recovery of operational costs 
through tariffs in the third rate rebasing review. The change in contract interpretation can 
be attributed to a lack of trust. When former President Benigno Aquino (2010-2016) was 
elected in 2010, his first order of business was to review all the contracts entered into by 
his predecessor, President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo (2001-2010) and fire all her 
appointees, including those at the MWSS-RO. A career service official from MWSS 
confirmed that this policy direction of the Aquino administration resulted in a number of 
changes in the conduct of the rate rebasing review (GO-2014-026). These modifications 
included (1) the concessionaires are no longer viewed as contractors but as public utilities, 
(2) the concessionaire cannot recover CIT through the tariff as public utilities, (3) the 
conduct of a more detailed audit that went to the level of inspecting all the receipts accrued 
by the concessionaires (that was not done in the two previous rate rebasing exercises and 
(4) the concessionaires were not given the opportunity to negotiate the rate rebasing 
decision with the regulator. The last action prompted the concessionaires to resort to 
international arbitration.  
The conditions that enhance accountability of contracts depend on ‘the context in which 
they are struck, the historical relationship of the parties, the incentives they confront, the 
openness of the process to independent third parties, the potential for adapting the 
contracts in light of changed conditions and a host of other considerations’ (Freeman 
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2000, p.671). To ensure and protect accountability, administrative law demands for greater 
contractual specificity (Freeman 2000, p.668). In drafting the CA, Dumol explained that 
some points in the CA were: 
Hand-mapped and spelt out in black and white but some were 
deliberately drafted to give a broader interpretation. That concession 
agreement had a certain style. It was compact. Now, maybe that has 
some faults of its own. Another style would be spelling everything out in 
black and white. When you do that you have such a thick contract and 
you'll have more mistakes. The thicker the contract, the more mistakes — 
inconsistencies, for example, more words, more misinterpretations. So I 
don't know why it's a legal issue, as far as I am concerned. And it's hard 
because you are talking of a long term concession. It's not possible to 
foresee everything that is going to happen during the term of that 
concession. That's why with concessions, the concession agreement has 
certain flexibility. It was deliberately done that way. 
However, as Dumol pointed out, no contract can exhaustively anticipate and specify all 
situations that parties may encounter in the implementation of long term contracts, 
transcend different leaderships and endure differing interpretations. If they attempted to, it 
will result in a voluminous and rigid CA, which may not be attuned to the changing times 
and may pose problems to future regulators. It is for this reason that the CA, according to 
Dumol, provided an arbitration clause so that in the extreme event that a left-leaning, 
socialist President is elected and decides to renege on the contract, the private utilities 
have a legal recourse.  
The act of the MWSS-RO of disregarding the arbitration ruling and disallowing tariff increase 
showed that it favoured its role as an advocate and regulator rather than a network 
manager. While trust between contractual parties can help stabilise the relationship, the 
government is eventually accountable to the public and therefore has to maintain and 
manage public trust. As international experience has shown, public backlash over tariff 
increases after PPP has caused the rescission or renegotiation of a number of water 
concession contracts in the developing world. The MWSS-RO Chief Technical Regulator 
Gerald Sullano admitted that the water tariff in Metro Manila is high because the capital 
expenditure for wastewater facilities is fully recovered from the tariff. In other countries, the 
cost of sewerage infrastructure is subsidised by the government because it is a public 
service. In Metro Manila, the government cannot afford to subsidise the cost so it is fully 
funded by the private sector.  
Even when the decision of MWSS-RO is made in the interests of consumers, activist groups 
still perceive that the government favours the concessionaires. WARM president Javellana 
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alleges that decisions of the government to cater to the interests of the private operators 
are deeply entrenched in an elaborate personal network that controls the water and 
sewerage sector. Javellana points out that personal network had played a major role since 
the very beginning of the Metro Manila water concessions, starting from the drafting of the 
CA, which water activists alleged had been skewed to favour the private utilities. With all 
the palpable connections that link the water and sewerage sector’s movers and shakers, 
Javellana is not surprised as to why the decisions of the government always favour to the 
private utilities, adding that gaining an understanding of how the personal network works 
will also bring insight to how the government decides. 
In the absence of network leadership and the existence of unstable political conditions, the 
private sector relies on alternative mechanisms. Where weak governance prevails, existing 
market exchanges tend to be supported by private ordering (Williamson, 1983; 1985; 
2002) or second party enforcement (North, 1990). These alternative mechanisms usually 
raise the cost of contracts to the parties (Fabella 2012). In an interview with Manila Water 
Vice President and author of the book, Tap Secrets, Virgilio Rivera pointed out that the 
private sector has to be resilient and innovative enough to hurdle the obstacles in its way if 
it is determined to fulfil its contractual obligations while running a profitable business. 
Regulatory risk is an accepted risk that businesses have to live with and the private sector 
must work around these risks. Notwithstanding the obstacles that they encounter, Rivera 
claims that the business is still profitable and as long as it remains that way, the company 
will continue operating. Mitigating the effects of regulatory risk, however, is not without cost 
to the private utilities, whether it is in the form of delays, transactional costs or corruption 
costs. These all add up to the expenditures of the private sector, which in the end would 
have to be shouldered by the consumers. As Rivera quipped, ‘money does not grow on 
trees.’ As businesses, they have to recover their business costs, including overruns and 
delays, somewhere and from someone. As a capital intensive service, it cannot and will not 
operate at a loss. When the government cannot afford to subsidise the capital costs of 
public infrastructure, it is the consumers who pay. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has examined the network effect of PPP in the tariff setting arena. The tariff 
setting arena is one of three crucial arenas in the Metro Manila sewerage network and is 
where major decisions on allocation of financial resources are made. PPP altered the 
landscape of governance of public infrastructure services, which was previously 
characterised by hierarchies and markets. PPP created a contractual relationship between 
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the government and the private sector provider. This contractual relationship created 
resource interdependence between public and private actors that dispersed decision 
making authority across a number of actors. The structure of organisational dependency in 
the network is shaped by the allocation of resources among network members (McGuire 
2002, p.605). Interactions among network actors revolve around the use and allocation of 
these resources and these decisions are often situated in arenas within networks. 
The tariff setting arena is in state of impasse. Due to the complexity of relational networks, 
it is difficult to identify a single reason that influenced the outcomes in this arena. An 
examination of the tariff setting arena revealed multi-causal explanations: (1) resource 
interdependence served as hindrance power, (2) there is no goal congruence between 
contractual parties due to different problem perception that resulted in a lack of unifying 
strategy to resolve the impasse and (3) the MWSS-RO does not see itself as a network 
manager as it prioritised its role as regulator and advocate of general welfare.  
The change in government leadership resulted in a change of policy direction. The new 
leadership in MWSS-RO interpreted the CA differently from its predecessors, which is the 
root cause of the impasse in the tariff setting arena. This arena also revealed the 
difficulties encountered by the private sector in engaging in a long term contract with the 
government that is susceptible to numerous uncertainties. Even if the contract stipulated 
safeguards to mitigate risks, it cannot be specific enough to cover all potential issues that 
may arise over a 40-year period, in which case, the private sector has to be creative and 
resilient enough to survive the turbulences that economic and political changes may bring. 
Further theoretical implications of the findings in this arena in relation to the entire 
sewerage network will be discussed in the Conclusion. 
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Chapter 6 
The network effects in the arena of  
sewage treatment plant construction  
6.1 Introduction 
When a new policy or programme is implemented, it is usually assigned to a single 
organisation that is expected to implement the programme by itself (Hjern & Porter 1981, 
p.217). However, the reality of PPP is that it has expanded accountability to numerous 
actors who have to coordinate and negotiate over decisions on public service 
implementation (Hodge & Coghill 2007; Freeman 2000; Osborne 2010a). A new network 
governance structure is formed as a result and generates network effects that may change 
the outcomes. In this context, no policy or programme can be fully implemented by a single 
organisation (Hjern & Porter 1981, p.216).  
This chapter examines the complex processes of building STPs and the challenges involved 
when actors do not recognise being part of an implementation structure working towards a 
common goal. While the responsibility of providing sewerage services in Metro Manila has 
been transferred to the private sector, the concessionaires are still dependent on a number 
of actors in implementing sewerage projects. The concessionaires have to work with a 
different set of actors to pursue different activities involved in STP construction. These 
activities include the purchase of land for STP site, conduct of tender for contractors to 
construct the STP, organise public consultations with local communities where the STP will 
be built and secure the necessary permits and licences from the local, subnational and 
national government agencies, among other things.  
The sewerage problem of Metro Manila is not one that purely necessitates technological or 
financial solutions. Building STPs is not a simple task as it is a public infrastructure that 
impacts on wider policy sectors such as health, environment, public works, economic 
development and utilities regulation, which are handled by different government 
departments. STP construction also crosses vertical and horizontal jurisdictions with the 
involvement of a gamut of national, sub-national, private and non-government entities. It 
also traverses temporal dimensions as the concession contract runs for 40 years. With the 
numerous entities that the concessionaires have to coordinate with, a number of 
relationships are created. In addition, several policies that directly and indirectly govern the 
sector have to be complied with, which translates to copious procedures to be observed. 
These numerous relationships and complex processes can create issues in the 
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implementation of STP projects. Most of the obstacles that the concessionaires encounter 
in STP construction are a result of these relationships and processes, which is not 
something that the private sector alone can resolve. 
This chapter examines the network effect of PPP in the STP construction arena and 
explains how the network features of PPP have served as barriers for the concessionaires 
to meet their service targets. The second section presents the problems that the 
concessionaires encounter in implementing STP projects. The third section examines the 
issues created by the network features of PPP in the STP construction arena. The fourth 
section analyses the network effect on STP construction and explains how the uncertainties 
of interorganisational dynamics shaped the outcomes in this arena. 
6.2 STP construction arena problems 
In urban centres in the developed world, domestic and commercial wastewaters are directly 
discharged into the sewerage system through a network of underground pipes connected to 
STPs that will treat wastewater prior to disposal into open bodies of water. In developing 
countries such as the Philippines, a large amount of untreated wastewater ends up in 
canals and rivers. Metro Manila, the country’s centre of economic activity, accounts for 30% 
of the country’s gross domestic product (Gilbuena et al. 2013, p.38), and generates 440 
tons of domestic wastewater on a daily basis (Bagayaua 2009). Barely 10% of the 
population are connected to the sewer network and some 62,590 families are living along 
waterways that have no sanitary facilities (Kearton et al. 2013; Manila Bay Coordinating 
Office 2011). As of 2003, the DENR declared Metro Manila’s major rivers as biologically 
dead (Gorme et al. 2010, p.173). Despite the proliferation of laws, policies, rules and 
regulations, and multiple agencies tasked to enforce the proper management and disposal 
of wastewater and solid waste, Metro Manila still lacks sufficient STPs.  
The two water concessionaires adopted a three-pronged strategy to provide sewerage 
connection and sanitation services in the metropolis: (1) regular siphoning of septic tanks 
via desludging trucks to haul out septage to be treated in septage treatment plants, (2) 
conversion of communal septic tanks into package STPs and (3) use of combined drainage 
systems and construction of STPs (Baffrey & Adis 2012). 
Under the first strategy, the concessionaires conduct periodic desludging activities for their 
customers by using vacuum tankers to siphon septage from septic tanks. The hauled 
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septage is brought to septage treatment plants for treatment. The treated wastewater is 
recycled for use in the wastewater facility or discharged safely into the drainage, while the 
biosolids or organic sludge from the septage are given to composting companies for use as 
soil conditioners. The second strategy involves the conversion of communal septic tanks 
into STPs. The treatment capacity of these converted communal septic tanks is smaller 
than STPs. Nevertheless, the concessionaires deem it economical and practical to convert 
these tanks into small STPs compared to decommissioning these tanks and installing a 
sewer network to transport sewage from these tanks to a bigger treatment plant (Baffrey & 
Adis 2012). The first two strategies, however, are not sufficient to provide treatment for the 
sheer amount of wastewater produced in the metropolis. Most homeowners are not diligent 
in getting their septic tanks desludged. When septic tanks are full or improperly 
constructed, the wastewater spills into the public sewers and ends up in the river system 
untreated. Also, wastewater generated in informal settlements adds to the volume of 
untreated sewage that ends up in the river system.  
The third strategy, which is the construction of combined sewer systems and STPs, is 
envisioned to augment the shortcomings of the first two strategies. Under this strategy, the 
existing drainage system is converted into a combined sewer and drainage system, 
interceptor lines are installed along the creek and/or river outfalls and interceptor boxes 
are placed on junctions of the drainage line. These interceptor lines and boxes divert the 
wastewater from the households and storm run-off into the STPs for treatment. The treated 
effluent will then be discharged into river system (Baffrey & Adis 2012). Figure 6.1 
illustrates how a combined sewer and drainage system works. 
As of 2015, Manila Water had installed 368.24 kms of sewer lines that convey wastewater 
from 172,370 households to 41 STPs, which can treat 317 million litres of wastewater per 
day. Maynilad Water, on the other hand, had built 20 STPs and installed over 500 kms of 
sewer lines (Tetra Tech & Berkman 2013). Figure 6.2 shows the location of STPs in Metro 
Manila. The map shows that there are still large portions of the concession area that do not 
have STPs. In the Maynilad service area, 9% of the population receive sewerage services 
and the Manila Water service area at 12%. Both concessionaires are behind the target set 
by the CA for 2013 to 2016, which is 30% and 14%, respectively (Tetra Tech & Berkman 
2013). Sewerage connection and investment targets over the contract period are 
enumerated in Table 6.1.  
 
Chapter 6 
122 
Figure 6.1 Combined sewer and drainage system  
 
Source: Manila Water file photo 
 
Table 6.1 Sewerage connection and investment in Metro Manila 
 Maynilad Manila Water 
Year Connection 
 (% of population) 
Investment Connection 
(% of population) 
Investment 
2008-2012 30% US$113M 14% US$295M 
2013-2016 45% US$411M 30% US$680M 
2017-2021 63% US$604M 66% US$164M 
2022-2037 100% US$622M 100% US$481M 
Total  US$1.7B  US$1.62B 
Source: TetraTech and Berkman 2013 
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Figure 6.2 Location of STPs in Metro Manila concession area  
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As discussed in Chapter 4, the implementation of sewerage projects encountered setbacks 
in the early years of the Metro Manila concessions. The two concessionaires prioritised the 
expansion of the water distribution network due to the dilapidated state of the water 
network that the concessionaires inherited from MWSS. The concessionaires were also 
locked in a number of legal disputes in the early years that delayed the implementation of 
sewerage projects. Because of these setbacks, the concessionaires and the regulator 
renegotiated the sewerage targets during the first rating rebasing in 2003. The first STP 
under the Metro Manila concessions was built in 2008 (Tetra Tech & Berkman 2013).  
Barring any major delays, the average turnaround for STPs, from planning to plant 
commissioning, is two to three years. The level of cooperation among the actors in this 
arena impacts on the efficiency of implementing sewerage projects. Efficiency is affected by 
duration and cost. Duration pertains to the time required to implement sewerage 
infrastructure, whereas cost refers to both operational expenditures as well as capital 
investments (Baffrey & Adis 2012, p.3). Any delay lengthens project duration and increases 
cost and an increase in project cost means an increase in tariff.  
There are two main activities in implementing STP projects: construction of the treatment 
plant and installation of sewage pipelines. Implementation of these activities involves a 
lengthy process that requires compliance with numerous laws and regulation, and 
negotiations with numerous stakeholders. Based on interviews with personnel from the two 
private utilities, the bottlenecks are encountered in three areas where they have to work 
with other actors: (1) acquisition of land for STPs, (2) securing numerous permits and 
licences for STPs and (3) solid waste management.  
6.2.1 Different stakeholders in land acquisition 
Finding land that meets the requirements of a treatment plant significantly impacts the 
duration and cost of the project. Available large tracts of land are a scarce commodity in 
Metro Manila. The capital occupies a land area of 1,940 kms2 and is home to some 14 
million inhabitants. The region is ranked as one of the ten most densely populated 
metropolitan areas in the world with around 19,000 people per km2 (Yujuico 2015, p.48). 
The selected site for a STP has to meet certain criteria, i.e., (1) a sizable amount of land 
with low elevation, (2) in close proximity to bodies of water and (3) far from residential and 
commercial areas.  
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Land options are limited for private utilities. Pieces of land near waterways are the ideal site 
for STPs and are cheaper as the government owns easement rights over these lands. 
However, these lands are usually occupied by informal settlers. Large tract of lands in the 
metropolis are usually reserved for the more lucrative commercial or residential ventures 
(Choi 2016, p.578-579). Where land is available, it is sold at a more expensive market 
price. In the event that the concessionaires acquire a suitable piece of land, the 
concessionaires are required to get the consent of the residents of the community because 
citizen complaints can bring the project to a halt, temporarily or permanently, depending on 
the outcome of the arbitration. Thus, it is imperative for concessionaires to undertake 
social impact assessment in the communities where the STP will be constructed prior to 
project commencement.  
6.2.2 Multi-level jurisdictions in permit and licence application 
The concessionaires have to comply with a number of regulations and standards in the 
construction of sewerage infrastructure. The necessary permits and licences required have 
to be secured separately by the concessionaires from the host barangay and LGU, from 
other cities in case multiple jurisdictions are affected and national government agencies.  
The concessionaires have to comply with the requirements of the host barangay and the 
city hall. Application for permits and licences starts at the barangay where the land is 
located. After the barangay, the concessionaires can proceed to apply for permits and 
licences from the city hall, such as locational clearance, building permit, excavation permit 
for local roads, electrical permit, mechanical permit, sanitary/plumbing permit, wiring 
permit, fencing permit, traffic permit and mayor’s permit. These permits and licences are 
separately processed and issued by different offices in the city hall.  
Pipe-laying work for sewer network is complicated because it can traverse multiple cities 
and private properties. In which case, right of way (ROW) or easement rights for installation, 
periodic repairs and maintenance of pipelines have to be obtained from different numerous 
parties, i.e., DPWH, LGUs, private owners and local associations. Excavation works for 
pipeline installation can also exacerbate the already congested roads of Metro Manila. As 
such, concessionaires are required to secure additional excavation and traffic permits from 
both the local and national governments.  
The concessionaires also have to coordinate with other private utilities and services that 
may be affected by the construction, such as telecommunications, gas, road improvement, 
flood control and water projects. There is no government agency that has an integrated 
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subterranean mapping of existing utilities so the concessionaires have to coordinate with 
other utility providers to ensure that excavation works will not damage any existing 
underground installations. Table 6.2 lists the permits, licences and certificates that the 
concessionaires have to secure at every stage of STP project implementation. The list is not 
exhaustive as requirements may differ in every city or on the nature and scope of the 
project. In the Doing Business Project report of the World Bank, it was estimated that 
dealing with construction permits in the Philippines entails 24 procedures for compliance 
that can be completed in 98 days (World Bank 2016). Raul Bernal of JFE Engineering 
Corporation (JFE Corp.) attests, however, that in their experience as STP contractor of the 
two concessionaires, the company usually deals with more than 24 procedures and more 
than 98 days when applying for the necessary permits and licences. The processing time is 
not consistent because every national and local government offices have different 
requirements.  
Table 6.2 Requirements for STP construction 
Stage Permit/licences/certifications Issuing authority 
Planning 1.Environmental Impact Assessment 2.Environmental Compliance Certificate 
DENR 
Pre-
Construction 
1. Locational Clearance 
 
2. LLDA clearance 
3. DOLE CSP  
4.Environmental Sanitation Clearance 
5.Fire Safety Evacuation Clearance 
 
6. Permit to cut/earth ball trees 
7. Clearance for national roads 
8. Clearance for local roads 
9 Barangay clearance 
 
10. Neighbour’s consent 
11. Homeowner's association 
12. Right of way 
13. Community Tax Certificate 
14. Contractors Tax 
15. Building Permit. The following permits are required before 
the building permit can be issued: 
15.1. Ancillary permits required for issuance of Building 
permit: 
a. Architectural Permit 
b. Structural Permit 
c. Civil/Structural Permit, Form No. A-02 
d. Electrical Permit, Form No. A-03 
e. Mechanical Permit, Form No. A-04 
f. Sanitary Permit, Form No. A-05 
g. Plumbing Permit, Form No. A-06 
h. Electronic Permit, Form No. A-07 
2. Accessory Permits required for issuance of Building permit: 
a. Fencing Permit 
b. Sidewalk Construction Permit 
LGU (City Planning and 
Development Office)  
LLDA 
DOLE 
DOH 
DILG (Bureau of Fire 
Protection) 
DENR 
DPWH 
LGU 
LGU (Office of the 
Barangay) 
Property owners 
Property owners 
Property owners 
LGU (City Treasurer's 
Office) 
LGU (Office of the 
Building Official) 
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Stage Permit/licences/certifications Issuing authority 
c. Sidewalk enclosure Permit 
d. Scaffolding Permit 
e. Excavation Permit 
16. Business or Mayor's Permit  
 
17. Certified true copy of the land title 
 
18. Lot plan with site map  
 
 
 
LGU (Office of the 
Mayor) 
DOJ (Register of 
Deeds) 
Geodetic engineer 
Construction 
Phase 
1. Fire safety inspection certificate (FSIC) 
 
2. Building inspection 
DILG (Bureau of Fire 
Protection) 
LGU (Office of the 
Building Official) 
Post-
Construction 
1. Certificate of final electrical inspection 
 
2. Certificate of Occupancy. The following are required before 
this certificate can be issued: 
a. FSIC 
b. Health certificate 
c. Duly notarized certificate of completion 
d. Construction logbook 
e. As-built plans and specifications 
f. Building inspection sheet 
g. Final inspection by OBO 
3. Tax declaration of improvement  
LGU (Office of the 
Building Official) 
LGU (Office of the 
Building Official) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LGU (City Assessor's 
Office) 
Operations 
Phase 
1. Discharge permit 
2. Transport permit and TSD (treatment, storage and disposal) 
permit  
3. Self-monitoring reports 
4. Vehicle road worthiness 
 
 
5. Processed sludge 
DENR(LLDA/ WQMA) 
DENR 
 
DENR (EMB) 
Department of 
Transportation (Land 
Transportation Office) 
DENR (Bureau of Soil 
and Water 
Management) 
Source: JFE Engineering (PS-2014-010); World Bank Doing Business Project 2016 
(http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/philippines#dealing-with-construction-permits) 
6.2.3 Interagency management of wastewater and solid waste 
Solid waste management is the responsibility of LGUs but the concessionaires have 
inadvertently taken the task of clearing solid waste. Tons of improperly disposed of and 
uncollected solid wastes pollute the waterways of Metro Manila and clog the sewer 
networks and interceptor lines. The concessionaires encounter coordination issues with 
LGUs on the removal and disposal of solid waste that obstruct their sewerage facilities as 
host LGUs are often reluctant to bear the cost for these. They argue that the solid waste 
that accumulated in their jurisdiction could have come from other cities and municipalities. 
The concessionaires have no recourse but to assume the cost and responsibility because 
requesting the different cities and municipalities to share the cost and responsibility entail 
a lengthy coordination process.  
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6.3 Network features in the STP construction arena  
Prior to the Metro Manila concessions, the then state-owned MWSS operated under a 
hierarchical structure. The MWSS provided water and sewerage infrastructure within the 
cities in municipalities in the MWSS service area and complied with health and 
environmental regulations administered by national government agencies. The traditional 
intraorganisational system operates under a ‘top-down’ approach with ‘a single central 
authority, a hierarchical ordering’ (Kickert et al. 1997; Hudson 2004). Under this system, all 
network members are from the government that sets the public goal and all public actors in 
the network are legally mandated to fulfil this goal.  
With PPP, the governance structure has been altered with the introduction of a new actor, 
i.e., the private concessionaire that is tasked to build and operate water and sewerage 
infrastructure. Under a relational network, actors are task-focused as they exist to complete 
a project, product or service. There is no formal structure governing the actors, instead, the 
task that brought them together is expected to generate positive benefits among these 
actors. The focus should be on ‘coordinating the strategies of actors with different goals 
and preferences with regard to a certain problem or policy measure within an existing 
network of interorganisational relations’ (Hudson 2004, p.81). This section discusses the 
challenges encountered by the concessionaires as a result of the network features of PPP 
based on four STP projects implemented in different cities in Metro Manila. Table 6.3 
summarises the description and network features of the four STP projects. 
.
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Table 6.3 Network features on STP projects 
 
Description 
Olandes STP 
(Manila Water) 
Talayan STP 
(Maynilad) 
Ilugin STP 
(Manila Water) 
Central Manila STP  
(Maynilad) 
Nature of ownership  Public Private Private Still looking 
Location Marikina and some parts of Quezon 
City 
Quezon City Pasig Manila 
Land size 660 m2  1,840 m2 5,000 m2 4,900 m2 
Capacity 10 mld for 40,000 residents 16 mld for 27,000 households 100 mld for 650,000 residents 437 mld for 1.4 million residents 
Cause of delay  Revision of technical design Non-cooperation of community Miscommunication with host LGU Lack and/or shortage of suitable land 
(landowner does not want to sell) 
Network features     
Resource 
interdependence 
High, LGU cooperation is 
indispensable 
High, LGU cooperation is 
indispensable 
High, LGU cooperation is 
indispensable 
High, LGU cooperation is 
indispensable 
Goal congruence  Other actors, i.e., LGU and MMDA 
were supportive of STP: 
-LGU assisted in scouting for land 
and negotiating for its purchase, 
-MMDA advised on project design  
-LGU assisted in securing permits, 
-LGU allowed MWCI to commence 
construction pending issuance of 
permits 
LGU was supportive of STP but left 
Maynilad to deal with the barangay 
and community on its own 
Miscommunication with LGU on 
original plans for STP 
Delay in issuance of construction 
permit due to revision of LGU’s land 
use plans 
Confusion on NGA processes (design) 
LGU cooperative but did not yield any 
result in land acquisition 
MBAC expressed support but no 
follow-up action was made 
Network 
management 
LGU acted as network manager. 
LGU took ownership and leadership 
of the project  
LGU used its powers to help Manila 
Water 
No network manager. City hall 
cooperative up to certain extent was 
involved in community issues even 
if it’s under their jurisdiction.   
No network manager. Manila Water 
left on their own to settle issues 
No network manager. MWSS not keen 
on exercising expropriation powers to 
acquire land 
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6.3.1 Resource interdependencies 
There is a number of resources exchanged under the STP construction arena, i.e., 
production, competency and legitimacy resources. There is a high degree of dependency 
among actors in this arena because the resources held and controlled by each actor have a 
low degree of substitutability, i.e., the resources cannot be substituted with another 
resource or acquired from another actor by the resource user (Table 6.4).  
Table 6.4 Resource dependency in the STP construction arena 
Actors Very important 
resources 
Degree of 
replaceability 
Dependency: Low, 
medium, high 
Critical 
actor: 
yes/no? 
Maynilad 
Manila Water 
STP Low High Yes 
LGUs Land Low High Yes 
 Permits/license Low High Yes 
NGAs Permits/license Low High Yes 
Local 
Community 
Consent Low High Yes 
 
There are more actors in the STP construction arena compared to the rate rebasing arena. 
In this arena, the two private concessionaires collaborate with 37 LGUs in Metro Manila 
and the adjacent provinces of Cavite and Rizal. Each LGU exercises local autonomy and 
operate independently from one another. The concessionaires also have to work with a 
number of national government agencies, other utility providers, host communities and 
private landowners.  
The concessionaires are highly dependent on the LGUs and private property owners for a 
production resource that cannot be substituted, i.e., land on which the STPs will be 
constructed. Land has a low degree of substitutability because available land that can 
accommodate STPs in Metro Manila are scarce and expensive. The Philippine Clean Water 
Act directed LGUs to appropriate lands in their jurisdiction for this purpose. In the event that 
the LGUs cannot provide the land, the concessionaires have to purchase private real 
estate. The concessionaires also depend on a competency resource of LGUs, i.e., the 
authority to issue the permits and licences required in constructing STPs in their 
jurisdiction. The LGUs, on the other hand, rely on the concessionaires to provide sewerage 
services in their locality.  
Once an appropriate piece of land is secured, the concessionaires have to acquire ROW 
from property owners, which can be private or public entities or individuals. The 
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concessionaires are highly dependent on the community for a legitimacy resources, which 
is consent from the community. This resource has a low degree of substitutability because 
this resource can only be secured from the host community and if the latter refuses to host 
the the STP in their community then the project cannot push through.  
The two concessionaires are also highly dependent on other utility providers for 
information. The construction of STPs includes the underground installation of kilometres of 
underground sewage pipelines to divert wastewater into the STP. This resource has a low 
degree of substitutability because the concessionaires are not able to secure this 
information from other actors. There is no agency that keeps a record of the underground 
mapping of utility infrastructure so the concessionaires take it upon themselves to 
coordinate with other utility providers, such as gas, water lines, phone and cable 
companies, to ensure that their underground works will not damage any existing 
installations. Above ground, the concessionaires also need electricity lines to power the STP 
and apply for electricity connection to the power provider. 
The concessionaires depend on a competency resource from the national government 
agencies that enforce building, health and environmental regulations. This resource also 
has a low degree substitutability because the issuance of permits and licenses are under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of certain agencies and cannot be sourced from other actors. The 
executive branch of the Philippine government is comprised of departments that are 
organised according to sectoral concerns.26 These departments are categorised herein by 
functional networks as certain regulatory functions are concurrently performed by several 
departments. These are the infrastructure planning and development network, environment 
network and health network.  
The infrastructure planning and development network is where policies and legal standards 
on maintaining safe and sustainable urban environment are set, including the minimum 
standards for buildings and structures. Actors in this network are the LGUs, DPWH and 
MMDA. The bulk of the permits and licences are issued by the different offices under the 
LGU, such as the planning office, building office, mayor’s office and the barangay office 
where the STP shall be constructed. If the pipelines traverse multiple LGUs, the 
concessionaires also have to secure permits and licences from the affected LGUs. In 
addition, the concessionaires have to secure permits and licences from MMDA as 
implementation of sewerage projects cross city boundaries. The MMDA is responsible for 
                                                          
26 Book 4, Chapter 1 of Executive Order No. 292 entitles, “The Administrative Code of the Philippines”. 
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the integrated planning, monitoring and coordination over the delivery of metro-wide 
services, such as transport and traffic management, solid waste disposal and 
management, flood control and sewerage management. The concessionaires also have to 
get the engineering design of the STPs approved by the DPWH and secure excavation 
permit for national roads from the Department. The DPWH is the national department that 
is mandated to undertake the planning of public infrastructure work. 
The construction of sewerage infrastructure, the collection, transfer and treatment of raw 
sewage and septage, and the disposal of treated sewage are subject to environmental 
regulations. The environmental network formulates and enforces these environmental 
regulations. Actors in this network are the DENR and its attached agencies, such as the 
EMB, LLDA and WQMAs. Among the regulations in this network are environmental impact 
assessments (EIA) for sewerage and sanitation infrastructure, transport permit and 
treatment, storage and disposal for septage and self-monitoring reports for effluent 
discharge in rivers and drainage. 
Untreated wastewater poses environmental threats and hazardous to human health. The 
health network formulates and implements policies and legal standards for the 
construction and maintenance of toilets, septic tanks and STPs, and treatment methods 
and disposal of sludge and wastewater. The lead actor in this network is the Department of 
Health (DOH) and its health officers at the city and municipal level. The concessionaires 
need to secure the necessary health permits from these agencies before and during the 
operations of the STP. Under the Sanitation Code of the Philippines, the approval of the 
DOH is required for the plans, design, data and specifications of a new or existing sewerage 
system or STP, the method of sludge disposal from septic tanks and the discharge of 
untreated effluent from STPs. 
6.3.2 Goal congruence 
A network is comprised of different organisations that provide different types of services to 
a common set of clients. When actors agree on the purpose of the collaboration, they can 
jointly define each one’s roles and responsibilities and level of interdependence, contribute 
towards resolving network issues and agree on the decision making process in the network 
(Bryson et al. 2006, p.46). It is assumed that the professional norms and views of 
institutional-level planners and policymakers will be generally consistent with the views of 
professionals who actually implement services (Provan & Milward 1991, p.399). When 
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actors have similar perceptions, it is easier to gain cooperation and resolve issues in the 
network (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.72). Perceptions can be about understanding of the 
content (e.g., nature of the problem or desired solutions, etc.) and the other actors (e.g., 
power and competence of actors) (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.71). 
Actors in the network make decisions based on their perceptions. However, the perceptions 
of actors in the network are mainly shaped by their organisational purpose. As each 
organisation is different, it is challenging for organisations to share a common perception 
on a network problem. Conflict may arise from differing perception of the problem, 
strategies and tactics to resolve the problem or dispersed attempts to control network 
outcomes (Bryson et al. 2006, p.48). These differences make it difficult to achieve a 
common purpose. The lack of commitment among actors to a common purpose may be a 
reason for failure (Kickert et al. 1997, p.9). 
Unlike the tariff setting arena where the goals, objectives and rules governing the 
relationship of the concessionaires and the regulator are defined in the CA, the STP 
construction arena does not have a formally defined goal. It is challenging to achieve a 
common purpose in the STP construction arena because there is no clear, formal and 
established structure. The STP construction arena is not purposely established by law or 
contract. There is no law or contract that directs the actors in this arena to cooperate with 
the concessionaires in implementing sewerage projects. It is only the concessionaires who 
are contractually obliged to deliver sewerage services. Other actors participate in this arena 
because they are required by some law to enforce sewerage-related laws or regulate 
sewerage-related activities.  
The implementation of sewerage projects requires the cooperation of a number of public 
and private organisations that are governed by their own organisational mandates. Other 
than the legal fiat under the Clean Water Act directing LGUs to allocate lands for STPs, the 
relationship of the LGUs with the concessionaires emanates from the Republic Act No. 
7160 or the Local Government Code of 1990, which empowers LGUs to regulate all 
activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within its jurisdiction. The 
concessionaires also have to comply with regulatory requirements imposed by national 
government agencies. Complying with the different regulatory standards at different levels 
of the government can cause delays in the implementation of STP projects. This is 
illustrated in the experience of Manila Water in its North and South Pasig sewerage system 
project in Pasig City. The North and South Pasig sewerage system project STP is the biggest 
STP project of Manila Water and the project timeline was reasonable expected to be longer 
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than Manila Water’s other STP projects. However, due to delays encountered by Manila 
Water at the local and national level, the project took much longer than planned. The 
design and build contract was awarded on the third quarter of 2012. The contractor was 
expected to complete the design by the first quarter of 2013, construction works to 
commence soon after and completed by the second quarter of 2015. However, 
construction only started in December 2014 and expected project completion was moved 
to December 2016 (PS-2014-0076) but as of May 2017, the STP has not been completed. 
The delay was caused by a number of coordination issues at every stage of the project, 
from securing the environmental impact assessment, relocating the informal settlers that 
occupied the land, getting the engineering design approved, down to securing numerous 
permits and licences from the local government (See Appendix 2.1 for North and South 
Pasig STP project details). 
In addition to hurdling bureaucratic processes, getting goal consensus in the STP 
construction arena is challenging for the concessionaires because of the prevalence of ‘not-
in-my-backyard’ (NIMBY) attitude among communities. NIMBY is defined as ‘a socially 
desirable land use that broadly distributes benefits yet it is difficult or impossible to 
implement because of local opposition’ (Richman & Boerner 2006, p.37). The NIMBY 
problem has been a perennial challenge for policymakers, local land use planners and 
developers from implementing socially beneficial facilities and infrastructure (Richman & 
Boerner 2006, p.32). The objection of the local community and the process of negotiating 
to convince the residents of these communities lengthen the duration of project 
implementation. Concessionaires are required to conduct public consultations to explain 
the benefits of the projects and get the consensus of communities. Due to scarcity of land 
in Metro Manila, the concessionaires are compelled to consider residential and commercial 
properties as STP sites if the property has low elevation and is located close to bodies of 
water as discharge points for treated wastewater. Some communities refuse to have STPs 
in their locality because they are concerned that the sewage stench will permeate and 
cause health hazards. Concessionaires face an even stronger resistance in affluent 
communities who wield influence to impede the STP from being built in their locality (PS-
2014-003, PS-2014-001).  
This was the experience of Maynilad with Talayan STP where the concessionaire had to 
forgo the original location chosen as the community opposed the project (See Appendix 2.2 
for Talayan STP project details). On the other hand, Manila Water did not face any difficulty 
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in getting the buy-in from the community for the Olandes STP because the project was 
championed by the Marikina city government (See Appendix 2.3 for Olandes STP project 
details). Manila Water also incorporated community features in the STP, such as park, 
basketball courts and parking lots, to disprove the perception that a STP project is dirty and 
stinky (Figure 6.3).  
6.3.3 Network management 
The STP construction arena is not a formally organised structure so the actors do not come 
together to deliberately define problems, formulate solutions and coordinate their activities. 
As such, it does not have a formally designated leader who has the authority to steer the 
arena towards a network goal. In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA’s legal mandate fits 
the role of a network manager not only for sewerage services but for any public services in 
the entire metropolis. Under Republic Act No. 7924, which is the law that created the 
MMDA, the agency is responsible for the planning and provision of metro-wide services. 
According to former MMDA Chairman Bayani Fernando (2002-2009), he struggled to 
implement this duty during his tenure as there were mayors in the 37 cities and 
municipalities in Metro Manila who view the MMDA’s authority as an encroachment on local 
autonomy. The refusal of some mayor to recognise his authority made it difficult for MMDA 
to implement cross-boundary projects. The concessionaires have experienced this in 
dealing with some LGUs, describing mayors as ‘ruling their own kingdoms’ with each 
kingdom having different rules so the concessionaires have to grapple with the different 
processes and regulations in each LGU (PS-2014-004).  
In the absence of a formal leader, informal leaders can step forward to facilitate the 
implementation of STP projects. In two STP projects, leadership spelled the difference in 
the outcomes. Land acquisition is one of the major sources of delay and biggest cost items 
for STP projects. The Olandes STP was implemented within the targeted project duration 
because the mayor of Marikina, Marides Fernando27 (2001-2010) stepped up, took 
ownership of the project and assisted Manila Water throughout the process (PS-2014-008) 
(See Appendix 2.3 for Olandes STP project details). In the case of the proposed Manila 
Central Sewerage Plant, the project is still pending because neither the MWSS nor the city 
government of Manila had taken the leadership in assisting Maynilad in acquiring a suitable 
land for the STP (PS-2014-006) (See Appendix 2.4 for Manila Central STP project details). 
                                                          
27 Marides Fernando is the wife of former MMDA Chairman Bayani Fernando. She succeeded her husband as 
mayor of Marikina who served from the years 1992 to 2001 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayani_Fernando). 
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Figure 6.3 Public park in Olandes STP 
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Figure 6.4 Map of Olandes STP 
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6.4 Network effects in the STP construction arena 
The network features of PPP created negative network effects in the STP construction 
arena. The arena produced negative outcomes because its objectives were not achieved. 
The ideal outcomes in the STP construction arena are: (1) that the concessionaires meet 
the year-on-year percentage coverage targets for sewerage services and (2) that STPs are 
constructed within the targeted budget and timeline. Both concessionaires are behind their 
sewerage service coverage targets. In 2011, Manila Water’s sewerage service coverage 
was only 13% out of the 21% target set for this period, while Maynilad’s was at 6% out of 
the 13% target (Kearton et al. 2013, p.37).  
The success or failure of the concessionaires’ target of providing 100% sewerage service is 
largely dependent on the cooperation of the actors in this arena. The typical project 
duration for STP is three years, from planning to operation but actual implementation 
usually takes longer in view of the numerous obstacles encountered by the concessionaires 
in land acquisition and dealing with bureaucratic processes. In the four STP projects 
examined in this chapter, only one STP was completed within the targeted budget and 
schedule. The other three projects were completed behind schedule and beyond budget or 
have not commenced due to coordination issues they encountered at the local, regional 
and national level. An examination of the STP construction arena revealed that poor 
network leadership and lack of goal congruence are the main culprits for the for the poor 
inter-organisational relations in this arena: (1) actors in this arena maintain an organisation 
set perspective and are more focused in performing their functions than the common good 
that a STP will bring; (2) the collaboration in the STP construction arena is not mandated by 
law or contract so actors do not feel compelled to work together; (3) constant change in the 
political environment, such as election and policy shifts in leadership, makes it challenging 
for concessionaires to create stable relationship with other actors in this arena and (4) 
there is power imbalance as LGUs impose bureaucratic rules and procedures for securing 
permits and licences that make it difficult for concessionaires to obtain these vital 
resources. Table 6.5 summarises the network effects of the network features of PPP on the 
four STP projects examined in this chapter.  
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Table 6.5 Network effects of PPP on STP projects 
STP Projects Network Effects 
Olandes STP (Manila Water) Positive effect. Completed within project timeframe due to network 
leadership demonstrated by the city government of Marikina and 
MMDA.   
Talayan STP (Maynilad) Negative effect. Completed beyond project timeframe. There was no 
goal congruence with the communities and residents. The local 
barangay and the local government of Quezon City did not exhibit 
network leadership in helping the concessionaire get goal consensus 
from the community.  
Ilugin STP (Manila Water) Negative effect. The project commencement was delayed. Construction 
ongoing and targeted completion date has been missed. There was no 
goal congruence with the local government of Pasig. The local 
government did not exhibit network leadership as it was the source of 
delay itself.   
Central Manila STP 
(Maynilad) 
Negative effect. The project is behind schedule and has not even 
started yet due to lack of suitable land. No goal congruence with 
property owners. The local government of Manila did not exhibit 
network leadership in assisting Maynilad in lot acquisition. The MBAC 
verbally declared to help Maynilad in negotiating with the property 
owner but no action from the MBAC took place.   
 
The network features of PPP in the STP construction arena hindered the concessionaires 
from delivering the expected benefits of the Metro Manila concessions of improving the 
quality of sewerage service and expanding the service coverage at a lower cost for the 
consumers. The network features of PPP created interoganisational coordination issues in 
the STP construction arena. The mutual dependency on the resources held by the 
concessionaires and the LGUs was not enough to guarantee a higher degree of cooperation 
between and among the parties because the LGUs used their resources as a hindrance 
power, which made it challenging for the concessionaires to implement STP projects even 
when the beneficiaries are the LGUs themselves.  
When interorganisational relationships are not formally and legally defined, organisations 
will only to commit to the programme goal if this is consistent with or contribute to their 
organisation’s objectives (Hjern & Porter 1981, p.215). Problems arise when actors are not 
committed to the programme goal. Many of the coordination issues confronted by the 
concessionaires in this arena were caused by lack of goal congruence and the absence of a 
network manager that can lead the network towards a goal consensus. The STP 
construction arena is not a formally organised administrative structure and in the absence 
of a formal set of rules governing this arena, actors are more inclined to prioritise 
organisational goals than the programme goal. The goal of providing sewerage service in 
Metro Manila is not just an organisational goal of the concessionaires but a programme 
goal of the Philippine government’s PPP policy.  
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The effect of the actors’ lack of adherence to a common goal resulted to the 
concessionaires having to navigate the labyrinth that is the Philippine government 
bureaucracy. The LGUs did not see themselves as collaborators in the construction of STPs. 
Each local government has its own institutional structure and culture and the cohesiveness 
of these structures is different for each LGU. With each local government exercising local 
autonomy, the concessionaires have to deal with different bureaucratic requirements and 
procedures. Application for permits and licences for sewerage infrastructure, which is a vital 
public service, is subjected to different requirements at the national and local level, some 
of which are superfluous, which cause delay on project implementation. All of these 
coordination issues create delay on project implementation, which increases the 
concessionaires’ cost of production. When asked about the actual monetary value of delay, 
a Maynilad official shared during the interview that the company had not calculated the 
actual amount that they lose for every day, month or year a project runs behind schedule. 
However, the company puts a certain percentage buffer on STP projects in the business 
plan that they submit to MWSS-RO because they are not allowed to submit cost variations 
once a project has commenced (PS-2014-005). 
The resource interdependence of actors in this arena had the potential of lowering the cost 
of the concessionaires. When other agencies perform their roles, the concessionaires will 
be able to build STPs within budget and schedule. If LGUs complied with the Clean Water 
Act by allocating public lands for STPs or if MWSS-RO exercised its expropriation rights, the 
concessionaires do not have to purchase the more expensive private lands. If the LGUs 
facilitated the processing of permits and licences required for STP construction, such as the 
assistance extended by the city government of Marikina for Olandes STP, the 
concessionaires will be able to complete their STP projects on time and within budget. If the 
LGUs performed their solid waste management responsibility, the concessionaires did not 
have to incur extra cost in hauling solid waste along waterways that clog the sewer 
networks, interceptor lines and pumping station or spend for repairs when these structures 
get damaged. All of these drives up the cost of STP construction and since capital and 
operational costs are pass-through costs, consumers have to pay a higher tariff. More 
importantly, when all actors in the STP construction collaborate with the concessionaires, 
concessionaires will be able to provide sewerage services to all residents of Metro Manila. 
The network effect of PPP will be positive to the consumers as they will not be exposed to 
the health and environmental hazards of untreated sewage. 
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Minda, an informal settler from the city of Manila, is among the four million urban slum 
dwellers in the metropolis with no water and sewerage connection. With a combined 
average household income of US$20 a day, Minda works as a vendor selling cooked food 
while her husband works as a jeepney driver. Minda, her husband and their three children 
reside in a 20 m2 shanty located in one of the residential barangays in the district of 
Sampaloc in the city of Manila. Their home is one of the five makeshift shacks illegally 
erected on a 100 m2 lot owned by a local businessman. Minda has resided on this lot since 
she was four years old with her parents and three other siblings. Minda’s two siblings have 
moved to other places but she, her parents, her brother and his family have stayed on. 
Minda’s mother rents out the two other shanties for US$38 a month as her main source of 
income. Minda’s shanty, like the four others in the property, are all one–room affairs where 
the 15 m2 home acts as the living, dining and sleeping space for Minda’s family of five. The 
walls are made of second-hand lumber, overhead is recycled rusty, old zinc metal sheets 
and the floor is concrete with cheap linoleum. Outside is a makeshift kitchen leading to 
what appears to be a small courtyard, with a couple of wooden stools around a small tree 
where everyone congregates on a cool evening. The occupants enjoy some privacy as they 
have enclosed the opening of the compound with recycled zinc metal sheets. There had 
been talks for decades that the owner will reclaim the property but has not materialised. 
For now, Minda and the other illegal occupants are secure in the property. 
Manila is one of the cities in the West zone of the greater Metro Manila area served by 
Maynilad Water but Minda, a Manila resident, is not a Maynilad customer. Prior to the 
Metro Manila concessions in 1997, Minda’s parents applied for a water supply connection 
but were rejected as they do not have legal rights over the property where they are residing. 
Water is sourced from an artesian well in the private lot, which was sponsored by the local 
barangay council in the 1990s. The Philippine government has issued a ban on 
groundwater extraction in Metro Manila in 2004 as it has been causing the metropolis to 
sink at an alarming rate and the dangers to human health due to groundwater pollution. 
Groundwater in Metro Manila had been tested to contain critical levels of chemicals such 
as lead, fluoride, mercury, aluminium, cyanide, arsenic, boron and manganese. Minda, 
however, is not mindful of the potential hazards that the extracted groundwater poses to 
her and her family. She attests that they have not contracted any waterborne diseases from 
drinking water from the artesian well. When they can afford it, Minda buys purified drinking 
water from a local water store that costs around US$0.70 per gallon, which lasts the family 
of five for two days. For most days, she boils the water from the well for drinking.  
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Minda’s family is among those families who made the municipal drainage as their septic 
tank. Five households share the 2 x 1 m2 toilet and bathroom that Minda’s husband and 
father built a few years ago. It has pour-flush sitting toilet bowl where wastes empty into a 
cemented vault underneath the shanty. Maynilad offers free septic tank cleaning for its 
customers but since they are not a customer of Maynilad, they cannot avail of this service. 
When the vault is full, they can enlist the services of a private septic tank siphoning 
company. This, however, costs money so Minda’s husband would clean the tank himself 
and dispose the waste directly in the public sewers.  
Without a contract or law that formally binds the relationship of the actors in this arena, the 
concessionaires rely on their own efforts to build working relationships with the local 
governments to facilitate implementation of STP projects. On numerous occasions, the 
concessionaires’ and their project contractors were asked by LGUs to donate or sponsor 
projects, such as the construction of basketball courts or community halls, to expedite the 
issuance of permits and licences (PS-2014-001, PS-2014-002, PS-2014-003, PS-2014-
008). These ‘donations’ were included as expenses in the last rate rebasing review but 
were not approved by MWSS as an allowable expense.  
The implementation of sewerage infrastructure requires the cooperation of numerous 
actors from different government levels and sectors. It is challenging to achieve goal 
congruence when actors maintain an agency-centric mindset. National government 
departments and LGUs see their roles as policy enforcers and regulators and not as 
collaborators. This organisation-set perspective of operating among government agencies 
has burdened the concessionaires with bureaucratic red tape. These unnecessary 
transactions inflate project costs. 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
Chapter 6 has examined the effect of the network features PPP on STP construction by 
showing that the actors in this arena do not see themselves as part of an implementation 
structure that has to work together towards a common goal. STP construction requires 
resource interdependence, goal congruence and network manager to be able to work well. 
When water and sewerage services were provided by the state, the MWSS enjoyed the 
benefit of hierarchy and legal mandate to get the cooperation of other government 
agencies. However, when water and sewerage services were awarded to the private 
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concessionaires, the tasks of the former MWSS have been distributed to multiple 
organisations. Problems emerged as a result of such split.  
PPP created resource dependency between public and private actors. It has also created 
problems that cut across the traditional jurisdiction of organisations and traverses the 
customary boundaries of the public and private sector. These problems are beyond the 
capability of any single organisation to resolve (Gray 1985, p.913). The resolution of 
problems requires a network approach solution where problem solving and policy 
processes are geared towards addressing mutual dependencies to achieve the network’s 
common goal (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004; Gray 1985; Kickert et al. 1997; McGuire & Agranoff 
2007).   
There is a high degree of resource dependency among actors in this arena but resource 
dependency is not sufficient to facilitate implementation of sewerage projects. For PPP to 
work, actors must agree on a common goal. There is no goal congruence in this arena 
because the actors, specifically the LGUs, maintain an agency-centric perspective, i.e., 
actors are more focused in performing their functions than the common good that a STP 
will bring. Since collaboration in the STP construction arena is not mandated by law or 
contract, actors do not feel compelled to work together. A network manager would have 
helped the arena actors to work towards a common goal but neither the LGUs, save for few 
STP projects, nor the MWSS stepped up to fulfil this role. The theoretical implications of the 
findings in this arena as it relates to network outcomes will be discussed further in the final 
chapter. 
 

 145 
Chapter 7 
The network effects in the arena of  
interagency monitoring 
7.1 Introduction 
Even when the network goal has been defined, getting the consensus of all actors is 
difficult to achieve. Each actor is governed by its own organisational mandate that take 
precedence over network goal. Under this complex setting, a network leader is necessary to 
facilitate consensus on a joint course of action, coordinate the strategies of actors and elicit 
support for these ideas within the organisation. However, this chapter suggests that it is not 
enough to have an established network goal and a formal network leader to ensure 
effective network cooperation. Network leadership can be a barrier for effective 
interorganisational collaborations if it does not possess the necessary skills and qualities 
required in managing a network. Network management requires certain skills and should 
be distinguished from usual strategies of managing policies in public organisations (Kickert 
et al. 1997, p.43). An effective network manager must be able ‘to promote the mutual 
adjustment of the behaviour of actors with diverse objectives and ambitions with regard to 
tackling problems within a given framework of interorganisational relationships’ (Kickert et 
al. 1997, p.44). Networks should be studied not just as a means of governance but equally 
important is the management of networks itself.  
This chapter examines the network features of interagency monitoring and its impact on 
the sewerage service outcomes. Unlike the two previous decision making arenas of the 
Metro Manila sewerage network, this arena was deliberately created with a legally defined 
goal and an appointed network manager. The Supreme Court created an interagency 
monitoring body, the MBAC, to address the problem of a lack of integrating mechanism and 
structure to guide concerned agencies towards a coordinated effort in cleaning up the 
Manila Bay. The MBAC is supposed to facilitate and improve interagency coordination by 
establishing processes for interagency collaboration. The two concessionaires are part of 
this arena because the construction of wastewater treatment facilities is one of the many 
strategies identified to rehabilitate Manila Bay. 
The second section of this chapter presents the main problems that the concessionaires 
encounter as participants of the interagency monitoring arena. The third section examines 
the network features in this arena, discusses the incentives for actors to cooperate in 
interagency monitoring and explains why a defined network goal and appointed network 
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manager were not sufficient to gain the cooperation of the network actors. The fourth 
section discusses the network effect on interagency monitoring and how the network 
features influenced the outcomes in this arena. The last section reviews the findings and 
concludes that the network features of PPP created negative outcomes in this arena.  
7.2 Interagency monitoring problems  
The MBAC was born out of the 36–page landmark decision by the Supreme Court in the 
case MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay28, through a writ of continuing 
mandamus29 that ordered 13 agencies ‘to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve the Manila 
Bay and restore and maintain its waters to SB level30 to make it fit for swimming, skin 
diving, and other forms of contact recreation.’ This decision stemmed from a petition filed 
in 1999 by 14 private individuals against the Philippine government for neglecting to 
perform its duties to abate the pollution of Manila Bay, in violation of the respondents’ 
constitutional right to life, health and balanced ecology and a number of environmental 
protection laws. In the decision, the Court acknowledged that one of the major causes of 
the current polluted state of Manila Bay was the failure of the executive branch of 
government to enforce environmental laws and regulations. The task to protect and 
preserve the country’s internal waters, rivers, shores and seas from pollution caused by 
human activities are distributed to a number of government agencies and their officers by 
nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory command. The Supreme Court 
attributes the pollution menace in the country, judging from the polluted state of Manila 
Bay, to the ‘cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution 
problem’ of these agencies, which ‘is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and 
commitment’ (Supreme Court of the Philippines 2008). To ensure that the executive 
department performs its legal duties, the Supreme Court created the MBAC to oversee the 
                                                          
28 Supreme Court General Register (GR) Nos. 171947-48 issued on 18 December 2008. 
29 A mandamus is a judicial remedy from a court ordering public authorities to carry out specific functions that 
are required by law. Section 7, Rule 8 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases 
(effective 19 April 2010) states that ‘the Court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus 
requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such 
other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall 
require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the judgment, and the 
court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor 
compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or observations on the execution of the judgment.’ 
30 Based on Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No.34, 1990. 
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performance of government agencies and compel them to organise a concerted, specific 
and actionable plan to revive Manila Bay.  
Among the respondents in the case was the MWSS, which was ordered to ‘provide, install, 
operate and maintain the necessary adequate wastewater treatment facilities in Metro 
Manila, Rizal and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time’ (Supreme Court of the 
Philippines 2008). Since this function has been transferred to the two concessionaires by 
virtue of the Metro Manila concessions, the concessionaires are treated as de facto 
mandamus agencies of the MBAC. The concessionaires welcomed the decision as it 
increased public awareness on the importance of urban sewerage treatment. Moreover, the 
concessionaires were optimistic that the judicial order could help alleviate the challenges 
they encounter in STP construction and improve their working relationship with national 
and local government agencies.   
Before the Supreme Court decision was issued, there already existed a comprehensive plan 
to rehabilitate Manila Bay, which was the Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal 
Strategy (OPMBCS). Completed in December 2005, the OPMBCS was spearheaded by the 
DENR in coordination with several government agencies and private stakeholders. Both the 
OPMBCS and the Supreme Court identified the absence of an integrated management 
framework as the main reason for the current state of Manila Bay, particularly the 
fragmented and weak institutional arrangements and lack of coordination among 
concerned agencies and between the national and local governments. The creation of the 
MBAC by the Supreme Court was supposed to address this issue. The MBAC appointed the 
Manila Bay Coordinating Office (MBCO) under the DENR as technical secretariat to assist 
the former in monitoring the implementation of the KPIs by the mandamus agencies.  
However, more than eight years after the Supreme Court ruling, the MBCO admitted that 
the water quality of Manila Bay remained problematic as the dumping of solid and liquid 
wastes remain unabated. Some 86% of wastewater produced in the metropolis is disposed 
untreated into public sewers and eventually ends up in Manila Bay (Pazzibugan 2014). 
According to MBCO executive director Noel Gaerlan, there are not enough wastewater 
treatment facilities being built to treat the wastewater produced by more than 14 million 
residents of the capital region. As discussed in Chapter 6, the concessionaires encounter 
interagency collaboration issues that hamper the timely implementation of STP projects. 
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A perusal of the minutes of MBAC meetings31 revealed that coordination issues in 
interagency implementation of projects continues to be a challenge. The mandamus 
agencies are still unclear as to the direction and expectation of the MBAC. In a 
subcommittee meeting called by the MBCO in October 2014 that I attended, I observed 
that the agencies were still arguing over the KPIs assigned to them when the meeting was 
called for the agencies to report on their accomplishments. Some member agencies were 
emphatic about their disagreement with the KPIs imposed on them by the Court. They 
found the KPIs unrealistic and difficult to achieve, especially since the accomplishment of 
some of the KPIs was not within their control and require the action and cooperation of 
LGUs. While the MBAC was formed to facilitate coordination among the mandamus 
agencies, the KPIs and action plans are agency specific, cross-sectional and lack systems 
orientation (Table 7.1).  
7.3 Network features in the interagency monitoring arena  
The two arenas discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 are the two major activities that directly 
concern the implementation of sewerage targets. The interagency monitoring arena is not 
involved in the implementation of sewerage projects; nonetheless, it is a significant 
decision making arena that bears impact on sewerage targets. The government agencies 
named in the mandamus are those that are responsible for some aspects of waste 
management, water quality, budget allocation or law enforcement that directly or indirectly 
impact on the problems of Manila Bay. Actors in this arena are legally mandated by the 
Supreme Court to be part this arena. The legal directive of the Supreme Court for agencies 
to work together was expected to address the coordination problems that have long 
plagued the implementation of projects to clean up Manila Bay. 
7.3.1 Arena actors and their resource interdependencies 
The MBAC was chaired by Supreme Court Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr., who penned the 
decision, with three environment experts appointed by the chairman as members. The 
members of the committee were former Environment Secretary Elisea Gozun, former 
Environment Undersecretary and Dean of the Ateneo School of Government Antonio G.M. 
La Vina and former director of the UP Marine Science Institute Dr. Gil Jacinto. The MBAC 
                                                          
31 I was only furnished by the MBAC secretary the minutes of five MBAC meetings on the following dates: 16 
February 2011, 2 December 2011, 29 November 2012, 6 September 2012 and 19 July 2013. I attended one 
MBAC meeting on 15 Aug 2014 as an observer upon invitation of Maynilad.  
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meets every quarter where the mandamus agencies report on the status and progress of 
their agency activities related to the clean up of Manila Bay.  
The Court designated the DENR as the lead agency responsible for the implementation of 
the OPMBCS. To effectively perform its obligations under the mandamus, the DENR 
instituted organisational reform within the department. The MBCO32 was strengthened and 
placed under the direct supervision of the environment secretary. The MBCO exercises 
coordinative functions among all offices and agencies involved in the Bay’s rehabilitation, 
restoration and conservation. The Court also directed the heads of the concerned agencies 
to submit a quarterly progress report of the activities taken to implement the decision. 
These reports are submitted to the MBCO, which prepares the consolidated reports for 
review by MBAC. Unlike the two arenas discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the interagency 
monitoring arena has a defined institutional structure. Figure 7.1 illustrates the 
organisational structure to implement the OPMBCS (Manila Bay Coordinating Office 2011). 
Figure 7.1 OPMBCS implementation structure 
 
Source: Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy 2011-2015 
 
                                                          
32 The organisational reform took effect by virtue of DENR Administrative Order No. 2011-01 entitled 
‘Strengthening the Manila Bay Coordinating Office.’ Prior to the issuance of this order, the MBCO was part of the 
DENR’s River Basin Control Office which was tasked to oversee the integrated planning, management, 
rehabilitation and development of all the country’s river basins. 
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Membership in this arena is not voluntary. By order of mandamus, the member agencies 
are legally obliged to perform the order of the Supreme Court arising from the case. The 
Manila Bay Coordinating Committee (MBCC) is composed of the following agencies: 
 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority 
 Department of Education  
 Department of Health  
 Department of Agriculture  
 Department of Budget and Management 
 Philippine Coast Guard  
 Philippine National Police - Maritime Group  
 Department of Interior and Local Government  
 Philippine Ports Authority  
 Local Water Utilities Administration)  
 Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System  
 DENR as the chair of the Committee.  
 
The following are additional department and agencies that were not named in the 
mandamus and invited to join the MBCC:  
 Department of Tourism   
 Department of Energy)   
 Department of National Defence  
 Department of Science and Technology  
 Department of Trade and Industry  
 Department of Finance  
 Department of Social Welfare and Development  
 National Anti-Poverty Commission  
 Pasig River Rehabilitation Commission 
 National Economic Development Authority 
 President of the League of Municipalities and Cities in Regions III, IV A and NCR.  
 
The MBCC was created in 2006 to coordinate with national and local bodies to ensure that 
the activities of these agencies are consistent and complementary to the OPMBCS. The 
MBCC also provides policy guidance and direction in the implementation of the OPMBCS, 
promotes participation, monitors the implementation and progress made, recommends 
legislation and institutional mechanisms and secures budget for the realisation of the 
OPMBCS. The MBCO serves as the secretariat of the MBCC and MBAC. The MBCO, headed 
by a Program Director, coordinates the implementation of the OPMBCS and monitors the 
reporting of accomplishments of the mandamus agencies to the Supreme Court.  
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The Site Coordinating Councils (SCC) is the regional counterpart of the MBCC, which is 
composed of LGUs in the Manila Bay area, regional directors of the mandamus agencies 
represented, the private sector and various stakeholder representatives. The SCC is chaired 
by the Regional Executive Director who is the also the concurrent Manila Bay Regional 
Coordinator of the SCC. The SCC has coordinative functions and is involved in the overall 
planning of the local- and area-based approach of the OPMBCS implementation. Moreover, 
a Site Management Office was established in Regions III, IV A and NCR to monitor and 
coordinate the progress of the implemented activities. 
What links all the actors in this network is that they depend upon one another to get a goal 
done, i.e. clean up the Manila Bay. It is important that the actors recognise their 
dependency among each other so that they can jointly define and understand what the 
problem is, develop the appropriate strategies that can influence each other to work 
together and pool their resources to get the work done. The MBAC is dependent on the 
competency and knowledge resources of the mandamus agencies to implement activities 
towards the rehabilitation of Manila Bay in performing its oversight functions. These 
resources have a low degree of substitutability because the MBAC can only get these 
resources from the mandamus agencies. The mandamus agencies, in turn, are dependent 
on the Supreme Court’s legitimacy resource, i.e., its legal authority to compel the agencies 
to perform their ministerial duties. The mandamus agencies are also dependent on each 
other as the implementation of their KPIs requires the resources and cooperation of other 
agencies. The MBCO, as secretariat of the MBAC, also possesses legitimacy resources as 
they collate and report to the latter on the accomplishments of the mandamus agencies. 
However, the mandamus agencies cannot be considered as highly dependent on the MBAC 
and MBCO as the former are mandated by law and are able to perform their functions 
without the latter. Nonetheless, the threat of administrative sanction by virtue of 
mandamus in case of non-compliance is viewed by the concessionaires as an opportunity 
to facilitate cooperation and create ease in their transactions with national and local 
government bodies. Table 7.1 summarises the resource interdependencies in this arena. 
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Table 7.1 Resource dependency in the interagency monitoring arena 
Actors Very important resources Degree of 
substitutability 
Dependency: 
Low, medium, 
high 
Critical 
actor: 
yes/no? 
MBAC Mandamus (Legitimacy) High Medium Yes 
MBCO Agent of MBAC to monitor 
mandamus agencies 
(Legitimacy) 
High Medium No 
Mandamus 
agencies 
Budget and resources to 
implement projects to 
cleanup Manila Bay 
(Competency) 
Accomplishment reports  
(Knowledge) 
Low 
 
 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
 
 
High 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
7.3.2 Goal congruence 
Network rules lay down the institutional structure of the network and lends insight into the 
opportunities and limitations on the actions that can be taken by the actors (Koppenjan & 
Klijn 2004, p.82). The interorganisational relationships of the actors in this arena are 
mandated by the Supreme Court and the rule that governs the actions of the mandamus 
agencies is the OPMBCS. In the first couple of years of reporting by the mandamus 
agencies, the MBAC observed that the quarterly reports submitted by the mandamus 
agencies were inconsistent, inadequate and behind schedule. The data and results 
presented by agencies varied for each reporting period and there was no established target 
and deadline to accomplish their KPIs. There was no standard reporting format, which 
made it challenging for the MBAC to review and verify the accomplishments objectively. 
More importantly, the regular reports did not show whether there were improvements in the 
water quality of Manila Bay (GO-2014-023, GO-2014-023). To correct these issues, the 
MBAC ordered the DENR, through the MBCO to oversee the review and update the OPMBCS 
in 2011.  
The updated Plan consists of the KPIs for each mandamus agency designated by the 
Supreme Court and the OPMBCS strategy framework. Mandamus agencies are required to 
submit accomplishment reports on their KPIs to the MBAC on a quarterly basis. To address 
these priorities, the Plan’s revised strategy framework provides for a two-fold action plan: 
(1) an issue-based action plan that specifies activities for water and solid waste pollution 
reduction, removal of informal settlers along waterways, and habitat protection and 
restoration and (2) the area-based or major river systems action plan with specific activities 
to improve the water quality of the different river systems that empty into the Manila Bay. 
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There are separate action plans for each river system.33 The issue-based action plan 
includes partnership and governance action plans to address the institutional barriers that 
hinder the implementation of projects. Each action plan includes management targets and 
the corresponding management outcomes on a yearly basis and five-year intervals until 
2025, starting 2011 to 2015. The management targets address the KPIs of the mandamus 
agencies. The Plan also calls for the establishment of a database for baseline data and 
information, which was lacking in the previous version. Table 7.2 enumerates the KPIs of 
the mandamus agencies. 
Table 7.2 KPIs of mandamus agencies. 
AGENCY KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) 
1. DENR 1. Percentage of total number of planned activities completed in the revised OPMBCS 
(MBCO) 
2. Percentage of estimated total pollution loading from industrial and commercial sources in 
the Manila Bay Region that is treated in accordance with DENR-EMB standards (EMB, LLDA) 
3. Percentage of industrial/commercial firms operating within Manila Bay region that is in 
compliance with required effluent discharge permits and meeting effluent standards (EMB, 
LLDA) 
4. Percentage of measures enacted and enforce to manage/ban the dumping of toxic and 
hazardous dredge spoils or waste into the Manila Bay system (EMB) 
5. Percentage of geo-referenced and integrated water quality monitoring site results that 
comply with the DENR standards for Class C (Pasig River and Laguna Lake) or Class SB 
(Manila Bay) (EMB, PRCC, LLDA) 
6. Percentage of budget increase for Manila bay rehabilitation activities 
7. Number of IEC activities 
2. DILG 1. Percentage of commercial establishments and homes along riverbanks and shorelines of 
Manila Bay watershed area that are inspected for adequate treatment facilities/septic tanks 
2. Percentage of total non-compliant establishments and homes that construct wastewater 
treatment facilities/septic tanks following inspection 
3. Percentage of LGUs in Manila bay watershed areas outside Metro Manila that are 
certified as compliant with regulations governing: a) 10 year Sold Waste Management Plan, 
b) Segregation at source, c) segregated collection, d) composted, recycled and reused, e) 
disposed residual waste in approved disposal site, f) solid waste management (RA 9003), g) 
informal settlers and illegal encroachments (permanently cleared)  
4. Percentage of LGUs implementing their Water Quality Plan in compliance with RA 9275 
5. Number of IEC activities 
3. MWSS 1. Percentage of water-served population and area covered by sewerage and sanitation 
treatment facilities  
2. Percentage of domestic pollution loading that is treated in accordance with current 
regulations and standards  
3. Percentage of estimated total septage desludged that are treated in accordance with 
current regulations and standards  
4. Amount collected for sewerage and sanitation services  
5. Amount invested for sewerage and sanitation facilities (capital expenditure)  
6. Number of IEC activities  
                                                          
33 The rivers in Metro Manila that empty into Manila Bay are the rivers of Paranaque, Las Pinas, Zapote, Navota-
Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros, Pasig-Marikina-San Juan and Pasig. The rivers outside Metro Manila that end up in 
Manila Bay are the rivers of Pampanga, Imus, Maragondon and Talisay, Laguna Lake and Angat Watershed.  
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AGENCY KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) 
4. LWUA 1. Percentage of residential, institutional, commercial, and industrial establishments 
connected and served by wastewater treatment facilities  
2. Percentage of total domestic pollution loading that is treated in accordance with current 
regulations and standards  
3. Percentage of estimated total septage desludged that are treated in accordance with 
current regulations and standards  
4. Percentage of water-served population and area covered by sewerage and sanitation 
facilities  
5. Amount of funds collected by water districts for sanitation and sewerage services  
6. Amount invested for sewerage and sanitation facilities (capital expenditures)  
7. Number of IEC activities 
5.DA- 
BSWM 
1. Percentage reduction of estimated total pollution loading from agricultural and livestock 
sources in the Manila Bay River Basin region  
2. Number of IEC activities  
6. PCG 1. Percentage of patrols/operations conducted in the Manila Bay system to ensure 
enforcement of PD 979, RA 8550 and RA 9993 and other laws designed to prevent marine 
pollution  
2. Percentage of apprehended violators of PD 979, RA 8550, RA 9993 and other laws 
designed to prevent marine pollution that are prosecuted and penalized  
3. Number of other projects and activities related to environmental protection and 
improvement of water quality of Manila Bay 
4. Percentage of IEC activities 
7. PNP-MG 1. Percentage of patrols/operations conducted in the Manila Bay system to ensure 
enforcement of RA 8550 and other laws and ordinances designed to prevent marine 
pollution  
2. Percentage of apprehended violators of RA 8550 and other laws and ordinances 
designed to prevent marine pollution that is prosecuted and penalized  
3. Number of other projects and activities related to environmental protection and 
improvement of water quality of Manila Bay  
4. Number of IEC activities  
8. PPA 1. Percentage of estimated total pollution loading from bilge water and solid and liquid 
waste that is collected and treated in accordance with current regulations and standards 2. 
Percentage of ports and terminals with adequate solid and liquid waste reception facilities, 
treatment procedures and funding requirements for treatment and/or disposal of ship-
generated waste  
3. Number of IEC activities  
9. MMDA 1. Percentage of estimated total area and number of illegal encroachments/informal 
settlers along Metro Manila water bodies that are permanently cleared in accordance with 
current laws and relocation provisions  
2. Percentage of estimated total volume of generated solid waste in Metro Manila that is 
collected in accordance with current regulations and standards. a) composted, b) recycled 
and reused, c) residual materials processed, d) disposal, e) over all diversion rate  
3. Percentage available storage capacity of sanitary landfills serving Metro Manila that is 
established in accordance with current regulations and standards  
4. Percentage of spoils and solid waste dredged from waterways that are disposed of in 
accordance with current rules and regulations 
5. Percentage of apprehended violators of RA 9003, RA 9275 and other existing laws on 
pollution who are prosecuted 
10. DPWH 1. Percentage of estimated total area of illegal encroachments and informal settlers along 
water bodies of Bulacan, Pampanga, Cavite and Laguna that are permanently cleared in 
accordance with current laws and relocation provisions  
2. Number of IEC activities 
11. DOH 1. Percentage of septic and sludge handling and treatment companies that are inspected 
and certified as being compliant with current regulations and standards  
2. Percentage of septic and sludge handling and treatment companies that have valid 
Environmental Sanitary Clearances (ESC) issued by DOH  
3. Number of IEC activities  
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AGENCY KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) 
12. DepEd 1. Number of Environmental Education, Information and Education (EEIC) program materials 
and lessons prepared regarding the Manila Bay clean up  
2. Number of students who completed a DepEd EEIC regarding the Manila Bay clean up  
3. Number of students who have participated in clean up activities within the Manila Bay 
system area  
4. Number of IEC activities 
Source: Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy 2011-2015 
 
The mandamus agencies are organised according to the three priority issues that need to 
be acted upon to clean up Manila Bay: (1) water quality improvement, (2) solid waste 
management and (3) relocation of informal settlers. The first cluster is chaired by the EMB-
DENR and the second and third clusters are chaired by DILG (Manila Bay Coordinating 
Office 2011). Figure 7.2 illustrates the strategy framework of the OPMBCS. The clusters are 
further grouped into three geographical areas in Metro Manila. The geographical clusters 
are comprised of cities and municipalities grouped in accordance to their territorial 
proximity to the major river systems: (1) MANATUTI,34 (2) MUNTIPARLASPIZAP35 and the (3) 
PAMMARIQSAN.36 Figure 7.3 illustrates the expanded OPMBCS implementation structure. 
Each cluster and sub-cluster is comprised of the concerned national government agencies 
named in the court order and each agency is assigned to carry out activities in service of 
the number of KPIs prescribed for each agency (GO-2014-013, GO-2014-014).  
The MBAC meets on a quarterly basis to receive and evaluate the quarterly progress reports 
on mandamus agency compliance with the OPMBCS. The mandamus agencies are grouped 
according the priority issue cluster during these meetings but each mandamus agency 
reports on the progress of its agency activities based on its KPIs. Each mandamus agency 
created monitoring teams to monitor the implementation of KPIs in their respective 
agencies and prepare the progress reports to be submitted to the MBCO and MBAC. The 
head of the mandamus agency or the designated deputy attends the MBAC meetings to 
present the progress report (GO-2014-024). Outside the MBAC meetings, the MBCO and 
the clusters also hold meetings to discuss their areas of concern. The MBCO holds cluster 
meetings to monitor the performance agencies and guide them on their compliance. The 
MBCO also consolidates the report of the mandamus agencies and reports on the overall 
implementation and compliance.  
                                                          
34 Cities of Caloocan, Malabon, Navotas, Valenzuela, and Quezon City. 
35 Cities of Pasay, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Manila and Paranaque. 
36 Cities of Pasig, Marikina, San Juan, Makati, Taguig, Mandaluyong, Pateros and Quezon City. 
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Figure 7.2 OPMBCS Strategy Framework 
 
Source: Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy 2011-2015 
 
Figure 7.3 Metro Manila issue-based action plan framework 
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It is not enough that the network goal is formally defined, it is equally important that actors 
agree on the network goal. To agree on the goal, actors must have a clear and common 
understanding of the rules to be effective as different interpretations can be a source of 
conflict (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004). The KPIs, while specific and relevant to mandamus 
agencies, require the cooperation of a number of agencies to be effectively implemented. 
Officials from DILG, in particular, encounter difficulty in coordinating their strategies with 
other agencies. One of their KPIs is to inspect commercial establishments and homes along 
Manila Bay for adequate treatment facilities and septic tanks, which overlaps with the 
DENR’s KPI to check compliance with effluent standards by industrial and commercial firms 
(Table 7.1). The clusters had not been an effective venue for agencies to discuss issues 
regarding the implementation of KPIs: 
What makes it difficult to collaborate is that every national government 
agency has its own strategies some of which we think are not applicable 
to us but are applicable to them. Like we want to collaborate with DENR, 
but now they are already fixed with their own strategies which they 
cannot change anymore, so that means we have to adjust to them. So 
what happens, we have to do our (activities on our) own (DILG)… We 
interpret some procedures one way, and the LGUs would interpret it 
another way so how do we meet halfway? But if the MBAC is there 
(during the forum), they will say which interpretation is correct, nothing 
else, and we would focus on that. So now we are scattered  
(GO-2014-014). 
Actors do not just collaborate to deliver a certain outcome: they also need to collaborate in 
solving problems that may arise in the course of implementing projects. When network 
actors jointly define the problems, they can jointly formulate more appropriate and targeted 
solutions. To iron out the confusion on the KPIs, the DILG proposed that the MBAC host a 
forum for all mandamus agencies for discussing the KPIs with the goal of arriving at a 
common understanding and a common strategy and direction in implementing projects. As 
the oversight body, the DILG expects the MBAC to mediate the discussion and rule, when 
necessary, on the most appropriate actions from among the different strategies by the 
agencies. However, the proposal of DILG was not welcomed and instead, the MBAC advised 
DILG to hold a separate meeting with DENR.  
Formulating solutions is not difficult when the interests and perceptions of the parties are 
congruent. The DILG officials surmise that the MBAC’s refusal to hold the forum stems from 
the fact they have no real feel, awareness and appreciation of the implementation 
problems that the agencies encounter ‘because they have not witnessed what is happening 
on the ground…. they just gather the reports… they see figures… but the details are not 
included in the reports’ and as such, they may not be able to respond to questions relating 
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to implementation should the forum be held (GO-2014-015). It is unclear to them as to 
what the MBAC intends to achieve during the quarterly meetings as the Committee just 
‘seems to be gathering information but no additional follow-through is happening’ (GO-
2014-015). Respondents from the DILG find that the collegial nature of the clusters makes 
it challenging to resolve interagency issues as there is no one in authority who can make 
the final decision.  
Networks in service delivery and implementation emphasise the importance of solving 
complex policy problems through horizontal coordination between interdependent and 
network actors. Network performance results from interactions between a variety of actors 
rather than just the actions and policy of one actor alone (Klijn & Koppenjan 2012, p.589). 
A review of the minutes of MBAC meetings37 reveals that the Committee does not seem to 
have a formal, consistent and effective way of addressing interagency collaboration issues. 
After coordination issues are raised, there is no follow-up in subsequent meetings as to how 
these issues have been addressed or if an interagency collaboration structure was set in 
place. Even when most issues raised require interagency collaboration, mandamus 
agencies report on their individual KPIs.  
The format of MBAC meetings starts with agency presentations followed by questions, 
comments or suggestions by the MBAC members. Thereafter, the agency responds — 
usually to explain the cause of delay or bottlenecks in the implementations of their projects. 
Should the action require the cooperation of another agency, the Committee asks the 
representative of the concerned agency, if present, to respond on the matter. Otherwise, 
the Committee directs the reporting agency to undertake the necessary coordinative 
actions. In at least three MBAC meetings, the matter of inspection of treatment facilities of 
industrial and commercial establishments and residential septic tanks had been reported. 
The DILG presented a consolidated report based on the reports submitted by the different 
LGUs and the EMB reported on the commercial and industrial establishments. The MBAC 
members inquired as to the low compliance. Reporting agencies explained issues at the 
local government level, such as insufficient numbers of sanitary inspectors at the local 
government level, poor enforcement by LGUs of sanitation regulations, poor coordination 
between national agencies and the LGUs and refusal of residents to get their septic tanks 
                                                          
37 See footnote 4. 
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desludged. In all instances, the MBAC members’ response was to order the mandamus 
agencies to coordinate and work with the LGUs.  
The concessionaires have also brought up in several MBAC meetings the challenges they 
encounter in implementing STP projects, i.e., land acquisition and securing permits from 
different national government agencies and LGUs. In particular, Maynilad pointed out that 
all the lands for their STPs were purchased from private owners, which are more expensive 
than public lands thereby affecting a higher tariff. Public lands would be cheaper but they 
have not received any assistance from the LGUs in acquiring lands, as required by the 
Clean Water Act. The concessionaires find that despite numerous meetings with MBAC and 
MBCO, these venues have neither helped resolve nor alleviate the interorganisational 
collaboration issues they encounter. In two separate MBAC meetings, one MBAC member 
advised that the government should exercise its power of eminent domain to acquire lands 
for STPs. This has not materialised as the MWSS refused to use its expropriation powers to 
assist the concessionaires. In another meeting, another MBAC member pronounced that 
the Committee will join the concessionaire in its meeting with a private landowner to help 
convince the latter to sell the land for the Central Manila STP. In my interview with the 
project manager, she said that she was not aware of that pronouncement nor was there 
any formal offer from the MBAC to help (PS-2014-006).  
Based on the strategies employed by the MBAC, it appears that the problem solving 
process of the MBAC is similar to the rational phase model (Figure 7.4), which regards 
problem solving as an intellectual design process governed by an individual decision maker 
and its decisions at the centre (E H Klijn & Koppenjan 2000, p.43). This process starts with 
specifying the nature of the problem, its consequences and causes. Solutions are then 
formulated, implemented and evaluated. Success is measured by the degree to which the 
objectives are accomplished.  
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Figure 7.4 Rational phase model as MBAC problem-solving cycle 
 
              Source: Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004 
The problem solving model adopted by the MBAC does not address the complex societal 
problems in the multi-actor and multi-purpose setting of the Manila Bay problem. This 
problem solving process focuses on a central actor taking main responsibility of problem 
identification who may have insufficient information about the nature of the problem 
situation and the effects of solutions. This incomplete knowledge can lead the central actor 
to select options and make assessments in a non-transparent way. In the case of Manila 
Bay, the problem was defined in the Supreme Court decision and the solution was the 
creation of the MBAC. The DENR, through the MBCO, was tasked to take the lead in 
updating the OPMBCS, which serves as the roadmap for the mandamus agencies to 
rehabilitate Manila Bay. The MBCO conducted several workshops with the mandamus 
agencies to gather inputs and feedback and, in 2011, the OPMBCS was revised. 
Notwithstanding these meetings, it seems as though the mandamus agencies do not agree 
with the revised plan. In a cluster meeting called by the MBCO in October 2014, agencies 
present expressed their disagreement with the KPIs, when the meeting was in fact called 
for the agencies to report on the progress of KPI implementation. They informed during the 
meeting that the Supreme Court formulated the KPIs without consulting the mandamus 
agencies.  
The Supreme Court’s approach to conceptualising problems from an organisation-set 
perspective is inherent to the Philippine government. When agencies are ineffective in their 
jobs, the solution is to create new agencies to coordinate and supervise these erring 
agencies. There is no proper diagnosis of the situation and no clear defining integrative 
mechanism for bringing all these actors together under the new set-up. This has resulted to 
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the indiscriminate creation of agencies that has expanded the water and sewerage sector 
(see Section 4.3 The resulting institutional framework on page 86). In addition to the MBAC 
and the MBCO, there is also the NSSMP Committee whose functions are akin to the water 
quality cluster of the MBAC. The NSSMP Committee is not part of the MBAC but the 
agencies under the NSSMMP Committee are the same agencies under the water quality 
cluster of the MBAC. It is not clear whether the NSSMP was considered in the formulation of 
the KPIs and the revision of the OPMBCS. 
There is no goal congruence between the MBAC and the mandamus agencies even with a 
legally defined goal and network structure. MBCO Director Gaerlan attests that the 
mandamus agencies were consulted but the agencies did not express their comments 
because they believed that the KPIs were already final. The Supreme Court drafted the KPIs 
for each mandamus agencies which also served as a reference in the revision of the 
OPMBCS. There was no misunderstanding during this process but the agencies felt obliged 
to defer to the Supreme Court-formulated KPIs even when they had reservations. According 
to Director Gaerlan, this is typical of the work culture in the Philippine government where 
people will ‘Say yes in your face and behind your back, they will complain but will still do it.’ 
Director Gaerlan admitted though that the OPMBCS was updated without proper diagnosis 
of the situation. The action plans were formulated without baseline information for setting 
targets on the interventions and strategies undertaken and the corresponding improvement 
expected. The programs and action plans formulated were broad, not activity-specific and 
site-specific and had no timeline. Director Gaerlan, who is a civil engineer by training from 
the private sector when he was appointed MBCO director in 2010, emphasised the 
importance of knowledge management in formulating an effective plan. When he joined the 
DENR, he noted that the department had no database of all types of pollutants and 
pollution sources of Manila Bay. He noted that government decisions lack a scientific basis 
and, instead, are usually backed by opinions, convictions and personal inclinations of 
decision makers.  
When he assumed the position, Director Gaerlan’s first order of business was to examine 
the science of Manila Bay before addressing the governance aspect. The MBCO is currently 
undertaking efforts to update and upgrade the scientific database to back-up the 
rehabilitation and clean up strategies. He forged a partnership with the Philippine Nuclear 
Research Institute and Bureau of Soils to do isotopic analysis for Manila Bay. At the time 
the interview was conducted in October 2014, the MBCO was in the midst of setting up a 
spatial mapping and modelling system that could provide online information on all major 
pollutants, location and water quality in Manila Bay in real time. The system took at least 
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two years to set-up as his office had to hurdle the bureaucratic processes of budgeting, 
procurement and approval. The MBCO is also collaborating with private science institutes to 
ensure sustainability of the project if government funding runs out. Science, however, has a 
different function from governance. Each polluter and pollutant is governed by different 
laws and different agencies. The challenge is to reconcile science with governance and, 
looking at the strategies of the MBAC and MBCO, the pathway towards an effective 
collaboration structure is unclear. 
7.3.3 Network management 
Even when network goal has been formally and legally defined, goal consensus among 
actors does not come automatically. A precondition to agreement is that actors have a 
mutual acknowledgment of the issue that the network goal seeks to address to allow the 
parties to negotiate issues of legitimacy and appreciate the interdependence that exists 
among themselves (Gray 1985, p.917). However, goal congruence can be challenging in a 
network where multiple actors function under different interests, problem perception and 
strategies. The role of management is critical for effective network governance, especially 
in handling conflicts that can arise from such differences (Provan & Kenis 2007, p.233).  
Cross sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when they have committed sponsors 
and effective champions who can impart leadership (Bryson et al. 2006, p.47). The 
interagency monitoring arena has a legitimate leadership, with the MBAC acting as sponsor 
and the MBCO as a champion. The sewerage network has found a sponsor with Supreme 
Court Justice Velasco and the MBAC members, who are credible, respected and 
accomplished figures in the environmental sector. With its power to impose administrative 
sanctions to non-complying entities, the MBAC is a powerful stakeholder and its legitimacy 
is recognised by all members. The ruling recognised that coordination among agencies is 
necessary to achieve the goal of cleaning up Manila Bay. The MBCO, as secretariat to the 
MBAC and MBCC, is an ideal champion as it possesses the technical knowledge and skills 
to mobilise agencies to work together and identify the problems by domain or arena. Under 
the leadership of the MBAC and the technical knowledge of the MBCO, the problem of 
interorganisational collaboration that plagued the implementation of Manila Bay projects as 
well as the sewerage sector was supposed to be addressed.  
The interagency monitoring arena has a legitimate leader with the MBAC but it has not 
resolved the issue of Manila Bay that the executive branch failed to do. The creation of the 
The network effects in the arena of interagency monitoring 
163 
MBAC, the MBCO and its clusters has ended up adding another layer of complexity to the 
already complex and fragmented sewerage network. The interagency monitoring arena 
created as a result of the Supreme Court decision was intended to get the different 
mandamus agencies to collaborate to achieve the common goal of cleaning up Manila Bay. 
However, MBAC focused on identifying strategies and plans to clean up of Manila Bay and 
monitoring their implementation.  
As network manager, the MBAC should have facilitated the setting up of a sustainable 
institutional structure that fosters interorganisational cooperation among the mandamus 
agencies to effectively implement Manila Bay clean up projects and activities. Managing 
and building interorganisational collaboration among the mandamus agencies has not 
been given attention by the MBAC and MBCO. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the 
MBAC, it still holds a large potential for improving interorganisational collaboration the 
Metro Manila sewerage network. Unlike the STP construction arena where actors have 
limited formal accountability to the arena goal, the actors in this arena are under 
mandamus to conform to the rules and procedures. The Supreme Court decision and the 
creation of the MBAC signified that the Manila Bay clean up was not just another ordinary 
government project as the writ of continuing mandamus makes this project indispensable 
and of the highest priority (Manila Bay Coordinating Office 2011). With an established 
leadership and defined set of rules to guide the actions of the mandamus agencies, 
accountability and coordination in this arena should be relatively easier to navigate. The 
role of a network manager should be differentiated from the usual public manager whose 
role is to manage the implementation of strategies. A network manager is expected to 
‘manage cooperative strategies, monitor the quality of the dialogue and intervene with 
questions designed to enhance understanding’ (Kickert et al. 1997, p.49). This gap may be 
addressed by bringing in relationship managers and boundary spanners whose tasks would 
be identify the collaboration gaps and bottlenecks, act as the ‘honest broker’ in case of 
conflicts and ensure that interdependencies among actors are sustained (Thomson & Perry 
2006, p.26). 
7.4 Network effects of PPP in the interagency monitoring arena 
The network features of PPP did not yield an optimal outcome in the interagency monitoring 
arena. The arena did not produce optimal outcomes because its objectives were not 
achieved. The ideal outcome in the interagency monitoring is the establishment of a 
sustainable interagency network structure and processes that enable the mandamus 
agencies to effectively work together in implementing projects to clean up Manila Bay. 
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Resource interdependence, the existence of formal network goal and a legitimate network 
manager did not guarantee collaborative success.  
The network features of PPP in the interagency monitoring arena failed to deliver the 
expected benefits of PPP to improve quality of public service while lowering its costs. The 
resource interdependence of actors in the interagency monitoring arena has the potential 
of lowering the cost of the concessionaires. When other agencies perform their roles, the 
concessionaires will be able to build STPs within budget and schedule. If LGUs effectively 
performed their solid waste management function (see Section 6.2.3 Interagency 
management of wastewater and solid waste on page 127) then the concessionaires would 
not have to incur additional cost in removing solid wastes that get trapped in their STPs. If 
riverbanks and waterways are cleared of informal settlers, the concessionaires will not 
incur further cost in redirecting sewage pipelines (see Appendix 2.1 on Box 6.1 North and 
South Pasig sewerage system project on page185). When other network actors refuse to 
cooperate, this increases the transaction cost of the concessionaires.  
It is important that the actors recognise their dependency on each other because from 
thereon they will be able to jointly define and understand what the problem is, develop the 
appropriate strategies that can influence each other to work together and pool their 
resources to get the work done (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.46). There is mutual resource 
interdependence among the mandamus agencies as they recognise that they need the 
cooperation of other agencies to perform their specific environmental protection functions. 
There is an established network goal in the interagency monitoring arena but the 
mandamus agencies do not agree on the strategies imposed on them to achieve the 
network goal. They do not agree on resource allocation because the rules are not clear to 
them.  
Collaboration among network members can be improved through incentives, process and 
conflict management and reduction of risks linked to cooperation (E. H. Klijn & Koppenjan 
2000, p.142). An incentive to work in a network is resource interdependence, i.e., to access 
resources owned by other actors that they need in performing their own functions. The 
creation of the MBAC was initially welcomed by the mandamus agencies as it promised to 
organise the interorganisational efforts towards the clean up of Manila Bay. Moreover, it 
has the power to impose administrative sanctions to non-complying entities.  
The network effects in the arena of interagency monitoring 
165 
The mutual dependency on the resources held by the MBAC, MBCO and the mandamus 
agencies was not enough to guarantee a higher degree of cooperation. The resources held 
by MBAC and MBCO could have been used by the resource owners as realisation power to 
help the mandamus agencies perform their functions. The concessionaires, in particular, 
expected the MBAC to provide them the venue to raise and resolve the interagency 
collaboration challenges they encounter in implementing sewerage projects. Most, if not all, 
of the agencies they work with are named in the mandamus. Mutual dependency is 
supposed to encourage a higher degree of cooperation among the parties but the 
mandamus agencies, however, perceived that the MBAC has not improved 
interorganisational collaboration and has just created another layer of reporting. The two 
concessionaires, while not named respondents in the decision, also attended the MBAC 
and MBCO meetings upon request of the MWSS so they can present their respective 
activities and accomplishments. They reported on their KPIs, which are the same with their 
KPIs under the CA with MWSS. The concessionaires also attend meetings for the issue-
based action plans organised by the MBCO, as well as meetings conducted by the DILG 
which takes the lead on the area-based action plans in Metro Manila. Since both 
concessionaires service the entire capital, they attend the separate meetings called by the 
three geographical clusters. They find that these meetings did not add value to their work 
as these did not resolve the issues they encountered with the national and local 
government agencies. The DILG and private utility officials do not find the MBAC helpful in 
resolving interagency issues.  
For a network goal to be effective, network members should have a similar understanding 
of the issues that the goal aims to address so that they can jointly formulate strategies that 
are consistent and complementary. The process of problem- and solution- shaping can be a 
hectic, fragmented and dynamic process so this to be managed. When there is 
disagreement and confusion about the goals, problems and solutions, the network 
manager can help facilitate understanding among actors. The MBCO has provided the 
venue for collaboration with the clustering of mandamus agencies by priority issues (Figure 
7.3) but it failed to establish a systematic approach to handle the process of collaboration. 
In its decision, the Supreme Court defined the problem as the polluted state of Manila Bay. 
The solution was the creation of MBAC, which was supposed to oversee the performance of 
the mandamus agencies. However, this is just a symptom of the real problem. The 
wretched state of Manila Bay was a result of the many years of neglect by the executive 
branch of the Philippine government, which was tasked with different functions to protect 
the environment. It is this neglect of ministerial duties that compelled the Supreme Court to 
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order the concerned agencies by mandamus to ‘jointly and solidarily clean up Manila Bay… 
to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation’ (Supreme 
Court of the Philippines 2008). The main issue is how to structure an effective and 
functioning coordination setup among these actors.  
7.5 Concluding remarks 
Among the three areas of decision making areas examined in this thesis, the interagency 
monitoring arena is the only one that has been legally created with an established network 
goal, formal leadership, institutional structure and clearly-defined rules. However, these 
have not been enough to bring effective collaboration to rehabilitate Manila Bay among the 
mandamus agencies. This chapter suggests that a formal network goal and network 
manager do not guarantee collaborative success. The deliberate creation of a network as a 
means of governance is as important as the management of the network itself. The 
undoing of this arena is attributed to the lack of recognition that the process of defining a 
problem is as much a collaborative process as implementing solutions. While there is 
formal leadership in this arena, it has failed to inspire and lead the members towards a 
collaborative approach and unwittingly encouraged an organisation approach by defining 
agency-specific KPIs. Additional findings on the theoretical implications of this arena vis-à-
vis the network outcomes will be considered further in the last chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
This chapter answers the main research question, deliberates on the relevance and policy 
implications of its theoretical and empirical findings and suggests prospects for future 
research. The aim of this research has been to explain why PPP failed to deliver the 
expected outcomes in privatised infrastructure services. This research endeavoured to 
answer the central question by examining the case of privatised sewerage service in Metro 
Manila, Philippines. Ultimately, this research contributes to the literature on network 
governance, PPP and policy implementation by explaining how PPP transformed the 
governance structure of public infrastructure services and how these changes can 
potentially hinder the accomplishment of the intended outcomes. To answer the main 
question, the following sub-questions were raised: (1) What are the network features 
created by PPP? and (2) What are the effects of these network features on PPP outcomes? 
8.1 Main research findings 
To answer the central question, this research aimed to establish the relationship between 
network governance theory and PPP. At the outset, this research argued that the 
concessionaires failed to deliver their targets on time because of the network effect of PPP. 
The network effect of PPP refers to outcomes that are caused by the emergence of network 
features created by PPP. The literature on network governance offers numerous sets of 
network features to explain a network’s success or failure, or to understand the 
relationships and dynamics in the network (see Section 2.4.2 Network features of 
governance structures on page 22). This research, however, does not aim to resolve 
network complexity nor adjudge networks as success or failure. Every network has its own 
characteristics that are unique to the service or sector and the broader environment in 
which it exists. It also difficult to gauge the success or failure of a network because 
numerous decisions are made in different arenas over different periods of time, which can 
yield varying levels of success or failure. This makes it challenging and even inaccurate to 
select the most appropriate set of criteria to analyse the network. 
Networks are inherently complex in that they cannot be captured by a single theory (Klijn & 
Koppenjan 2012, p.600). Instead of making these generic features fit different networks, 
the complexity and uniqueness of the network should be considered in identifying the 
appropriate network governance perspective. Klijn and Koppenjan (2012) advocate for a 
more specialised and differentiated application of the governance network theory that will 
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capture the diversity of networks. One subject matter that pleads for a specialised network 
study is PPP. This has not been explored in the current PPP literature, which focused either 
on the performance of the private sector in delivering the public infrastructure service or on 
the implementation by the government of the PPP policy. PPP has been viewed as transfer 
of services from ‘public to private’ rather than as a ‘public and private’ responsibility. The 
limitation of this perspective is that it obfuscates the interdependence among public and 
private roles in governance and the extent of accountability problems created as a result 
thereof (Freeman 2000; Goldsmith & Eggers 2004).   
Taking into consideration the complexity and uniqueness of networks in privatised public 
infrastructure services, this research has developed an analytical framework to analyse the 
network effects brought about by the network features of PPP. The analytical framework 
was used to understand why the concessionaires are behind their sewerage targets in 
Metro Manila. Referring to the Metro Manila concessions as a case study, this research has 
revealed three main findings: 
1) The decisions that impact on the outcomes in privatised infrastructure services are 
made by public and private actors in different arenas, 
2) PPP has resulted in the emergence of new network features that altered the governance 
structure of public infrastructure services and 
3) The new network features created negative network effects that hindered the 
accomplishment of intended outcomes. 
8.1.1 Decisions are made in arenas of multiple actors, not just by a single actor 
The entry of the private sector in public service delivery through PPP has created a new 
governance structure that is relational in nature where decision making is no longer 
monopolised by the government but is negotiated among a number of public and private 
actors. These decisions take place in different arenas. In determining the network effects of 
PPP, I identified the vital decision making arenas or in the Metro Manila sewerage sector. 
The arena is where decisions over a policy or programme implementation are made by a 
cluster of actors on the basis of their perceptions of problems and solutions and the 
outcomes are a result of the mix of strategies brought by the actors in the arena 
(Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, p.50).  
Conclusion 
169 
The arenas under a relational network are different from hierarchical or market-like 
networks. In a hierarchical network, all actors are public in nature where decisions are 
usually made at the top of the hierarchy and implemented by those at the bottom rung of 
the hierarchy. Arenas in market-like networks are comprised of public and private actors 
and their relationship is within a principal-agent context. The state contracts out the 
delivery of a public infrastructure service to the private sector and the performance of the 
private sector is monitored by the public sector on the basis of the performance indicators 
specified in the contract. Networks in PPP are relational in nature where actors are 
autonomous and their relationships are interdependent and non-hierarchical. Decision 
making is made in more than one arena as different aspects of the service are spread over 
a number of public and private actors. Each arena is unique as each one is comprised of a 
number of actors with different functions and perceptions who have to cooperate to 
produce the public service, which makes governance more complex. The working 
relationships among actors in different arenas vary according to the type of public 
infrastructure service and the different stages of production in a specific service.  
Prior to the Metro Manila concessions, the Philippine government had sole responsibility for 
all aspects of sewerage services such as determining the tariff, construction of sewerage 
infrastructure, monitoring service delivery, collecting payments from consumers and 
dealing with consumer concerns. In carrying out its function of delivering sewerage 
services, the concessionaires have to collaborate with a number of national and local 
government entities. We learned in the last three chapters that decisions over the delivery 
of sewerage service in Metro Manila, Philippines are made in different arenas. There are a 
number of arenas in the Metro Manila sewerage sector but this thesis only examined the 
three most crucial decision making arenas: (1) the rate rebasing arena, (2) the STP 
construction arena and (3) the interagency monitoring arena.  
Network outcomes are a result of the different perceptions, decisions and strategies of 
different actors in the different arenas. Policy implementation is complex not only because 
there are many actors who can make unpredictable and sometimes conflicting decisions. 
Further complexity is created when actors are simultaneously involved in more than one 
arena when problems have different dimensions that require the application of different 
policies and involvement of different actors for resolution (Van Gils & Klijn 2007, p.14). This 
is the predicament encountered by the two private concessionaires, Maynilad and Manila 
Water, as participants in the three arenas. The ability of the concessionaires to fulfil their 
contractual obligations does not rely solely on their financial resource and technical 
competency but is largely dependent on various policies implemented by different actors at 
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various government levels in the different decision making. As a result, the policy 
implementation becomes highly fragmented in character as decisions are made in different 
arenas at different levels and times (Van Gils & Klijn 2007, p.14).  
8.1.2 PPP created network features that changed the governance structure 
 of public services 
The entry of the private sector in public infrastructure service delivery altered the 
governance structure of public infrastructure services, i.e., a horizontal, relational and self-
organising structure where private and public actors resolve and negotiate problems and 
decisions jointly. This new structure exhibited new network features that changed and 
impacted on the way public infrastructure services are delivered. The network features 
created by PPP are (1) resource interdependence between the private and public sector, (2) 
the challenge of achieving goal congruence in a multi-stakeholder setting and (3) unclear 
network management roles. These features were not present when public infrastructure 
services were provided by the government. The government performed all aspects of the 
services, such as planning and implementing the projects, allocating resources, providing 
the service to the consumers and collecting payment for the service provided.  
PPP has created a contractual relationship between the public and private sector, which 
establishes resource interdependency and this interdependency is the basis of goal 
congruence among the actors (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004; Klijn et al. 2010; Agranoff & 
Mcguire 2003). However, achieving goal congruence in the network is challenging because 
it is comprised of a diverse set of autonomous actors who may have conflicting perceptions 
on issues and solutions (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004; Klijn et al. 2010; Hajer & Wagenaar 
2003). With numerous actors having to share resources towards a common goal, a network 
manager is needed to guide the network members to effectively work together but, since 
the relationship of actors is not hierarchical, it is unclear who assumes this leadership role. 
8.1.2.1 Resource interdependence does not guarantee collaboration  
PPP created resource interdependency between the public and private sector. The 
government enlisted the private sector because it has the financial resources and technical 
competency needed to improve public infrastructure service. Resource interdependence 
requires coordination and the inherent complexity in contracting and outsourcing intensifies 
coordination challenges (Brown & Potoski 2003, p.276). Uncertainty in relationships is 
created by the complexity of the environment and the risk that the other party might adopt 
opportunistic behaviour (Rossignoli & Ricciardi 2015, p.9). The higher the uncertainty risks, 
the more actors are required to work together to mitigate the risks and ‘the more numerous 
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and more complex the transactions, the higher the costs’ (Rossignoli & Ricciardi 2015, 
p.9). As demonstrated in the last three chapters, the concessionaires have to work with a 
different set of actors in each arena. As the functions of each arena and the decisions 
made therein differ, the number and nature of complexity of the transactions involved in 
coordinating and maintaining the relationship of the concessionaires with the actors in 
each arena vary as well.  
Resource interdependence in the tariff setting arena is supposed to improve transparency 
as checks and balance mechanisms in the management and distribution of resources have 
been put in place after PPP. The contract that specifies obligations of both parties, the 
creation of a regulator and monitoring systems and the options for arbitration are the 
mechanisms to improve transparency. However, these mechanisms require constant 
coordination between parties to work effectively. Coordination entails transaction costs. In 
the tariff setting arena, the transaction cost of the concessionaires increases during the 
rate rebasing exercise, particularly when the parties resort to arbitration to settle their 
disputes. While resource interdependence may have improved transparency, the complex 
transactions and coordination required in the tariff setting arena have created additional 
costs on sewerage service in Metro Manila.  
In the STP construction arena, the relationship of the concessionaires and the LGUs is 
interdependent because the former need a number of resources, i.e., land, permit and 
licenses, from the latter to be able to implement STP projects in the latter’s jurisdictions. 
The LGUs, on the other hand, need the concessionaires to provide sewerage services to 
their constituents. Resource interdependence has been a source of delay in the 
implementation of STP projects, which adds to the extraneous costs of the concessionaires 
that are not within their control. Delay ‘is a function of the number of decision points, the 
number of participants at each point and the intensity of their preference’ and the more 
decision points and participants, the higher the coordination costs (O’Toole & Montjoy 
1984, p.499). As revealed in Chapter 6, the concessionaires incur additional costs and 
delay coordinating with actors in the STP construction arenas on the aspects of land 
acquisition, permit and licenses acquisition for STP construction and solid waste 
management.  
Mandated coordination is the resource interdependence in the interagency monitoring 
arena and it was expected to facilitate coordination among mandamus agencies towards 
cleaning and rehabilitating Manila Bay. This decision was welcomed by the mandamus 
agencies as they recognised that they need the cooperation of other agencies to perform 
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their specific environmental protection functions. The concessionaires welcomed their de 
facto membership in this arena as it provided them a venue to discuss and resolve the 
coordination issues that they encounter with the national and local governments. However, 
the MBAC failed to resolve the interagency coordination issue and instead, only added 
another layer of reporting for the concessionaires.  
8.1.2.2 The challenge of achieving goal consensus in a multi-stakeholder setting  
Goal congruence is not easily achieved because networks are comprised of different 
agencies that are guided by their organisational mandates. It is easy to blame the veto 
power of actors for hindering goal attainment but it could be that the goal itself or the lack 
thereof or the way it is pursued that is the cause of the failure (Kickert et al. 1997, pp.174–
175). Even when the network has a clearly defined goal, it is important that all actors in the 
network agree on the goal. Actors do not just collaborate to deliver a certain outcome; they 
also need to collaborate in solving problems that may arise in the course of implementing 
projects. To achieve goal congruence, it is crucial that the actors have a common 
understanding of the problem that the goal seeks to resolve. When actors agree on a 
common problem definition, they can jointly formulate resource allocation rules and 
complementary strategies. Conversely, when actors perceive and define problems 
differently, they may formulate divergent strategies. Most of the problems in the three 
arenas are rooted to a lack of goal consensus among actors.  
In the tariff setting arena, the goals were defined in the CA. The CA is the main instrument 
of service provision and mode of regulation but these were not enough to get the actors in 
this arena to cooperate towards the network goal. The long term nature of the contract 
exposes the parties to changing conditions that can undermine or challenge the terms of 
the contract. When government leadership changes, there is a risk that government 
policies change as well. The contract instituted dispute resolution mechanisms in case of 
conflict but in the recent and still pending legal impasse, these mechanisms have been 
used to challenge the other party rather than resolve the issues. 
The STP construction arena does not have a formally defined goal. It is challenging to 
achieve a common purpose in the STP construction arena because there is no clear, formal 
and established structure. There is no law or contract that directs the actors in this arena to 
cooperate with the concessionaires to help them implement their sewerage projects in the 
service area. The national government agencies LGUs do not see themselves as 
collaborators in STP construction of STPs but as regulators. The concessionaires have to 
navigate the government bureaucracy in applying for permits and licenses for sewerage 
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infrastructure. The concessionaires rely on their own efforts to build working relationships 
with different LGUs to facilitate implementation of STP projects.  
The interagency monitoring arena has a formal, legal and defined goal. The 
interorganisational relationship of the actors in this arena is mandated by the Supreme 
Court and the rule that governs the actions of the mandamus agencies is the OPMBCS. This 
arena had the potential of resolving the interorganisational collaboration issues 
encountered by the executive department in cleaning up Manila Bay, including those faced 
by the concessionaires. However, even a defined goal requires consensus among the 
network actors. The MBAC took main responsibility of problem identification when it is the 
mandamus agencies that possess sufficient information about the nature of the problem 
situation and the effects of solutions. The MBAC behaved more like public manager whose 
role is to manage the implementation of strategies, rather than a network manager who 
‘manages cooperative strategies, monitors the quality of the dialogue and intervenes with 
questions designed to enhance understanding’ (Kickert et al. 1997, p.49).  
8.1.2.3 Unclear network management roles  
The public and private sectors are motivated by different goals and respond to different 
incentives.  The private sector is not subject to the legislative, executive, and judicial 
oversight that public agencies submit to  (Freeman 2000, p.574). An effective network 
manager is needed to get the actors to collaborate in resource allocation and achieving 
goal consensus in the network. In the Metro Manila sewerage network, there was no 
designated network manager. The three arenas would have benefited from the leadership 
of an effective network manager that could have guided the network in resource allocation 
and goal consensus.  
In the rate rebasing arena, there was no designated network manager but the 
concessionaires’ view that the MWSS-RO as regulator, commercial signatory to the contract 
and contract manager should have taken the role of a network manager. Complexity arose 
when the government prioritised one role over the others. As commercial signatory to the 
contract and contract manager, it is the government’s responsibility to ensure that the 
concessionaires perform the terms of the contract. On the other hand, the government also 
takes on a regulatory role to ensure that the right of the public to water and sewerage 
service is protected. Tension inevitably develops when any or all of these roles conflict. The 
regulator prioritised its role as regulator and advocate of general welfare when it 
interpreted the contract differently from its predecessors, which triggered the problems that 
the parties are still embroiled in. 
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The STP construction arena is not a formally organised structure so the actors do not come 
together to deliberately define problems, formulate solutions and coordinate their activities. 
It does not have a formally designated leader who has the authority to steer the arena 
towards a network goal. The interdependence between the concessionaires and the LGUs 
is a consequence of the concessionaires’ contract but their relationship with the LGUs is 
neither mandated by contract nor by law. In the absence of a network manager, the 
concessionaires had to rely on their own efforts to maintain good working relationships with 
the different LGUs. 
In the interagency monitoring arena, the MBAC is the formally designated network 
manager. With its legal authority and its network members mostly comprised of public 
organisations, the MBAC would have been an effective network manager had it focused on 
managing and building interorganisational collaboration among the mandamus agencies. A 
problem arose when the MBAC exercised hierarchy by formulating and imposing the KPIs 
on the mandamus agencies. According to the agencies, they were not consulted in the KPI 
formulation and they were under the impression that they are duty bound to comply even if 
they are unclear and disagree on the KPIs.  
8.1.3 Network features of PPP can create negative network effects  
 
The Metro Manila concessions were expected to resolve Metro Manila’s water and 
sewerage woes. The ideal outcome for the Metro Manila sewerage network is that the 
concessionaires provide sewerage infrastructure and services to the consumers within the 
concession timeframe at an affordable tariff. The network effect of the network features of 
PPP in the Metro Manila sewerage network, based on the outcomes in the three arenas, is 
that the concessionaires did not deliver the expected benefits in sewerage service in Metro 
Manila. The network did not produce optimal outcomes because the concessionaires are 
behind schedule in fulfilling their sewerage targets under the CA. Table 8.1 summarises the 
network features and network effects in the three arenas. 
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Table 8.1 Summary of network features and network effects on the Metro Manila  
sewerage services network arenas 
Network features Tariff setting arena STP construction arena Interagency 
monitoring arena 
Resources interdependence  
 Do actors need the 
resource of another to 
perform its functions  
Yes Yes Yes 
 Is resource dependence 
mutual or one way? 
Mutual One way One way 
 Do actors agree on how 
the resources shall be 
allocated or shared? 
No No No 
Goal congruence  
 Does the network have a 
clearly defined goal?  
Yes No Yes 
 Do all actors agree on the 
goal? 
  No 
 Do the individual 
mandates of each 
organisation align or 
conflict with the common 
goal? 
Yes No No 
 Do they actually perform 
towards the goal? 
Yes No No 
 Are there rules set on how 
to jointly achieve the goal? 
Yes No No 
 Are the rules:     
a. Formal or informal? Formal: stable and 
predictable 
Informal: flexible and 
negotiable 
Formal: stable and 
predictable 
b. Specificity Detailed Broad Detailed 
c. Time-bound Yes No Yes 
Network leadership/management  
 Authority   
a. Is there an authoritative 
decision maker? 
b. Does the authority have 
legitimacy?  
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Management style No network manager No network manager Top to bottom/ 
hierarchical 
Network effects Negative outcomes: 
objectives not achieved 
Mixed: outcomes differ 
per project 
Negative outcomes: 
objectives not 
achieved 
 
The Metro Manila sewerage network is complex as it involves numerous stakeholders 
competing for limited and common resources that cross multiple boundaries and scales. 
The network is riddled with barriers that make it difficult for the concessionaires to fulfil 
their obligations and targets. There are too many actors involved, interacting at different 
levels, time and jurisdictions and operating under various legal and administrative 
instruments and social and political processes. With the existence of different networks, 
arenas, rules, and perceptions and dynamics, a network that is unstructured, governed by 
rules that are subject to different interpretations or disregarded creates an unwieldy 
environment for the concessionaires. Notwithstanding the complexity of the Metro Manila 
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sewerage network, the concessionaires still managed to perform their contractual 
obligations but usually beyond budget and scheduled target. Poor coordination results in 
delays and higher costs. In the three arenas, the concessionaires were challenged to meet 
their contractual obligations because the three network features were not considered in the 
implementation design of the PPP policy.  
PPP was expected to address the shortage in financial and competency resource that the 
government suffered as former operator and provider of MWSS. The Metro Manila 
concessions was expected to improve the quality of public service and expand the service 
coverage while lowering its costs and lead to lower tariff for consumer. Lower costs were to 
come from private sector efficiency and economies of scale (Evans 2005; Hefetz & Warner 
2004; Brubaker 2003; Kerf et al. 1998). The resource interdependence of actors in each 
arena had the potential of lowering the cost of the concessionaires. When other agencies 
perform their roles, the concessionaires will be able to build STPs within budget and 
schedule. While private sector can lower production cost, the need to coordinate with 
numerous actors have increased the coordination costs for the private sector. The 
concessionaires have to collaborate and negotiate with numerous actors over decision 
making over a common goal. However, the proponents of the Metro Manila concessions 
expected the private sector to assumed sole responsibility over all aspects of sewerage 
services. The need for a network manager, or who would take on this role, was not 
considered during the policy design. 
Another claimed advantage of PPP is that it has improved accountability arrangements 
compared to the traditional procurement method (Greve & Hodge 2010, p.156). With the 
entry of non-public actors in public service governance, as the responsibility over service 
delivery outcomes is no longer monopolised by the government. However, accountability 
systems can also act as a major impediment to crossing boundaries in public management 
and policy, in part because the focus is on 'individual contributions not joint outcomes' 
(Statskontoret 2007: 37 as cited in O’Flynn 2013, p.36). Thus, the accountability system in 
PPP is only effective when actors are clear on their roles and responsibilities. It was 
revealed in the three arenas that the government at different levels is unclear on its roles in 
the Metro Manila sewerage services network. 
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8.2 Research contribution and policy implications  
Water and sewerage concessions, in general, have been analysed based on their effects on 
the government’s economic and social objectives. These studies have focused on the 
organisation-level, either the performance of the private sector in delivering the service or 
the government in implementing the PPP policy. While these perspectives provided insight 
into the performance of PPP, these only provided a partial and a fragmented understanding 
as these studies assumed that implementing the PPP policy is a function of one 
organisation alone. Policy implementation, however, involves a series of decisions and 
actions from more than one actor in order to achieve the desired outcome or effect, which 
requires an interorganisational or network perspective to understand its performance 
(O’Toole 2000; Lester & Goggin 1998). This research endeavoured to analyse the 
performance of privatised public infrastructure services through the lens of the network 
governance theory. In doing so, this research contributes to the literature on network 
governance, PPP and policy implementation in the following ways: 
First, the network perspective to analysing PPP performance augments the current 
literature on understanding PPP outcomes by filling out the administrative analysis gap that 
has not been explored in the literature. This research does not discount the importance of 
analysing social and economic effects. Milward and Provan (1998) have advocated network 
analysis to correct the seeming imbalance on the ‘overdeveloped capacity for policy 
analysis and an underdeveloped capacity for administrative analysis’ (Milward & Provan 
1998, p.388). The Metro Manila concessions had been extensively studied and variably 
adjudged a success or a failure, anti-poor and innovative to name a few, on the basis of its 
social and economic effects (cf. Chng 2008; Cuaresma 2006; Fabella 2011; Fabella 2012; 
Malaluan & Wu 2008). The network effect of PPP in the analysis of the Metro Manila 
concessions has not been explored.  
Second, this research offers a new perspective on evaluating and understanding PPP 
outcomes. An analytical framework was developed to analyse the performance of privatised 
sewerage service in Metro Manila that examined the sewerage services network in terms of 
the decision making arenas, network features and network effects. These three aspects of 
relational networks capture the multi-actor nature of policy implementation and may be 
worth considering when designing, implementing and evaluating policies. In particular, the 
use of decision making arenas as a unit of analysis ably captures the complexity of 
decisions and the links and contexts among the different decisions made in the network 
(Van Gils & Klijn 2007). Decision making arenas represent the knowledge base that can 
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help policymakers and public managers appreciate the vertical and horizontal matrix of 
intergovernmental network management (Agranoff & Mcguire 2003, p.1402). Also, this 
research augments the understudied area of sewerage and sanitation that has been 
traditionally subsumed under the topic of water and sanitation but rarely examined in 
detail.  
Third, this research seeks to promote the understanding that policies are implemented by 
multiple institutional actors and policy implementation can be a complex process.  As 
government increasingly works with non-public organisations and actors, there is a need to 
rethink the design of policy implementation structures to ensure that these are responsive 
to the purpose (O’Flynn 2013, p.36). An acceptance of the perspective that policy 
implementation is interorganisational in nature contributes to effective and responsive 
policy design. Lester and Goggin (1998, p.5) have long advocated the rejection of a 
‘dichotomous conceptualisation of policy implementation as simply a success or failure.’ 
Networks are complex not only because there are many players but because these players 
can make unpredictable strategic choices and create problems in different arenas. When 
network complexity is understood then targeted solutions can be offered as to how 
networks should be organised to make it effective. This understanding can guide 
governments in considering the potential network features that may arise when adopting a 
new policy, such as PPP, that can hinder the achievement of the desired goals or effects. 
PPP has been implemented with the faulty assumption that the private sector can 
unilaterally deliver high quality service at low cost (Kettl 2010, p.248).  
Fourth, with a perspective that policy implementation is a multi-actor activity, this research 
aims to inform policymakers to consider the vital role that a network manager, boundary 
spanners and/or relationship managers play when designing policies. Implementation of 
policy involves some kind of strategic alliance, joint working arrangements, networks and 
partnerships and collaboration across sectoral and organisational boundaries but current 
discourse is usually focused at the institutional and organisational level (Williams 2002). 
Policy implementation designs are usually focused on managing the policy itself but not on 
the management of interorganisational relationships that will be created as a result 
thereof.   
Fifth, this research intends to contribute to the growth of a more specialised and 
differentiated study in the field of network governance theory. Networks are diverse and are 
confronted by different issues and may create misunderstanding and imprecision if the 
outcomes of a network are made to fit a specific set of network features or network 
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typology. Klijn and Koppenjan (2012) foresee that the diverse and generic concepts and 
assumptions of governance network theory will be applied with other theories and specific 
questions (Klijn & Koppenjan 2012, p.600). 
Finally, this research also recognised the limitations of the network governance theory. It 
should be kept in mind that network governance theory does not endeavour to resolve 
network complexity neither does it aim to measure the success nor failure of a network. It 
should be seen as an insightful tool and an alternative approach in analysing policy 
implementation outcomes and to understand how multi-actor interdependence impact on 
the fulfilment of policy objectives.  
8.3 Methodological and research observations  
While this thesis was able to provide the answers to the research questions posed at the 
onset, the research process was not without its challenges. 
First, the literature on network governance theory offered multiple levels of analysis and 
multiple yet distinct theoretical approaches to explain complexity in interorganisational 
networks (Zaheer et al. 2010, p.62). I chose to use decision making arena as the unit of 
network analysis because it is effective in depicting the complexity of decision making and 
interactions in networks. Public service delivery involves many actors, each performing 
different functions, observing different types of polices and encountering these different 
dimensions brings the actors together in numerous arenas. This research explored only 
three arenas in the Metro Manila sewerage services network but due to the nature and 
magnitude of the sector, there could be more arenas that would have been worth 
examining as well. Due to financial and time constraints, I decided to limit the research to 
the three arenas selected that are deemed representative of the complexity of the network. 
Second, I chose to define the research problem from the perspective of the concessionaires 
over other network actors, which can create the risk of selection bias. In the initial 
identification of research problem, I adopted the concessionaires’ perspective because, 
compared to other network actors, the concessionaires as the main implementers of 
sewerage projects in Metro Manila are the ones who are most immersed in all aspects of 
sewerage activities: policy making, project implementation, monitoring and coordinating 
with all actors in the network. To neutralise this risk, the initial problem identified was 
validated by interviews with other actors in the network. Once the problem definition was 
validated, the research problem was evaluated using an analytical framework.  
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Third, it was challenging to secure accurate, consistent and timely statistical data on the 
sewerage sector. The fieldwork was conducted in 2014 but the latest water and sewerage 
data available dates back to 2011. This could be attributed to the fact that the 
concessionaires and the MWSS-RO were still under litigation for the third rate rebasing and 
were not allowed to release any information related to the cases. Another reason is that 
there is a dearth of studies on the sewerage sector in the Philippines because availability of 
sewerage service in the Philippine is still low, with only seven cities in the archipelago 
having sewerage systems that covers only around one to15% of the population (Pham & 
Kuyama 2013, p.3). I was able to secure official reports from the regulators and the 
concessionaires but some data provided had different units of measurements or reckoning 
dates that make it challenging to make a comparison. An example of this is the sewerage 
coverage target where the target for Maynilad was specified in number of households while 
Manila Water was in percentage of the population (see Table 4.4 Original and revised 
sewerage service coverage targets on page 86). I attempted to verify the information with 
the regulator and concessionaires via email but did not get a reply. In similar cases to this, I 
relied on the best obtainable information available.  
8.4 Future research needed 
Notwithstanding the above challenges, the research provides new insights and presents 
new research opportunities. Some areas for potential research are as follows: 
8.4.1 Test the robustness of the analytical framework developed in this research  
This research developed an analytical framework to analyse the network effects of PPP in 
the Metro Manila concessions. Future research on other privatised public infrastructure 
services in the Philippines and other developing countries could employ this analytical 
framework to test its robustness. The MWSS is only one of the many enterprises privatised 
by the Philippine government as part of the country’s PPP program. During my fieldwork, I 
interviewed a few respondents working in services and/or industries that had been 
privatised and they revealed that their companies encounter similar challenges that the 
concessionaires face in implementing their projects. Another privatised utility that may 
benefit from the analytical framework developed in this research is the power sector. The 
electricity prices in the Philippines have consistently been rated among the highest in the 
world and the most expensive in Southeast Asia.  Like water and sewerage, the electricity 
sector also failed to meet the expectations of PPP (Roxas & Santiago 2010) and it would be 
worth looking into if and how much has the network effect of PPP contributed to this 
outcome. 
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8.4.2 Undertake comparative study in different PPP cases using network 
governance theory 
The literature revealed that, while the topic of PPP in public infrastructure services had 
been well researched, the existing literature had focused mainly on its social and economic 
effects. There is a scarcity of research in PPP that explores its network effects. Network 
governance theory can add a new perspective in understanding PPP outcomes. 
In addition to the need to augment research on network analysis on PPP, more research is 
also needed on networks in policy implementation in the context of the developing world. 
Much of the network governance literature has focused on western experiences in the 
Americas, Europe and Australia where there is rule of law and institutions are developed. 
Among the reasons identified on as to why PPP failed in developing countries was that it 
was also expected to resolve macroeconomic issues, which was broader than the efficiency 
and resource allocation objectives of the developed economies (Cook & Uchida 2003, 
p.122). In considering the developing world context, this could address what Klijn and 
Koppenjan (2012) envisioned as specialisation in network governance theory by applying 
its diverse and generic concepts and assumptions alongside other theories and specific 
questions. The Metro Manila concessions is just one case but, moving forward, the 
research on PPP could benefit more from empirical research from the network perspective. 
Comparative studies can be conducted on different privatised industries in different 
developing countries. 
8.4.3 Compare performance of networks with and without network managers  
The literature on network governance has emphasised the importance of effective network 
managers and/or boundary spanners in managing interdependencies and monitoring 
relationships towards leading the network to goal congruence. One of the major causes for 
the negative network effect in the Metro Manila sewerage services network was the lack of 
an effective network manager who will manage and build interorganisational relationships, 
not just to make sure that goals are met. This finding may be further validated if future 
research examines networks with network managers and/or boundary spanners and 
compare their performance against networks with no network managers and/or boundary 
spanners. 
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8.4.4 Examine the correlation between poor policy design and use of personal 
connections in networks  
This research has shown that policy implementation, when network features are not 
considered in the policy design, can result in failure to achieve the intended outcomes. It 
can also yield unintended negative consequences, such as the creation of personal 
networks in the tariff setting arena. As discussed in Chapter 5, activist groups accused the 
concessionaires of taking advantage of their personal connections and networks to gain 
favours for their business. Due to time and financial constraints, this research was unable 
to explore this aspect in detail. Also, the topic of personal networks is beyond the scope of 
this research. This research did not seek out to explore whether or not awarding PPP 
contracts to powerful families has an impact on the quality of service delivery. This subject 
has been adequately explored in the literature of ‘rent seeking’ and ‘crony capitalism’ 
culture in the Philippines, which had been identified as among the causes for the 
weakening of the Philippine state and failure of its policies (McCoy 2009; Hutchcroft 2000). 
Bad institutions persist in the Philippines persist because they are usually aligned with the 
dominant group’s effort to protect and perpetuate wealth and power (Fabella 2006, p.105). 
According to McCoy (2009, p.10), the participation of the private sector in the 
‘management of public resources strengthens a few fortunate families while weakening the 
state’s resources and its bureaucratic apparatus.’  
As discussed in the three preceding chapters, the main constraint of the concessionaires in 
implementing their contractual obligations come from the government itself, from 
bureaucratic red tape and inconsistent government policies to ineffective management. 
They resort to other avenues to circumvent the political and bureaucratic constraints in 
order to ensure that they meet their obligations, such as giving donations to LGUs to 
facilitate cooperation. These activities, however, are not necessarily unlawful. According to 
Freeman (2000, p. 548), connections are also resorted to gain access to legitimate ‘public 
pursuits’. While rent seeking and crony capitalism has been known to be prevalent in 
Philippine politics, it may be worth examining how poor policy planning and implementation 
unwittingly encourage rent seeking.  
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Appendix 1  
List of interviewees 
 Code Respondent Interview date Designation Organisation 
1 PS-2014-001 Jason Latoja 12 May 2014 Project Inspector Maynilad 
Water 
2 PS-2014-002 Ulysses Tatel 12 May 2014 Project Management 
Officer 
Maynilad 
Water 
3 PS-2014-003 Emmanuel 
Bravo 
12 May 2014 Acting Head, Sewage 
Treatment Plant 
Projects 
Maynilad 
Water 
4 PS-2014-004 Jerry Palma 15 May 2014 Head, Wastewater 
Planning and Project 
Development 
Maynilad 
Water 
5 PS-2014-005 Ryan Orillo 15 May 2014 Head, Planning, 
Information and 
Management,  
Wastewater Division 
Maynilad 
Water 
6 PS-2014-006 Ann Margaret L. 
Marigondon 
 
9 October 
2014 
Wastewater Planning 
Officer 
Wastewater Planning 
and Project 
Development, 
Wastewater 
Management Division 
Maynilad 
Water 
7 PS-2014-007 PJ Patricio 22 July 2014 Program Manager, 
Ilugin STP 
Manila Water 
8 PS-2014-008 Gillian Berba 30 July 2014 Program Manager, 
Olandes STP 
Manila Water 
9 PS-2014-009 Virgilio Rivera 5 Sept 2014 Group Director, 
Corporate Strategy 
and Development  
Manila Water 
10 PS-2014-010 Raul Bernal 14 May 2014 
13 August 
2014 
Assistant General 
Manager 
JFE 
Engineering 
Talayan STP 
11 PS-2014-011 Engr. Gilbert 
Valle 
Sept 2014 Manager Meralco 
12 GO-2014-012 Erwin Gamino 
 
08 August 
2014 
Local Government 
Operations Officer VI 
DILG 
13 GO-2014-013 Kathleen Sibal 08 August 
2014 
Local Government 
Operations Officer V, 
DILG 
14 GO-2014-014 Rolex Reyes 08 August 
2014 
Program Officer DILG 
15 GO-2014-015 Jess Marie 
Acoba  
08 August 
2014 
ISF program for 
informal settler 
DILG 
16 GO-2014-016 Engr. Rogelio 
Hernandez 
18 August 
2014 
Chief, Drainage and 
Slope Protection 
Section 
DPWH-BOD 
17 GO-2014-017 Engr. Rey 
Rosario 
3 Sept 2014 Chief, Maintenance 
Division 
DPWH-NCR 
18 GO-2014-018 Robert Beltran 24 July 2014 City Engineer Quezon City 
Government 
19 GO-2014-019 Winifredo 
Molina 
24 July 2014 Engineer III, 
Maintenance 
Management Division 
Quezon City 
Government 
20 GO-2014-020 Jose Reyes 20 August 
2014 
City Engineer Pasig City 
Government 
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 Code Respondent Interview date Designation Organisation 
21 GO-2014-021 Engr. Kennedy 
Sueno 
10 Sept 2014 City Engineer Marikina City 
Government 
22 GO-2014-022 Engineer 
Comandao 
14 October 
2014 
City Engineer Mandaluyong 
City Hall 
23 GO-2014-023 Noel Gaerlan 1 Sept 2014 
9 Oct 2014 
Executive Director DENR- MBCO 
24 GO-2014-024 Annrou Ramos 9 Oct 2014 Environmental 
Management 
Specialist 
DENR- MBCO 
25 GO-2014-025 Gerald Sullano 16 Sept 2014 Technical Deputy 
Regulator 
MWSS-RO 
26 GO-2014-026 Evelyn Agustin 16 Sept 2014 Acting Manager, 
Water Quality Control 
Department 
MWSS-RO 
27 GO-2014-027 Jonathan Dela 
Cruz 
9 Sept 2014 
2:01:50 
Congressman, 
Abakada Party List 
House of 
Representa-
tives 
28 NGO-2014-
028 
Kagawad Tony 16 Sept 2014 Barangay Secretary Barangay Sto. 
Domingo 
29 NGO-2014-
029 
Christopher 
Ancheta 
11 Sept 2014 Senior Sanitary 
Engineer 
World Bank 
30 NGO-2014-
030 
Rodolfo 
Javellana, Jr. 
9 Sept 2014 President Water for All 
Refund 
Movement 
(NGO) 
31 C-2014-031 Name withheld 23 July 2014 Junk Shop Owner Resident, 
Barangay Sto. 
Domingo 
32 E-2014-032 Mark Dumol 1 August 
2014 
Author, Manila Water 
Concession 
President, 
Private 
Infrastructure 
Development 
Corporation 
33 E-2014-033 Bayani 
Fernando 
Sept 2014 
 
Former Mayor, 
Marikina City and 
former MMDA 
Chairman 
Elected congressman 
in 2016 
House of 
Representa-
tives 
34 E-2014-034 Elisea Gozun 15 August 
2014 
MBAC Member MBAC 
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2.1 North and South Pasig sewerage system project  
The North and South Pasig sewerage system project STP is the biggest STP project of 
Manila Water with a treatment capacity of 165 million litres of wastewater per day to serve 
650,000 residents. The project, which is estimated to cost US$193.4 million, includes the 
installation of 64 kms of combined sewer drainage lines or conveyance system, 56 
interceptor boxes and 11 pumping stations that will divert wastewater to the STP for 
treatment. The timeline for this project was expected to be longer compared to Manila 
Water’s other STPs as it is the company’s biggest STP to date. Planning for this project 
commenced in 2010. The design and build contract was awarded on the third quarter of 
2012 and the contractor was expected to complete the design by the first quarter of 2013. 
Construction works was supposed to commence on the first quarter of 2013 and 
completed by the second quarter of 2015. However, construction only started in December 
2014, which was almost two years behind schedule. Project completion was moved to 
December 2016 (PS-2014-0076) but as of May 2017, the STP has not been completed. 
The delay was caused by a number of coordination issues: 
The EIA took two years to complete in view of the numerous coordination activities involved. 
Preparatory activities for the EIA took place in 2010, which included meetings with the 
LGUs and key informant interviews with national government agencies (such as DOH, 
DENR, MMDA and DPWH), commercial, industrial, education, church and NGO sectors, and 
project presentation/public consultation with the project beneficiaries. The EIA was 
completed on January 2012. 
The relocation of the informal settlers that occupied the land Manila Water also took time 
to carry out. The land was privately-owned but was occupied by 29 families at the time of 
purchase. The just and humane relocation of informal settlers is guaranteed by the 
Philippine Constitution and a condition for World Bank-funded projects.  
The initial engineering design for the sewer network was disapproved by DPWH and Manila 
Water had to revise the design to meet the Department’s requirements. Some parts of the 
sewer networks will cut through an entire segment of Eulogio Rodriguez Avenue (C-5), which 
will require road closure for an extended period. The DPWH cannot allow the closure of C-5 
as it is a major beltway that traverses several cities in Metro Manila (GO-2014-016). 
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According to Manila Water, it is challenging to design underground sewer network in Metro 
Manila. For decades, there were no organised urban plans on underground utilities. Power, 
flood control, and water supply are given priority over sewerage. Thus, sewerage networks 
have to literally work around and under the existing underground utilities.  
The issuance of permits and clearances at the local level were delayed. The local 
government of Pasig was concerned about the traffic disruption that the construction will 
cause as the excavation of the proposed sewer network and other facilities will affect five 
major roads traversing the city. Manila Water revised its construction schedule and offered 
to undertake 24/7 construction to fast track the project. After revising the schedule, the 
processing of permits was caught up in another delay, which was the revision of Pasig City 
government’s land use plan. Pending the land use plan’s completion and approval, no new 
construction permits can be issued (GO-2014-020).  
Quezon City is the most populous city in Metro Manila with a population of three million (as 
of 2014) and a population density of 19,151 per km2. The city’s land area is 161.126 km2, 
which is a quarter of size of entire Metro Manila. Since land is scarce in Quezon City, 
Maynilad opted to build smaller STPs in the city. Talayan STP was built on a 1,840 m2. lot 
located in P. Florentino St. in Barangay Santo Domingo, Quezon City. The STP can treat 
wastewater up to 16 mld produced by 27,000 households. The project cost was PhP249 
million. The construction was initially scheduled to commence in 2012 and targeted for 
completion by the end of 2014. However, the project was awarded to JFE Engineering only 
in March 2013 and the STP was inaugurated in February 2015.  
2.2 Gaining goal consensus of local community in Talayan STP  
Project implementation was delayed due to issues encountered in lot acquisition. Maynilad 
shortlisted three lots for potential sites for Talayan STPs. The first site is located in a 
commercial area and the second was located in a medium to high-end residential gated 
community. Public consultations were conducted but both communities opposed the STP 
construction. The third property was privately-owned but occupied by informal settlers. The 
land used to be a private garment factory, which was gutted by fire decades ago. After the 
fire, the owner decided not to rebuild the plant and allowed some of his former workers to 
reside on the property for free, and in turn, act as de facto caretakers of the property. The 
occupants used the property as storage for their scrap trading business of buying and 
reselling recyclable scraps of metal, plastic and bottles. The operators reside in the same 
street.  
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The local community in the third property consented to the STP construction after public 
consultations. The residents were mainly low income households, a number of whom used 
to be informal settlers occupying government lands but were eventually awarded ownership 
by the Philippine government in 1984, including the owner of the scrap trading business. 
While Maynilad was able to secure the support of the community, it was not problem-free. 
When the land was sold to Maynilad, the occupants were asked to vacate the property and 
were given cash compensation by the former owner. The occupants removed their 
materials from the premises and moved them outside the parameter fence of the property 
outside the property. These materials obstructed the operations of the contractor, JFE 
Engineering, whenever they need to bring in or take out heavy equipment and materials in 
the construction site. In February 2014, Maynilad asked the junk shop owner again to 
remove the scrap materials as the road had to be cleared for the installation of the sewer 
pipelines that will be connected to the STP. The local government of Quezon City requires 
that the excavation area should be cleared of debris before it can issue the excavation 
permit to the contractor. Excavation permit is needed to install the wastewater conveyance 
system that will connect the pipelines to the STP. 
At the time the interview with the project team was conducted in June 2014, the junk shop 
owner still has not removed the materials. Maynilad has sought the assistance of the 
barangay council to talk to the owner. The Local Government Code empowers the barangay 
chairman to settle local disputes. Instead of directing the junk shop owner to vacate the 
premise, the council directed the parties to settle the matter among them. The Maynilad 
project team suspects that the barangay chairman played safe so as not to antagonise 
junks shop owner, who is also his constituent and potential voter in the next election. The 
owner requested Maynilad for a modest financial assistance to finance the transportation 
of the materials to another storage site. The project team deems that dealing with the cash 
pay-off requests of low income communities is more manageable than dealing with the 
lawsuits that affluent communities will file against the concessionaire. Even when Maynilad 
knows that it is within their legal right to evict the junk shop owner, the Maynilad project 
team and the project contractor opted to maintain cordial relations with the community. 
They want to avoid aggressive confrontations with the community as they will be neighbours 
for the entire lifetime of the STP.  
  
Appendix 2 
188 
2.3 Local government leadership as key driver for success in the Olandes STP 
 
The Olandes STP in Marikina City cost PhP262 million funded by Manila Water from a World 
Bank loan. The design and construction contract was awarded to JFE Engineering 
Corporation in July 2008. Construction was completed in August 2009 and operations 
commenced in April 2010. The plant can treat wastewater amounting to 10 mld produced 
by the 40,000 residents of Sitio Olandes and Barangay Industrial Valley in Marikina and 
Barangays Libis and Blue Ridge in Quezon City (PS-2014-008). Olandes STP’s site is in a 
flood prone area along the Marikina River easement. The 11-km long Marikina River used 
to be a dumping ground for domestic and industrial wastes but is now a flowing waterway 
lined on both banks with parks and playgrounds as a result of the efforts of the city 
government of Marikina to clean up the river.  
The Olandes STP was designed to minimise the adverse impact of flooding. Since the 
easement area is small and perennially flooded, the STP is submersible. Then MMDA 
Chairman Bayani Fernando, who is also a civil engineer, suggested this design to adapt to 
the conditions of the site. The main processing plants are located underground while its 
support facility, which houses sensitive equipment such as blowers and control panels, is 
built on stilts.  
The Olandes STP was constructed within budget and schedule. Manila Water credits the 
efficiency of implementation to the leadership demonstrated by the city government of 
Marikina (PS-2014-008). When Manila Water proposed the project to then incumbent 
mayor Marides Fernando (2001-2010), the mayor was very receptive to the project and 
extended assistance to Manila Water every step of the way. The local government identified 
the location and sold the land to Manila Water at a reasonable price on the condition that a 
public park and a jogging lane connected to other facilities along the riverbank will be 
constructed above the submersible STP (Figure 6.3).  
Manila Water did not have to navigate the city hall to secure the different permits and 
licences required. Manila Water was given a one-stop shop service, which was only made 
available to commercial construction projects in other cities in Metro Manila. The mayor 
allowed Manila Water to commence with the construction while the city hall assisted them 
in securing the required permits and licences. The city hall coordinated with other national 
government agencies and other LGUs as Olandes STP also served parts of Quezon City and 
Pasig (Figure 6.5). The local government tried to make the process as easy as possible for 
Manila Water as the project is aimed to benefit the city and its residents at no cost to the 
 189 
city government. In Marikina, there is continuity of policies and programs. Approval of 
projects and issuance of permits are insulated from politics, i.e., regardless of who the 
incumbent mayor is, projects will proceed on the basis of their merit and projected benefits 
for the population (GO-2014-021). 
2.4 Manila Central Sewerage Plant 
The Manila Central Sewerage Plant, when implemented, will be the biggest STP in Metro 
Manila as it is expected to treat wastewater up to 437 mld and serve 1.4 million residents 
in Manila. Unlike other cities in Metro Manila where the concessionaires build smaller STPs 
to adapt to the land availability, the existing sewage network in Manila prevents Maynilad 
from adopting this option. Manila is the oldest city in the metropolis and its sewerage 
network was the first one constructed in the country during the American colonial period. 
Since 1908, the network had not been upgraded nor expanded. Due to dense population 
and road congestion in the city, Maynilad has to follow the existing system as it will be 
technically challenging to redesign the drainage system (PS-2014-006). 
A STP of this size and capacity requires a sizeable plot of land, which is a minimum of 
5,000 m2. In a city that is densely populated and saturated for new development, Maynilad 
managed to find three vacant lots that can accommodate the infrastructure and meet the 
criteria for STP. They have ruled out the first site as it was occupied by informal settlers. The 
land was also partially reclaimed and used to be a garbage dumpsite. When Maynilad 
surveyed the land, they found that the land was not properly reclaimed and there were 
issues on soil stability. The rubbish was not removed completely and the land is not 
compact and solid enough to accommodate a big treatment plant. The second site was 
privately owned and leased out to a tenant. Maynilad proposed to build an underground 
STP so the owner can still use the ground level for other purposes. The owner was not 
receptive to the proposal as they may have other plans for the property later on. The third 
site is owned by a government bank, the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which was also 
not keen on selling because the bank is liquid and has no need for cash. At the time this 
interview was conducted in October 2014, the Maynilad project team was still negotiating 
with PNB and was hopeful that the owner would eventually agree to sell the property. In 
Maynilad’s experience, private property owners are not usually receptive to the idea of 
selling land for STP-use. They prefer to sell or utilise the property for commercial use as it 
will yield a more lucrative price.  
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In the two latter properties, the government can exercise its power of eminent domain as 
the intended use for the property is for public use. It is also stipulated in the CA that MWSS-
RO can exercise this power for the purpose of assisting the concessionaries in meeting 
their contract obligation. Maynilad has raised this possibility with MWSS-RO a few times but 
the latter was not keen on exercising its expropriation power. MWSS Deputy Regulator 
Gerardo Sullano laments that such power is ‘difficult to exercise against the LGUs because 
as government, the MWSS and LGU should be on the same side. The government should 
have a united front if the expropriation power is exercised because that is for the benefit of 
the people.’ 
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